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ABSTRACT
This thesis investigates management change in housing associations in 
London since the Housing Act of 1988. Previous work on housing 
management has tended to focus on the adoption of new public management 
principles, assuming that policy from 1988 has resulted in a cultural shift 
towards individualism. This study makes use of ‘grid-group’ cultural theory to 
challenge this assumption by tracking all four ‘cultures’ within housing 
association management: egalitarianism, hierarchalism and fatalism as well 
as individualism. As a detailed qualitative analysis of the voluntary housing 
sector, it addresses a neglected field of study within public policy.
London provides rich ground for analysis of cultural change in the voluntary 
housing sector. It has a higher concentration of housing associations than any 
other UK city, it is where most of the larger housing organisations originated 
and it is the site of the greatest development activity throughout the period. 
London housing associations encapsulate all the significant changes in 
housing management resulting from the reforms of the 1980s.
Whilst the study finds evidence of individualistic philosophy, particularly 
amongst senior housing association managers, it also finds evidence of 
egalitarianism, hierarchalism and fatalism.  Egalitarianism remains as the 
legacy of housing associations’ historical origins and organisational 
structures. Hierarchy results from an increasingly dominant role for a small 
number of large, elite organisations, which become more hierarchical as they 
grow. Fatalism has emerged as a prevalent ethos amongst front-line staff, 
reflected and reinforced by the increasingly negative experience of residents. 
The thesis reveals how, contrary to the expectations of the 1988 Act, an 
overall shift ‘up-grid’ towards hierarchalism and fatalism emerged as the most 
significant response.
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9Chapter 1
OVERVIEW OF THE THESIS
1.1  Introduction
The stereotypical image of the UK housing association worker has 
traditionally constituted either philanthropic ‘Lady Bountiful’ types, engaging in 
charitable activity or well-intentioned amateurs campaigning to prevent 
homelessness. Following the introduction of the Housing Act 1988 this image 
is now widely seen as an anachronistic depiction of the contemporary 
voluntary housing sector. The leading commentator on housing associations 
sees the history of the sector as undergoing a radical transformation from a 
‘tiny, insignificant and mostly risible’ feature of housing policy, ‘leading a 
precarious existence on the margins of viability’ into a ‘dynamic, expansionist 
and highly professional set of social businesses, well-suited to play a key role 
in the modernised welfare state’ (Malpass, 2000a, p.270).  The housing 
association sector has experienced significant growth over a relatively short 
period of time, from a sector owning around 100,000 properties in the UK in 
1974 to around 1.8 million by 2003 (ODPM, Housing Statistics). It has 
assumed a position (since 1988) where it has replaced local authorities as the 
main provider of new housing, with an estimated asset base of £60 billion and 
receiving around £25 billion in private finance per year by 2003 (Aldridge, 
2005, p.27-28).
The housing association sector has therefore experienced substantial 
transformation resulting from a combination of legislative change, 
management ideology and financial reforms (Walker, 2000; Mullins and 
Riseborough, 2001). The cumulative effect has been fundamentally to 
challenge the original philosophy of the sector, calling into question its 
attachment to founding ideals, its core ethos and the nature of housing
10professionalism. For example, there is considerable debate about whether or 
not the sector can continue to represent itself as a coherent ‘movement’.
Whilst many discussions choose to highlight the major changes that have 
affected the sector, other interpretations have chosen to emphasise the 
continuities between earlier and later periods of change and to downplay the 
scale of the reform process:
The sector weathered the impact of the Housing Act 1988 and embraced 
the introduction of private finance, emerging in the 1990s, perhaps a little 
leaner and more efficient, but largely unchanged; the housing 
association of 1979 is still recognisable as such, in terms of activities and 
ethos, in 1999 (Cope, 1999, p.345).
These differences in interpretation highlight how disparate explanations can 
emanate from a lack of theoretical tools to adequately explain the processes 
of change within the sector. They also reflect a lack of practical accounts of 
the experience of working within these organisations that can help to 
understand the processes of change.
The aim of this thesis is to ‘map the genome’ of the housing association 
sector through an analysis of its organisational DNA. In doing so the thesis 
focuses on the impact of management change within the housing association 
sector following the introduction of the 1988 Housing Act. The thesis 
ascertains how historical and cultural influences have determined policy and 
practice. Second, it examines the extent of change within the housing 
association sector. Third, it considers how organisational change has affected 
the identity of the sector and the implications for housing policy, now that it 
has assumed the role as the major provider of new social housing. The thesis 
addresses the following research questions:
•  In what ways was the housing association sector affected by an injection 
of individualism in 1988?
•  To what extent was the sector able to retain an egalitarian organisational 
identity?
11•  What are the consequences of the sector becoming used as a tool of 
social policy?
1.1.1  Definitions of the sector
What kind of organisations are housing associations? The term ‘housing 
association’ is a generic name for the voluntary housing sector in Britain. The 
voluntary status serves to distinguish it from the traditional main provider of 
social housing, the local authority sector. Housing associations are 'diverse, 
non-profit-making organisations with a variety of constitutional formats, 
structures and aims’ (Langstaff, 1992, p.30) and are managed by voluntary 
management committees (sometimes referred to as Boards). The voluntary 
housing sector has historically comprised a number of forms, including 
charities, limited companies as well as Industrial and Provident Societies. 
However, housing associations must not trade for profit, meaning that any 
profits made must be reinvested into the organisation (Cope, 1999, p.26).
The term ‘housing association’ was first coined in Britain in the 1930s. Before 
this period, the generic term was ‘public utility society’ (Malpass, 2000b, 
p.203). In order to claim public subsidy, housing associations are required to 
register with a non-departmental public body (the Housing Corporation). The 
Housing Corporation has also been responsible for monitoring the 
performance of associations. However, since 2003, the Audit Commission, 
through the auspices of the Housing Inspectorate has taken over this 
monitoring role. Housing associations have to classify themselves either as an 
Industrial and Provident Act society or as a charity in order to register with the 
Housing Corporation. The Housing Corporation distinguishes between a 
number of different forms, including: Abbeyfield, co-operative, co-ownership, 
hostel, letting/hostel, letting, sale or lease and YMCA/YWCA.
The wide diversity is evident in the differences in aims, philosophies, 
functions, sizes and organisational structures (Cope, 1999, p.2). The sector is 
not restricted to rented housing and may be involved in housing for sale and 
shared ownership schemes. Some are large organisations with tens of
12thousands of properties; others have no property at all but only manage stock 
on behalf of others. Some are significant, developing businesses across the 
country; others have small stock in a limited geographical area and no 
development programme. Some will provide general housing for a range of 
groups; others are restricted to specialist housing for specific groups such as 
older people or people with mental health needs. For the purposes of this 
study and to aid comparison, most of the organisations examined comprise 
general housing providers, receiving government subsidy and with a 
development programme. These ‘mainstream’ organisations comprise the 
major, developing organisations that have been placed at the centre of 
contemporary housing provision following the 1988 Housing Act.
However, there is little consensus about the role of the voluntary housing 
sector beyond the basic definition of providing ‘affordable housing and related 
services for people on low incomes and in housing need’ (Cope, 1999, p.1). 
This vague statement generates a number of questions. For example, how is 
the concept of affordability to be defined? Who qualifies as ‘low income and in 
housing need’? Should provision be exclusive to such groups? What 
geographical areas should they work in?
The public status of housing associations derives from the significant 
government subsidy that they continue to receive. Their voluntary status 
derives from their governance by unpaid management committee members 
and the fact that they do not fulfil statutory functions. Their financial and 
operational independence has placed them within a private sector 
environment. Thus ‘on the one hand, actively growing associations have been 
under pressure to become more businesslike and competitive, while on the 
other hand they have become more obviously and deeply entrenched within 
the structure of the state apparatus for meeting social needs’ (Malpass,
2000a, p.240).
The standard view of the sector was that it had substantially benefited from 
the diversity of organisational types and the range of strategies, allowing it to
13appeal to a broad spectrum of political opinion. According to this 
interpretation, housing associations therefore gained distinct advantages from 
their ability to adapt to the different demands of competing government 
administrations. The growth and survival of associations is therefore attributed 
to their ability to appeal to a range of ideological preferences. Housing 
associations have been seen as ‘falling within the intersections of the three 
worlds of government, private sector bureaucracies and membership 
associations’ (Billis et. al.  1994, p.28). They ‘occupy overlapping ambiguous 
territory that has the characteristics of both bureaucracy and membership 
associations’ (ibid. p.28). Situated between government, market and voluntary 
environments, the extent to which housing associations could retain this 
indistinct status was seen as crucial to their continued expansion. Housing 
associations appealed to left and right on the political spectrum (Hills, 1987; 
Back and Hamnett, 1985) and historically functioned as an acceptable 
compromise for both Conservative and Labour governments in their 
intermediary role between the public and private sectors (Harrison, J., 1995). 
Writers have argued that this ambiguity has over time, been largely 
advantageous, enabling associations to benefit from the growth of the 1970s 
and also to avoid the worst expenditure restrictions in the 1980s and 1990s 
(Hills, 1992). The view that the ‘lack of clarity has not hindered the sector in 
any way’ (Cope, 1999, p.2) is a widely shared one.
An alternative view is that the flexibility of housing associations may have 
been gained at the cost of their independent status. Hence, it was ‘precisely 
because of their ambiguous status that successive governments have been 
able to adapt the movement to satisfy their own goals’ (Back and Hamnett, 
1985, p. 398). Whilst associations historically were thought to have benefited 
from their distinction from public sector bureaucracies their ambiguities have 
become more problematic in an era when associations no longer enjoyed the 
benefits of such independence from government. These ambiguities have led 
to important tensions in their role and functions and commentators are 
beginning to acknowledge that the tensions are becoming increasingly 
problematic. Thus, Harrison (2002) argues that there may be a ‘divergence
14between, on the one hand, growth, managerialism, financial prudence and 
commercialisation and, on the other, advocacy and continuing community 
interactions’ (p. 123).
The story of housing associations is inextricably connected to changes in 
housing tenure in Britain in the twentieth century where they have historically 
played only a marginal role. The restructuring of tenure in Britain has seen 
private landlords decline from a figure of 90 per cent of all properties before 
1914 (a figure which included housing associations) to around 10 per cent in 
2001. During the same period owner occupation has increased to form the 
majority tenure from a figure of 10 per cent to approximately 70 per cent. In 
relation to socially rented housing, local authority owned accommodation 
reached a peak of around 30 per cent of properties in 1971  reducing to 
around 14 per cent in 2002. Housing associations have increased from 2 per 
cent of properties in 1981  (when they were first distinguished from private 
landlords) to around 7 per cent in 2002. Table 1.1  illustrates the changing 
composition of housing tenure in Britain since 1950.
Table 1.1 Housing tenure in Great Britain, 1950-2002, percentages
Owner occupied Local authorities Housing associations Private rented
1950 29.0 18.0 - 53.0
1961 42.3 25.8 - 31.9
1971 50.6 30.6 - 18.9
1981 56.6 30.3 2.2 10.9
1991 66.0 21.3 3.2 9.5
2001 69.2 14.4 6.6 9.8
2002 69.6 13.8 6.7 9.9
Source: ODPM, Housing and Construction Statistics
Despite the low level of housing association property in percentage terms, it is 
the sector that is increasing at the most rapid rate. Figure 1.1 shows how from 
1988 the housing association sector overtook local authorities in terms of 
provision of new housing.
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Figure 1.1. New Housing Completions, Great 
Britain, (000s)
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Source: ODPM, Housing and Construction Statistics
Not only do housing associations have responsibility for new provision, but 
since the mid 1990s they have taken responsibility for previously local 
authority owned stock through transfer programmes (so-called local authority 
voluntary transfer initiatives); a process which has led to a major shift of 
assets from the public to the voluntary sector. A further impetus to the 
development of the sector has been the willingness of many organisations to 
become involved in diverse initiatives connected to regeneration programmes 
under schemes known as ‘Housing Plus’ and wider community investment 
initiatives, encompassing training, education and community development 
schemes. The diversity of activity has served to change considerably the role 
that housing associations play within contemporary housing policy.
Since 1996 housing associations have been included under the generic term 
‘registered social landlords’ (RSLs) to represent the different kinds of housing 
organisations that can claim public subsidy. However, this study primarily 
uses the term ‘housing associations’ to illustrate the historical development of 
this institutional form.
A range of unanswered questions surrounds the development of 
contemporary housing policy.  In particular, the definition, function and role of 
contemporary housing associations can be seen as subject to a wide range of
16competing interpretations. Are they part of a public or private sector 
environment? What is their core ethos or organisational purpose? What range 
of activities should they be engaged in? Are there geographical limitations to 
their operations? As will be shown, all of these questions are highly contested.
1.2  Theoretical framework
The discipline of housing studies has generally struggled to establish itself as 
a distinct academic discipline and to develop a distinctive body of theory. 
Attempts to apply conceptual models and to encourage cross-disciplinary 
fertilisation have been limited and housing policy has been neglected in 
theoretical debates about organisational change. Historically, a striking 
feature of housing policy analysis has been the disproportionate level of 
attention devoted to local authority housing provision at the expense of other 
tenure types. Although this local authority bias is beginning to be addressed 
(see for example, Malpass, 2000a; Mullins and Riseborough, 2001) there 
remains little detailed conceptual analysis of the role of the housing 
association sector and a lack of detailed empirical, qualitative accounts of 
relationships and responsibilities of the experience of working within the 
sector. The thesis aims to redress this lacuna: to apply insights from wider 
disciplines in order to study the development of the sector; to examine how 
the sector changed and to illustrate staff attitudes to organisational change. In 
particular, it uses the tools of political science and social anthropology in order 
to throw fresh light on developments in the voluntary housing sector and to 
examine the influence and impact of competing interests, values and attitudes 
represented within contemporary housing organisations.
In order to provide a more detailed empirical analysis of the sector the thesis 
makes use of ‘grid-group’ cultural theory (Douglas, 1982) to consider the 
competing cultural influences facing contemporary housing organisations. The 
intention is to provide a conceptual layer, to explain the diverse social 
solidarities that constitute the sector. Cultural theory explains social behaviour 
through a typology incorporating different ‘ways of life’ or ‘cultural biases’ 
which are constructed from two axes, namely regulation (grid) and collective
17behaviour (group). From these two dimensions, four ways of life are 
generated consisting of hierarchy, individualism, egalitarianism and fatalism. 
According to writers such as Douglas (1982) these ways of life form the main 
categories within which social life and organisational behaviour is conducted, 
explaining the reasoning behind the formation of choices and preferences. 
Each of the cultural biases is defined in opposition to the other, implying a 
limitless potential for conflict. At the same time, each way of life is dependent 
upon the other to sustain itself and to reassert its legitimacy. The 
management of change therefore entails an inevitable and continual struggle 
between competing interpretations of organisational identity, purpose, vision 
and strategy, concomitant with the dominant cultural biases. Cultural theory 
offers an interpretative framework, which is capable of analysing institutional 
change in housing associations through a conceptual scheme that allows for 
conflict and unintended consequences.
In adopting this approach, the thesis develops Hood’s (2000) application of 
grid-group cultural theory to a general public management context. By 
providing an application of cultural theory located within the empirical context 
of organisational change in the voluntary housing sector, the thesis provides a 
detailed exposition of organisational behaviour in a rapidly changing 
environment. The thesis thus combines theoretical and practical accounts of 
management change and provides a bridge between abstract theorising, 
which is frequently divorced from day-to-day decision-making in organisations 
and practical accounts of housing association reform, which commonly lack 
explicit theoretical foundations. As Stoker (2004) contends the value of grid- 
group theory is that it ‘goes beyond a useful heuristic device for thinking about 
patterns of social organisation to provide powerful insights into social change 
and how institutions respond to change’ (p.5). These insights have a clear 
resonance to a sector that has undergone radical change in the 1980s and 
1990s.
181.3  The field of analysis: Housing management and London housing 
associations from 1988 to 2003
The thesis pays particular attention to the development of housing 
management practice within the voluntary sector. Normally understood as a 
common-sense occupation; dealing with rent arrears, empty properties, 
tenancy support and managing anti-social behaviour, it has attempted to 
ground itself on a more professional basis. As the core business of the social 
housing sector it plays a central part in determining organisational identity. 
One of the main struggles within contemporary housing management is the 
attempt to present itself as a professional occupation whilst catering for an 
increasingly marginal client group. Moreover, as a fluid, indeterminate 
practice, it encapsulates many of the key, contemporary organisational 
conflicts within the sector.
The growth of housing associations in the 1980s was seen as a response to 
the deficiencies of local authority housing management, which was widely 
perceived as inflexible, impersonal and inefficient. A number of influences 
stimulated the changes in the 1980s, including: ideological hostility to the 
State; new forms of managerialism; legislative reform and a restructuring of 
housing subsidies. Proponents of new models of housing management stress 
the importance of ‘a move away from a public service ethos to that of a public 
innovation ethos’ (Duncan and Thomas, 2001, p.67). Housing associations 
were selected as the ideal tools to deliver these new styles of management as 
they were seen as locally based, professional and adaptable to new ways of 
thinking.
The managerial reform programme of the 1980s is commonly referred to 
under the umbrella term of a ‘new public management’ (NPM) (Hood,  1991). 
This term covers a very broad range of ideas, concepts and ideologies. 
Nevertheless, the three core notions of ‘incentivisation’, ‘competition’ and 
‘disaggregation’ (Dunleavy and Hood, 1994) represent the ways in which 
public sector organisations were compelled to utilise techniques of 
performance measurement, to compete with other organisations for business
19and to divide themselves into client and contractor (or purchaser and provider) 
elements. These ideas have had considerable purchase upon the housing 
association sector, which was seen as an ideal testing ground for the 1980s 
reforms and in particular was seen as an effective alternative to state 
provision through local authority management and ownership. The housing 
association sector therefore epitomises these NPM principles and 
consequently, many studies have tended to rely on models of new public 
management as an explanation of organisational change (Walker, 1998b; 
2000). However, as will be shown, NPM is inadequate to explain the 
complexities of organisational change in the sector -  there has not been a 
simple shift towards modernisation, implying the rejection of hierarchy. In 
practice (as will be shown) management change has involved a complex set 
of changes involving a number of cultural ideologies.
The Housing Act 1988 is chosen as representing a moment of ‘punctuated 
equilibrium’ (Krasner, 1984) whereby a period of relative organisational 
stability is disrupted by a process of radical transformation heralding wider 
and fundamental changes. Described as constituting ‘new organisational 
paradigms’ (Walker, 1998a, p. 108) and ‘little short of revolutionary’ (Cowan 
and Marsh, 2001, p.6) the reforms of the 1980s marked a key watershed in 
housing policy. Hence, ‘a quiet revolution in public, or municipal housing has 
taken place’ with ‘municipal housing...viewed as a phenomenon of the 20th 
century’ (Walker, 2001, pp.675-6). The significance of the Act warrants 
detailed study as it provided the foundations for a wide-ranging and 
fundamental set of transformations to the independent rented sector. The Act 
was part of broader changes described as ‘seismic shifts’ which ‘transformed 
the British social policy landscape during the 1980s and early 1990s’ (Harris 
et. al., 2001, p.4).
The range of the study is limited to housing associations within the London 
region. There a number of reasons for this focus on the London region. First, 
London has historically represented the heart of voluntary activity. Those 
organisations with deep historical roots have tended to be situated within the 
capital, which continues to function as the centre of the housing association
20movement. The first philanthropic housing associations originated in the 
London area and currently 440 members of the National Housing Federation 
are based in the capital, constituting a third of the total membership (Malpass, 
2000a, p.8). Table 1.2 illustrates the changing profile in dwelling stock in 
London from 1991.
Table 1.2: Changes in tenure in London, 1991-2001
1991  (000s) % 2001  (000s) % % change
Housing
association
155 5.6 274 9.1 77.2
Local authority 644 23.3 516 17.1 -19.9
Owner
Occupation
1,579 56.5 1,705 56.5 7.9
Private rented 383 17.3 521 17.3 36.1
sector__________________________________________________________________________
Source: Dataspring, 2003
The above figures show that although the housing association sector is small 
in numerical terms, it is nevertheless the fastest growing social rented tenure 
with a 77 per cent increase in growth between 1991 and 2001. Housing 
associations comprise around 9 per cent of the three million dwellings in 
London (almost 300,000 properties), compared to 17 per cent for local 
authorities, 56 per cent owner occupied and 17 per cent privately rented. 
However, these figures fail to illustrate the increasing proportion of 
completions through the housing association sector in the London area. As 
shown in table 1.3, the supply of new local authority housing has declined to 
negligible levels, with council house building ending in the late 1980s.
Table 1.3: Housing completions in London by tenure, 1990-2002
Registered 
social landlords
Private enterprise Local authorities Total
1990 2,279 13,208 1,745 17,232
1995 5,437 9,462 223 15,122
1999 3,198 9,631 35 12,864
2002 4,258 11,435 71 15,764
Source: ODPM, Housing Statistics
21A second reason for choosing London as a focus of study is that it has 
historically been a source of extensive municipal activity, with many of the 
social experiments in high-rise and mass housing played out within its 
environment. Functioning as a ‘technological shortcut to social change’ 
(Dunleavy, 1986, p. 193) the modernist mass housing era was an important 
factor in the subsequent rejection of the local authority landlord function. The 
‘crisis of legitimation’ (Dunleavy, 1981, p.242) for high-rise housing can be 
traced to the disaster at the Ronan Point tower block in Newham in 1968 
when an explosion resulted in the collapse of the property and the loss of five 
lives (Dunleavy, 1981, p. 122). The reaction against the mass housing 
experiment took the form of a wider critique of the legitimacy of bureaucratic 
municipal landlords in general and allowed a more positive attitude towards 
the voluntary housing sector to develop.
A third justification is that London represents extensive challenges of 
marginalisation, crime and vandalism facing public landlords, meaning that 
the housing management function is subject to severe ‘social’ pressures.  Five 
of the ten most deprived wards in England are located within the Greater 
London area and of the 20 most deprived wards, 70 per cent are located in 
London (London Research Centre, 1996). Furthermore, London experiences 
some of the most intense spatial polarisation between rich and poor. In 
particular, housing association new tenants now comprise the most 
disadvantaged groups in the country. As the correlation between social 
housing and relative deprivation has become increasingly marked in recent 
years, the status of a social housing tenancy has become increasingly 
associated with stigma (Lee and Murie, 1997). With the capital experiencing 
the highest level of homelessness in the country, local authorities in London 
and surrounding areas are compelled to allocate an increasing proportion of 
new social housing to statutory homeless groups. As new properties are now 
almost exclusively supplied by housing associations, new tenancies therefore 
comprise groups perceived as in ‘priority need’. Furthermore, within London 
new luxury private developments are frequently situated alongside housing 
association developments comprising highly marginal groups, creating
22significant management problems for housing association providers. 
Consequently, the London area has witnessed many of the key dilemmas and 
conflicts faced by the voluntary housing sector in a process of fundamental 
organisational change.
1.4  Methods
The thesis has primarily adopted an approach that utilises qualitative data 
through an analysis of the experiences of key stakeholders involved with the 
housing association sector. Interviews were conducted with individuals and 
groups including professional managers, front-line staff, management 
committee members, local authority members and residents (see appendix 
one for a more detailed discussion of the methodology used). The purpose of 
the interviews was to develop a thorough picture of the experience of change 
from within the sector and also from those who worked closely with housing 
association partners. The interviews were conducted over a period of seven 
years (from 1996 to 2003) in order to gain a clearer longitudinal picture of the 
kinds of changes facing the sector. The research also included four focus 
group discussions with professionals working in local government, housing 
associations and advice agencies. It makes use of two resident surveys: one 
conducted in 2001  at a tenants’ conference and the other a survey collected 
from residents of a housing association consortium estate. This study differs 
from existing representations of the sector which rely upon either highly 
descriptive explanations (Cope, 1999) or general historical accounts 
(Malpass, 2000a). It provides a detailed representation of the way in which 
organisational changes have influenced the sector in the most significant 
geographical area of housing association activity. It also offers an analysis of 
attitudes to management change from a variety of perspectives, to capture the 
experience of working in the housing association sector at the end of the 
1990s and into a new millennium.
231.5  Structure of the thesis
The remaining chapters provide the detailed analysis. Chapter two covers 
existing academic approaches to the study of the housing association sector. 
It classifies existing approaches to the sector under five main headings; those 
advanced by practitioners, historical accounts, managerialist approaches, 
network theorists and institutionalist accounts. It considers the limitations of 
these explanations, primarily for their neglect of culture, and identifies grid- 
group theory as the most useful analytic framework to provide a conceptual 
basis for an understanding of the sector.
Chapter three provides a broader historical account of the background and 
context to the 1988 Housing Act. This history is developed through the lens of 
four cultural ‘biases’ to explain the competing influences upon the sector, 
expressed as ‘hierarchical’, ‘individualistic’, ‘egalitarian’ and ‘fatalistic’ 
pressures. The discussion considers how these pressures have affected 
approaches to the housing management function and outlines how the main 
changes introduced in the 1988 Act followed classic New Public Management 
themes.
The next four chapters identify the continuing existence of each of the four 
cultural types in London housing associations at the beginning of the twenty- 
first century. Chapter four considers the impact of managerialist ideologies in 
the immediate post 1988 environment. The main objective of the Act was to 
introduce a more individualistic ethos into the provision of housing services. 
Individualism in housing associations results primarily from three broad 
trends, namely the discipline of private finance, new risk factors and the 
notion of a social business. Many individualistic initiatives have been couched 
in normative terms and the chapter considers how this has shaped a culture 
of ‘heroic managerialism’, increased conflict and institutional fragmentation. 
The chapter explores the opportunities and constraints offered by these 
organisational cultures.
24The influence of egalitarianism within the housing association sector is 
considered in chapter five. Evidence of strong group and low grid pressures 
are identified within certain organisational forms, in particular at a 
management committee level. In providing much of the original motivation of 
housing staff, egalitarianism permeates the housing association sector 
through a process of ‘sedimentation’, expressed as a desire to remain loyal to 
historical roots. Egalitarianism can be traced to a bias towards democratic 
values, where a high group preference for mutuality remains important 
alongside a strong preference for autonomy and a resistance to centralised 
control. Egalitarianism tends to be a particularly strong influence within 
smaller and minority ethnic organisations, reflecting the importance of values 
such as solidarity, mutuality and cooperation. An egalitarian bias reflects 
much of the historical roots of the sector and this historical legacy can be 
expressed as a type of ‘path dependency’ for the sector. Egalitarianism 
provided the impetus for much of the policy changes in the late 1990s, but 
resulted in significant organisational tensions as it was re-introduced into a 
sector which had been permeated by the individualistic cultures of the 1980s. 
The chapter argues that this organisational history acts both to constrain and 
enable future organisational expansion but that an egalitarian bias is under 
severe threat from organisational expansion.
Chapter six discusses one of the main unintended consequences of the 
reforms, namely an increase in hierarchy. Whilst at a rhetorical level writers 
have been keen to dismiss hierarchical approaches to management as 
outdated, the chapter illustrates the resilience of bureaucracy as an 
organising principle for housing associations. The chapter illustrates how a 
propensity towards high group and high grid structures is influenced by a 
centralisation of government policy, organisational growth and a desire for 
policy influence. The consequence of these pressures has been: an elitist 
sector with the emergence of a premier league of associations; a loss of 
discretion, and a specialisation of housing management activity, with an 
abandonment of traditional ‘generic’ roles. Moreover, these hierarchalist 
pressures exert a reinforcing effect with further pressures towards
25standardisation and uniformity as organisations develop their roles and 
functions and pursue yet further growth.
Chapter seven considers the other main unintended consequence of the 
reform programme; namely the emergence of a fatalist cultural bias. Fatalism 
is the result of a combination of external and internal features. Externally, 
government regulation and wider economic factors have established a sector 
that is subject to a high level of constraint. Internally, the pressures from a 
more challenging client group and features that are inherent to the 
management task have combined to produce a low level of collective 
identification. The result is a strong sense of futility, a deteriorating 
relationship between staff and tenants and ultimately a worse experience for 
consumers. Significantly these tendencies reinforce one another to produce a 
vicious circle of fatalist attitudes and values.
Heavily dependent on market mechanisms, competition and choice and 
dominated by a rhetoric of risk and managerialism housing associations have 
been perceived as a particularly effective example of welfare reform.
However, the pressures of social exclusion and more authoritarian 
management strategies strongly conflict with the laissez-faire, neo-liberal 
model of welfare provision. The research indicates the diversity of cultural 
influences and identifies the main areas of cultural conflict for housing 
organisations. The conclusion maintains that, contrary to the expectations that 
the 1988 Act would herald the emergence of a more individualistic culture for 
housing management, an overall shift ‘up-grid’ towards both hierarchalism 
and fatalism have emerged as the most significant responses.
26Chapter 2
UNDERSTANDING THE HOUSING ASSOCIATION SECTOR: THE 
APPLICATION OF CULTURAL THEORY
Rather than ask, what is human nature? We ask, what are the social 
constructions of human nature? That is, what does social life have to be 
like to make a particular conception of human nature persuasive to 
people?...What has been missing from past conceptions, in sum, is the 
institutional context within which models of human nature make sense to 
the people involved (Thompson et. al., 1990, p. 33).
2.1  Introduction
The aim of this thesis is to ‘map the genome’ of the housing association 
sector through an analysis of its history and organisational forms, to come to 
an understanding of its ‘DNA’. This chapter outlines the main theoretical 
approach adopted as an aid to understanding the different influences affecting 
organisational behaviour in the sector. First however, the chapter considers 
existing accounts of housing associations and discusses their limitations. It 
classifies these accounts into five analytically distinct groups of writers: 
practitioners, historical accounts, managerialist approaches, network theorists 
and institutionalist accounts. The main contention is that each of these is 
limited in explanatory potential, primarily due to their neglect of culture.
The chapter therefore proposes an explanation of the sector through the use 
of grid-group theory to provide a more detailed framework for developing an 
understanding of the processes of cultural change within housing 
associations. Following Douglas (1982) the chapter maintains that 
determinants of organisational culture are underpinned by a limited number of 
models, which influence perceptions of effectiveness and shape systems, 
procedures and decision-making processes within organisations. In examining 
these models, it utilises Douglas’ (1982) grid-group typology to argue that
27housing associations can be classified within four basic categories. The 
options available to housing organisations can therefore be most usefully 
understood by reference to the cultural themes of hierarchy, individualism, 
egalitarianism and fatalism. This framework is chosen as a means to develop 
organisational types and is used to provide a detailed model for institutional 
analysis to understand preference formation, organisational history and the 
management of change
2.2  Existing Accounts of Housing Management and Housing 
Associations
Housing management generally refers to a range of functions connected with 
the social rented sector. It relates to duties such as: allocating property; 
collection of rent; maintenance and repairs; neighbour nuisance; managing 
empty property and providing advice and support to vulnerable groups. The 
literature on housing management practice has followed a highly practical 
vein with most of the early studies being little more than good practice guides 
and descriptions of the various functions carried out by social housing 
managers (e.g. Macey and Baker, 1973; Smith, 1989). The small number of 
critical studies that have been conducted have paid attention almost 
exclusively to the local authority sector (e.g. Power, 1987), reflecting the bias 
within housing management towards municipal authorities, at least until the 
late 1980s. However, even those studies that were written in the late 1990s 
continued to pay scant attention to the role of housing associations (e.g.
Pearl, 1997).
Within housing associations, housing management has generally been of a 
generic nature, providing a comprehensive housing service (Cope, 2000, 
p.208). This genericism has been partly due to tradition (based on an ‘Octavia 
Hill* model of housing provision, combining welfare and technical functions) 
and partly due to the generally small size of these organisations; they were 
insufficiently large to deploy specialist staff. Hence, for those working within 
the housing association sector, the management task has combined letting of
28property, arrears control and tenancy support, with housing officers as the first 
point of contact for tenants.
Housing management has suffered from three specific problems of 
recognition and reputation. First, there is a sense in which the task has 
become associated with ‘women’s work’. Thus the history of housing 
management practice in the twentieth century has been a gender-dominated 
struggle between those who took a ‘bricks and mortar’ view that it should be 
an aspect of property management (the view of the male dominated Institute 
of Housing Managers) and those who perceived the function as a welfare 
practice, related to the tenant (the view of the Society of Women Housing 
Managers). It was only in the 1960s that the two organisations combined to 
form a unified Institute of Housing (now the Chartered Institute of Housing). 
The merger in 1965 was originally seen as a victory for a male-dominated 
profession, emphasising the property-based nature of the task rather than an 
approach that took a more personal interest in residents (Power, 1987). Since 
the 1980s as social housing has catered for an increasingly marginal 
population, the welfare model has become a widely accepted approach to 
housing management.
The founder of modern housing management is generally believed to be the 
Victorian philanthropist, Octavia Hill (Spicker, 1992) and the perception of 
housing management as primarily women’s work compared to the more 
practical maintenance tasks associated with estate management has served 
to marginalise the status of modern housing management and weakened its 
attempt to portray itself as a serious professional occupation. Moreover, the 
management of social housing was historically not viewed as a priority in 
comparison to the need to construct new dwellings. The political priority in 
times of housing shortage has therefore been on numbers of dwellings 
completed rather than on the effectiveness of management arrangements 
(Kemp and Williams, 1991, p.121).
The second main problem was that housing management has been seen as a 
service limited to deprived groups. Social housing has never been viewed as
29a universal welfare service and is increasingly limited to groups experiencing 
multiple deprivation. This notion that social housing is limited to deprived 
groups compared to the majority of the population who aspire to owner 
occupation has meant that social housing occupies a low profile in political 
discussion, compared to other universal welfare services such as health and 
education. A certain level of stigma is consequently associated with the 
granting of a social housing tenancy, as the sector has been subject to a 
progressive residualisation since the 1970s (Malpass, 1990). The tendency to 
view social housing in pejorative terms is becoming an increasing issue for 
the housing association sector; social housing management is increasingly 
equated with a welfare function, yet lacking the professional status of social 
work.  Housing managers have not achieved any degree of market closure; it 
is not necessary to hold a professional qualification in order to practice and 
less than 15 per cent of the 100,000 housing staff are members of the 
Chartered Institute of Housing (Pearl, 1997).
Additionally, housing management has not been considered to require high 
levels of technical expertise. It has lacked a professional mystique and within 
a local authority context, housing management was subject to a high degree 
of political interference from councillors (Cole and Furbey, 1994, p. 122). 
Subject to both a weak professional base and intellectual marginalisation, 
housing management has long been viewed as a simple ‘common-sense’ 
activity requiring little expertise and a low level of technical understanding.
Furthermore, the uncertainty and range of interpretation of housing 
management functions has meant that it has been an occupation with an 
uneasy professional status, where disputes over definitions and ‘boundary 
management’ are endemic (Franklin, 1998; 2000). As Franklin and Clapham 
(1997) have argued, housing management is noted for an absence of 
consensus about the duties and responsibilities of practitioners, lacking clear 
boundaries and characterised by fundamental disagreement about aims and 
objectives. Housing managers have suffered from ‘boundary-spanning’ 
problems wherein the role and function of the housing manager overlaps with
30other professional groups such as social workers, engineers, architects and 
planners.
Thus, and with few exceptions (e.g. Laffin, 1986), academic discussions of 
professionalism, bureaucracy and power have tended to ignore studies of 
social housing organisations and in particular housing associations. The 
research agenda has broadly followed this narrow empirical trend. 
Researchers have been concerned with evaluating initiatives, making 
recommendations and improving current practice with a fragmented 
theoretical contribution. As Franklin claims: ‘It has been rare indeed for 
housing management to be the subject of any sustained attempt at 
conceptual or theoretical analysis which would locate it within wider debates 
about society or the individual’ (1998, p.201). Housing management has only 
recently begun to engage with wider issues of organisational theory, partly 
due to the practical limitations imposed by the major professional institution 
(the Chartered Institute of Housing, CIH). The CIH has often been criticised 
for insularity, emphasising tasks and skills required, rather than a wider 
knowledge base (Clapham, 1997; Mullins et. a/., 2001, p.614).
The role of the housing manager can thus be seen as an uncomfortable one; 
poorly defined, lacking status and under-theorised. These difficulties are 
compounded in a voluntary sector that has suffered from marginalisation and 
neglect. As discussed above, housing policy in Britain reflects the distinctive 
circumstances of a large municipal stock and minimal private sector activity. 
Until the 1980s therefore, discussion of housing management was 
synonymous with local authority practice.
In contrast to other explanations it is a contention of this thesis that the 
marginalisation ignores the extent to which the practice of housing 
management is central to the identity of the social housing sector. Housing 
organisations tend to see their core business as providing adequate services 
to people in housing need and the attempt to carve a more coherent 
professional identity for the housing manager can be seen as central to the
31organisational identity of housing associations. An understanding of housing 
management change will therefore provide an illustration of how the corporate 
identity of the voluntary housing sector is being constructed. However, this 
understanding needs to have the ability to explain how the role of the housing 
manager has changed; to be able to interpret features at the level of structure 
and agency; to analyse causes and effects; to interpret the major conflicts and 
struggles and also to identify continuities as well as changes.
The neglect of housing management practice has been further exacerbated 
by a neglect of the housing association sector. Before the 1988 Housing Act 
there was little extended debate of housing associations. The exceptions were 
general discussions of philanthropy (Tarn, 1973), or studies produced by 
professional institutions (e.g. NFHA, 1983a; Jones, 1985) or organisational 
case studies (Stack, 1967; Emsley, 1986). Following the Housing Act 1988, 
housing associations became subject to more detailed, critical focus. The 
following sections discuss the attempts to date to explain housing 
management and housing associations.
2.2.1  Practitioners
Much of the literature on housing associations has been written by 
practitioners and therefore reflects an inevitable bias towards improving 
practice. A considerable proportion of housing association studies have 
comprised descriptive and normative studies that were closely related to best 
practice (e.g. Cope, 2000). These kinds of studies strongly emphasised how 
organisations should respond to the management changes of the late 1980s. 
For example Cope concluded her book on the sector with the following 
entreaty:
RSLs are working in a changing environment and each must position 
itself for success by learning new skills and ways of working. 
Competence, cost-efficiency (combining cost-effectiveness with 
affordability and quality) and accountability are keynotes for the future 
(Cope, 2000, p.353).
32Cope’s study typifies much of the commentary on housing associations, being 
entirely atheoretical and making no attempt to consider wider issues around 
the restructuring of welfare or the place of housing within a modernised 
welfare state. It provides an informative account of the main duties 
undertaken by housing associations, but there is no attempt to place these 
duties within a wider conceptual framework. Instead it is mainly concerned 
with providing advice to those working within the sector:
RSLs of the future must remain committed to building stable and 
inclusive communities. For many hundreds of years the independent 
housing sector has attempted to ensure that decent quality affordable 
housing is available for all who need it; as we enter a new millennium the 
need still remains great (Cope, 2000, p.353).
Often commissioned by government agencies and professional interest 
groups, practitioner accounts are designed to assist managers and policy­
makers in understanding how the sector operates and in defining the roles of 
the sector. Many accounts stressed that housing associations had a 
distinctive identity, but it was unclear what precisely this identity consisted of. 
For example the National Federation of Housing Associations (NFHA) 
suggested: The message which the NFHA has tried to put over on the 
movement’s behalf is that it is not public sector, nor private sector, but 
something different’ (NFHA, 1990, p.38, cited in Mullins, 1998, p. 138).
These studies were either presented in general and often superficial terms 
(National Housing Federation, 1997; 1999) or focussed on specific issues 
such as regulation (Day et al., 1993; Day and Klein, 1996), community 
involvement (Fordham et al., 1997; Dwelly, 1999), relations between 
committee members and senior managers (Exworthy, 2000), group structures 
(Audit Commission, 2001) and the black and minority ethnic sector 
(Hammond and Tilling, 2003). As these studies were mainly practice based, 
they were deliberately aimed at a professional audience, rather than an 
academic readership.
Practitioner accounts of housing associations tended to comprise detailed 
empirical studies of the sector, commissioned by independent funding
33agencies (e.g. Pawson and Ford, 2002). One of the most controversial studies 
in this regard was Page’s (1993) study of new housing association estates. In 
indicating some of the major problems likely to be experienced by housing 
organisations in managing large estates, the Page report (as it was termed) 
caused controversy as it suggested that the development of new housing 
association estates was replicating the past mistakes of local authorities. His 
argument was that although properties were developed with better design 
standards than in the past, allocation process based on priority need groups 
meant that there would be disproportionate concentrations of deprived groups 
in new properties, that there would be high child densities and low levels of 
economic activity. These factors would inevitably lead to tensions amongst 
residents, high levels of anti-social behaviour and a ghettoisation of new 
social housing.
Page’s work was criticised both by practitioners for presenting too negative a 
picture of the sector and by academics who argued that the study lacked 
empirical substance and failed to draw on resident experiences (e.g. Cole, 
2000; Cole et at, 1996). Notwithstanding this controversy there has been 
little further discussion of the specific management difficulties facing the 
sector.
Empirical studies have provided some thorough discussion of specific issues 
such as allocations policies (Pawson and Kintrea, 2002), stock transfers 
(Pawson and Fancy, 2003), investment (Chaplin et al., 1995), governance 
and accountability (Kearns, 1997; Klein and Day, 1994) innovation (Walker et. 
al., 2001) or rent policy (Walker and Marsh, 2003). However, these studies 
rarely considered qualitative experiences of working within these 
organisations, did not provide a broader scope to debates about the role of 
the sector and generally did not engage with theoretical issues in public 
policy.
342.2.2  Historical accounts
The history of twentieth century British housing policy is almost exclusively a 
history of the rise and fall of council housing (e.g. Cole and Furbey, 1994) and 
have chosen to ignore housing associations. There have been a number of 
historical works on the influence of key individuals such as Octavia Hill 
(Darley, 1990) or the philanthropic organisations (Tarn, 1973) but none of 
these texts have discussed contemporary housing associations. The majority 
of textbook discussions of housing policy in the UK have mentioned housing 
associations only in passing as an adjunct to the local authority sector (for 
example, Balchin, 1995; Malpass and Murie, 1999; Balchin and Rhoden, 
2002) with the voluntary housing sector meriting a short chapter at best.
Whilst there were some brief attempts at historical analysis of the sector prior 
to the 1988 Act (Back and Hamnett, 1985; Hills, 1987) after the Act there was 
much greater attention on the significance of the legislation (Hills, 1989; 
Langstaff, 1991; Best, 1991; Randolph, 1992; 1993; Harrison, 1995) and 
some attempts were made at considering both the past and the future of the 
sector (Spencer et. al., 1995). However, these discussions tended to be 
relatively short accounts of organisational and sectoral change. The main 
lesson arising from such studies was the impossibility of drawing 
generalisations from such a wide disparity of organisational forms.
An exception to the largely atheoretical historical accounts of the sector is 
Garside’s (2000) history of the William Sutton Trust. This text makes use of 
game theory as an explanatory device to illustrate the relations between 
different actors in the voluntary and statutory sectors and to explain how 
William Sutton Trust exerted different levels of influence at distinct periods 
during the course of the twentieth century. However, this was a study limited 
to one distinct organisation, which Garside shows was not representative of 
other forms of housing association. Garside’s study therefore has a limited 
applicability to other organisations in the sector. As she comments:
35The role the William Sutton Trust has been groomed to play was that of a 
responsible public body, nested within the priorities of national housing 
policy. The rules that it had internalised placed it closer to local 
authorities than to the voluntary housing sector (Garside, 2000, p. 108).
A more influential historical analysis of the sector has been provided by 
Malpass (2000a; 200b; 2001) in a number of articles and one book-length 
history. Malpass’ main contention is that the housing association sector has 
experienced an ‘uneven development’, suggesting that there is little 
cohesiveness in institutional structures. New organisations have been formed 
in different periods in response to government action and inaction but there is 
little to connect current and historical form. The sector is therefore being 
categorised by a ‘discontinuous history’, with little if any similarity between the 
‘public utility societies’ of the early twentieth century and the ‘registered social 
landlords’ of the twenty-first. As Malpass comments,
the history of housing associations differs from that of the building 
societies; whereas virtually all building societies in Britain...have direct 
organisational continuity reaching back into the 19th century and there 
have been no new formations since the Second World War (apart from 
mergers), the opposite is true for housing associations (p. 196).
Thus Malpass contends ‘it is quite wrong to talk about voluntary housing as if 
it constituted a single social movement’ (2000a, p.7). Malpass utilises the 
concept of a ‘dual social rented sector’ (2001) of local authorities and housing 
associations to explain why voluntary organisations played such a minimal 
role in UK provision for most of the twentieth century. In particular, he argues 
that the poor performance of housing associations after 1918 allowed 
municipal landlords to play a dominant role that lasted until the late 1980s.
Whilst Malpass provides the most important contemporary history of the 
sector he is unable to generalise satisfactorily about housing associations as 
he lacks the analytical tools to classify different organisations. His view that 
their history is ‘discontinuous’ and their development ‘uneven’ fails to provide
36any systematic way to analyse variation and lacks typologies that can 
distinguish between different forms of housing association.
These historical accounts provide detailed discussions of the role and scope 
of the sector, but fail to supply clear analytical tools with which to analyse 
wider issues or to offer categorisations or typologies of organisational types. 
Such studies can be described as ‘juxtapositional’ approaches which provide 
a variety of examples of organisational types but neglect to offer explanations 
of organisational behaviour.
2.2.3  Managerialist approaches
A further group of writers who have become influential since the 1980s have 
adopted what may be termed ‘managerialist’ approaches, seeing the reforms 
to the social housing sector of the late 1980s as part of a wider set of changes 
to public sector organisations and provide normative explanations of the 
attempt to reform the organisational culture of bureaucratic institutions into 
dynamic, flexible and responsive agencies. Some grandiose claims have 
been made for the impact of managerialism as developed in the UK. For 
example, it has been described as heralding a ‘quasi-market revolution’ 
(Bartlett et. al.t 1998, p. 275) and instigating a fundamental shift ‘perhaps for 
ever, in the way the public sector is structured and managed’ (Greenwood et. 
al., 2002, p.15). McLaughlin and Osborne (2002) state that NPM ‘has become 
one of the dominant paradigms for public management across the world’
(p.1). Osborne and McLaughlin (2002) also argue that it is fundamentally 
concerned with a shift from a unitary to a plural state (p.8) and an indication of 
changes from the management of public services to their governance.
Managerialist accounts of organisational change have been founded on three 
distinctive approaches, summarised as the core ideas of new public 
management, namely ‘competition’, ‘disaggregation’ and ‘incentivisation’ 
(Dunleavy and Hood, 1994).  NPM approaches were influenced by criticisms 
from ‘public choice’ economists that public agencies are inevitably subject to
37‘budget maximisation’ processes and over-supply of goods and services 
(Downs, 1967; Niskanen, 1973) as well as the arguments of populist 
management writers (for example, Peters and Waterman, 1982 and Osborne 
and Gaebler, 1994) that the traditional public sector organisation was 
inherently inflexible, unresponsive, and incapable of managing change. The 
overall aim of the reform programme was to transform the culture of public 
sector agencies from a model based upon administrative procedure to one 
based upon achieving managerial outcomes (Hood, 1991; Lane, 2000).
Managerialist accounts comprise a mixture of normative and empirical 
analysis and housing policy was strongly influenced by these ideologies in the 
late 1980s. Housing policy has been described as undergoing a ‘quiet 
revolution’ (Lowe, 2004) through tenure restructuring and the marginalisation 
of the local authority sector. Housing association managers were strongly 
attracted to the opportunities offered by the reform programme. In terms of the 
three main principles of NPM, competition was always a feature of the 
housing association environment and the ‘quasi-market’ reforms of the 1980s 
extended the ‘marketisation’ of the sector to generate intensified rivalry 
between these agencies (Le Grand and Bartlett, 1993) and effectively 
pumped significant levels of private finance whilst reducing the levels of public 
subsidy.
Disaggregation was an inevitable consequence of the fragmentation of social 
housing, where local authorities were encouraged to delegate their 
responsibilities to a more diverse and pluralistic range of agencies (Malpass, 
1999b). Municipal bureaucracies were reduced to a strategic, enabling role 
with a much wider group of voluntary sector providers responsible for housing 
provision. Incentivisation was pursued through the demands of a more 
rigorous and systematic process of monitoring and regulatory supervision, to 
generate a ‘performance culture’ within social housing management (Mullins, 
1997b). Performance incentives were introduced in order to motivate 
managers to act in more innovative and entrepreneurial ways, paying much 
greater attention to value for money and effectiveness of service provision.
38The managerialist view of housing policy is that the influence of new public 
management principles resulted in an end to the bureaucratic paternalism of 
local authority hierarchies (Hambleton and Hoggett, 1987). As witnessed in a 
burgeoning literature about new public management (McLaughlin et. al.,
2002) housing organisations are seen as representative of a general 
‘paradigm shift’ (Hughes, 1994, p.256) within the public sector to ‘post- 
bureaucratic’ forms (Hoggett, 1991). Influenced by the broad range of 
criticisms of public sector organisations, commentaries on the development of 
the housing association sector therefore assumed that change has meant an 
end to the paternalism of bureaucratic housing management (Power, 1988).
According to managerialist accounts, the housing association sector was 
perceived both by central government and housing practitioners as an ideal 
form of not-for-profit agency which could achieve organisational outcomes 
based on generic, private management models. Walker (2001) contends that 
the NPM theoretical framework ‘has been shown to be a useful additional set 
of analytical tools and techniques to housing studies to explain the significant 
changes that are being witnessed to the management and organisation of the 
[social rented] sector’ (p.693). Although acknowledging that the ‘NPM 
nomenclature needs to be updated’ (p.693) due to the growth of regulation, 
Walker continues to see the social housing sector as primarily governed by 
the twin NPM concepts of ‘externalisation’ and ‘managerialisation’ (ibid.). Thus 
‘externalised housing associations in England and Wales display stronger 
NPM characteristics than the municipal housing sector’ (ibid.). Walker 
identifies a clear direction of change:
The impact of the NPM reforms and the use of private finance in 
particular, has been to drive organisational behaviour in a particular 
direction, promoting a business ethos and a performance culture 
(Walker, 2001, p.691)
This notion of managerialism, influenced by public choice explanations, has 
been widely accepted as the rationale for the transformation of housing 
associations. For example Boyne et. al. (2003, p.83) contend that ‘public
39choice principles have been at the centre of housing reforms in the social 
rented sector’. Walker also emphasises the individualist nature of the reforms:
The clear acceptance of public choice theory arguments indicates the 
political and ideological factors which have driven management reforms 
and attitudes towards social housing. These have played a strong role in 
determining the nature of policies (2001, p.690).
In retrospect the application of managerialist approaches into the social 
housing sector was viewed as highly effective in attracting competition into 
service delivery previously viewed as dominated by monopolistic providers.
These explanations have led to overly euphoric accounts of the sector which 
choose to see managerialist successes of housing associations as socially 
beneficial. For example, Klein and Day (1994) described housing associations 
as ‘one of the outstanding success stories of the last twenty years’ (p. 18). The 
experience of housing association landlords helped to shape later private 
finance initiative (PFI) schemes. Seen as an arena wherein market testing has 
had the greatest impact (Walker et at, 2001) the housing association sector 
has become accustomed over almost twenty years (in some cases longer) to 
sustained competitive pressures. As will be shown in the thesis, these 
managerialist explanations have taken an idealised and over-optimistic view 
about the achievements of the sector.
Whilst the continuing relevance of hierarchy has been acknowledged in some 
explanations, it was seen as merely a residual consequence of traditional 
approaches to housing management:
hierarchical forms of organisation remain prominent through housing 
association and local authority provision and management. In many 
senses this is to be expected as it takes substantial time for new 
organisational paradigms to be established (Walker, 1998a, p. 108).
It was therefore only a matter of time before the ‘new organisational 
paradigms’ of NPM embedded themselves into the sector. Others have been 
more critical of the impact of new public management (e.g. Sprigings, 2002),
40suggesting that market-based reforms would inevitably result in diminished 
personal contact with residents. However, these critical comments have not 
led to the development of rigorous alternative analytical frameworks to 
discuss the sector.
Managerialist explanations ignore the more complex process of the 
management of change that has affected the sector. They fail to adequately 
explain the dynamics of change and do not sufficiently analyse the 
continuities and path dependent nature of organisational development. 
Moreover they fail to pay sufficient attention to the attitudes, norms and values 
of individuals and groups within housing associations. Managerialism can be 
said to rest upon an inherently modernist assumption about progressive 
change; it fails to account for the fact that change has not been in a linear 
direction. Processes of change have not been (as managerialists would 
expect) in the form of substantial disaggregation. In contrast, as will be 
shown, there has been an increase in central control, in regulation and a 
tendency for organisations to take advantage of economies of scale and to 
form group structures and mergers, in other words a re-emergence of 
hierarchalism.
2.2.4  Network theorists
An increasingly influential strand of explanation of the behaviour of housing 
associations can be found in literature drawing on public policy, governance 
and networks. The late 1990s saw an emergence of network models of policy 
coordination to supplement traditional dichotomies between hierarchy and 
markets (see for example Stoker, 1999). The less antagonistic relationship to 
the public sector of the Labour administration elected in 1997 and the focus 
upon community governance (for example, DETR, 1998a) suggests that 
individualistic and managerialist explanations have become outdated. The 
main benefit of a networked governance model is that it is capable of 
explaining the post-NPM fragmentation of public policy.
41Network views contended that in place of orthodox management by monolithic 
local authority landlords, the environment in which housing associations 
operated was based on reciprocal relationships and partnership working. This 
environment relied on complex models of organisational behaviour wherein 
the potential for conflict and confusion was greatly increased as lines of 
responsibility became unclear, accountability was diffuse and boundary 
disputes were accelerated. The uncertainties of this institutional environment 
meant that organisational outcomes and consequences were increasingly 
difficult to determine.
These network approaches drew upon a wider literature wherein analysts of 
public administration have chosen to focus upon the shift from market to 
network forms of governance (Rhodes, 1996). Network structures emphasise 
the importance of interdependencies between varieties of organisational 
types. The importance of partnerships between public, private and voluntary 
sectors has become a central theme of much analysis of contemporary 
governance and has replaced two-tier models of central and local government 
systems. Hence the unitary state mechanism of post war welfare provision 
was replaced by a fragmented system of welfare provision within a 
differentiated polity. Network structures are therefore seen as increasingly 
important ways of understanding housing policy relationships in contrast to 
traditional hierarchy and market models of coordination (Thompson et. al., 
1990).
However, this literature has generally neglected to consider housing 
associations in any depth. For example in the leading journal on public policy 
(Public Administration) between 1997 and 2003, out of a total of two hundred 
and seventy-seven articles, only four considered housing policy, and only one 
(Mullins et. al., 2001, to be discussed below) discussed housing associations 
in any meaningful way. Studies of local governance tended to focus on local 
and central government relations and were less comfortable with the voluntary 
housing sector (e.g. Stoker, 1999, 2002; Rhodes, 2000; Newman, 2001).
42Moreover, general studies of the voluntary sector such as those of Davis 
Smith et. al. (1995), and Taylor (1994; 2003) mention housing associations in 
passing but fail to acknowledge their growing importance as a central 
component in a modernised welfare state. For example, Kendall (2003) 
includes a chapter on ‘the impact of voluntary sector social housing’ and 
argues that the success of the voluntary sector in housing is attributable to the 
failure of other sectors; that it is attractive as a ‘late starter’ and that it is 
remarkable for a freedom from resource insufficiency...’ (p. 134). However, 
this approach tends to view housing associations in superficial terms, either 
making generalisations about their role (that it has considerable management 
improvements over others) and ignoring the wide range of organisational 
forms within different settings.
Despite neglect from a wider public policy literature, network approaches 
represent an increasingly common model applied within housing studies to 
explain changes to the social housing sector, acknowledging the increasing 
complexity and dynamism of contemporary housing policy (Reid, 1995). In 
this respect, housing associations were viewed as encapsulating a pluralistic 
approach, involving a variety of stakeholders in partnership arrangements; 
what Reid (1999) termed the ‘new competition’ where ‘local housing services 
are now planned and provided through networks of organisations, 
necessitating the development and maintenance of effective cooperative 
interorganisational relationships’ (Reid, 1995, p. 13). The consequence is that 
‘there has been a fundamental alteration to the governance of local housing 
services as seen in the patterns emerging from the governing activities of the 
expanding range of actors involved in providing services’ (Reid, 1999, p.129).
The new interorganisational approach to organising and delivering local 
housing services through joint working can be seen as based on policy 
networks based at local level, or ‘local housing networks’. Local housing 
networks in turn comprise groups of different service providing 
organisations, some of which are ‘independent’ in that they are not 
regulated directly by the state, or they are part of the voluntary or the 
private sector (Reid, 1999, p. 134).
43Housing organisations were therefore part of a new style of coordination 
which relied less on the individualistic market styles of 1980s managerialism 
and more upon new forms of community governance, with housing 
associations playing a leading role as new providers.
The reframing of local housing services is read by many to constitute a 
discernible shift towards market principles of organisation and the 
incorporation of the ‘new management’. In practice however, it has led to 
an intermediary position, between hierarchy and market, where network 
forms of coordination are being employed to secure this position (Reid, 
1999, p. 134).
As with managerialist explanations, network theories represent an unduly 
optimistic view of the sector; assumptions of a decrease in central control are 
not supported by empirical evidence. With regard to housing associations, the 
opposite may be the case, namely that there has been an exponential 
increase in large organisations, at the expense of smaller, community-based 
associations. Thus rather than a predominance of network structures, the re- 
emergence of hierarchy may be a more significant factor.
2.2.5  Institutionalist accounts
A final form of explanation of housing associations can be found in 
institutionalist theory. A variety of models of institutionalism can be identified, 
including ‘economic’, ‘sociological’ and ‘historical’ forms but the key insight of 
institutionalism is determined by the notion that ‘institutions matter’ and 
therefore they should be considered in explicit and systematic ways. 
Institutions do not merely constrain options but establish the criteria by which 
individuals discover their own preferences (Di Maggio and Powell, 1991b). . 
Institutions can be seen as ‘political actors in their own right’ (March and 
Olsen, 1984, p.738) and help to determine not only patterns of behaviour, but 
how individuals think (Stoker, 2004, p.71). Society is ‘constructed, embedded 
and sustained in a range of institutional patterns of behaviour, norms and 
organisations’ (ibid., Lowndes, 2002).
44Historical institutionalism is useful in the sense that it can explain 
organisational legitimacy and stability over time, despite what appear to be 
radical transformations. This concept helps to explain both continuities and 
change within the voluntary housing sector. The possibility of ‘inefficiency in 
history’ (March and Olsen, 1984, p.737) counsels against the notion of 
historical progress, the idea that there is an inexorable historical movement 
towards a more ‘advanced’ level. Evolution, through a historical process of 
improvement, can be seen as a feature of many contemporary, ‘modernist’ 
management approaches. Managerialist explanations have advanced the 
view that change represents an inevitable process of organisational 
improvement towards more innovative and creative approaches. In contrast, 
organisational change taking contradictory and diverse forms, many of which 
are detrimental to long-term organisational effectiveness.
In particular, historical institutionalism can help to explain organisational 
change through the concept of ‘sedimentation’; a gradual process of building 
upon and developing previous historical foundations. For example, 
organisational identities of housing associations are developed through the 
process of building upon organisational history, values and traditions. 
Furthermore, seeing the process of institutionalisation as value-laden, 
adaptive and responsive reflects both values of internal groups and the 
external environment (Perrow, 1979, p. 167). The notion of a housing 
association ‘movement’ reflects a complex range of normative and descriptive 
assumptions about its role and purpose.
Institutional theory illustrates how structural arrangements are reproduced as 
individuals are unable to conceive appropriate alternatives or because the 
alternatives are viewed as unrealistic. Patterns of behaviour create ‘path 
dependencies’ or ‘processes in which choices made in the past systematically 
constrain the choices open in the future’ (Pierson, 2001, p.306). The value of 
a historical approach is that it can allow detailed case studies of the way in 
which processes of policy development have developed over time through 
institutional change and stability (Hudson and Lowe, 2004, p. 150).
45An example of the influence of institutionalism in the analysis of housing 
policy can be found in Lowe’s (2004) textbook discussion. He contends:
The case of British housing policy, and where it fits in relation to other 
comparable nations, is replete with ideas drawn from the historical 
institutionalist literature, and through this lens it is possible to see more 
clearly the forces that have shaped the direction of policy (2004, p.20).
Similarly Lowe maintains ‘practically all current policy is the product of, or 
closely related to, past policy, which inevitably impinges on its design and 
social purpose. Housing is inherently very “path dependent’” (p.21). As with 
historical accounts, Lowe therefore stresses the importance of providing a 
background and context to contemporary decision-making processes. Unlike 
writers such as Malpass however, Lowe acknowledges a greater extent of 
continuity or what institutionialists call ‘sedimentation’ of organisational form 
and policy outcomes. As Hudson and Lowe (2004) maintain:
The lessons that can be drawn from the historical institutionalists’ work 
are hugely important: that history matters; that institutions foster stability 
and mobilise bias; that policies display increasing returns and path 
dependencies; that institutions frame the rules of the game and so 
fundamentally influence the nature of the policy process and the 
outcomes it tends to produce (p. 161).
With specific regard to housing associations, Mullins (1997a; 1999) and 
Mullins and Riseborough (2000) incorporate institutionalist ideas, suggesting 
that housing associations have been incorporated in a modernised welfare 
state through a process of ‘isomorphism’ (Mullins and Riseborough, 2001, 
p. 156). Pointing to a wider picture, Mullins and Riseborough offered a vague 
and imprecise conclusion:
The research supports post-structuralist critiques which contest the 
notion of the state as a unified, albeit contradictory and complex entity. 
Instead we interpret the state as disconnected and erratic and politics as 
a set of contests over meaning (2001, p. 167).
An attempt to provide a more explicit theoretical basis to analysis of the 
voluntary housing sector was found in the aforementioned study in Public
46Administration by Mullins et al. (2001). Mullins et al. advocated a ‘theoretical 
refocusing around a tripartite framework which draws upon new institutionalist 
economics, strategic management and institutional theory’ (p.600). This 
approach offered an advance on earlier models of new public management as 
it acknowledged:
Housing organisations can be said to have extended their competence 
beyond the new public management by equipping themselves with 
ongoing adaptive strategies designed to maintain their collaborative 
advantages within the framework of the ‘new competition’ (p.607).
Mullins et. al. correctly state that ‘housing research has not yet critically 
addressed this changing world’ (p.621) and acknowledge that simplistic NPM 
approaches are outdated:
The governance and organisation of the sector has moved away from 
the single model of the traditional hierarchical form of organising that 
typified the British public sector towards a menu of new combined forms 
of governance and coordination which draw on hierarchy, but also on 
market and network principles (p.620).
However and despite their stated objectives, institutionalism has not been 
systematically applied to the social rented sector. Although ostensibly based 
on empirical research, the work of writers such as Mullins et. al. has 
functioned primarily at an abstract level and was not based on detailed case 
study research. The writers admitted that their study constitutes an 
‘exploratory review of the application of these theoretical ideas’ (p.621) and 
concluded that ‘further research is needed’ based on ‘rigorous empirical work’. 
The eclectic combination of economic theory, management practice and 
political science can illustrate some of the tendencies in the social rented 
sector but does not pay sufficient attention to the complex dynamics of 
change. Institutional theory has a role in pointing to historical dimensions of 
change but is less successful at explaining variation over time.
It is clear that discussions of organisational change and stability benefit from a 
theoretical approach that can make sense of structure and agency. However, 
whilst institutionalism may represent a useful starting-point (for example in
47highlighting the path dependent nature of change) it is less successful at 
illustrating how organisational change operates at a practical level. It also fails 
to account for organisational differentiation. Moreover, it largely fails to 
illustrate how values and attitudes play a role within specific organisational 
contexts. Whilst institutions are seen as important, the theory fails to provide 
the tools to determine how they may be different from one another, and here 
the concept of ‘culture’ needs to be introduced to explain organisational 
behaviour. For example, Peters’ (1999) analysis of institutional theory in 
political science fails to mention the notion of ‘culture’. Institutionalism can 
provide a limited analytic framework but it has not been substantiated through 
practical examples of housing organisations. What is therefore needed is a 
more detailed illustration of the relationship between structure and agency 
through a model that considers cultural relationships. The importance of 
culture is that it allows us to understand the DNA of organisations. It is 
therefore possible to ‘map the genome’ of organisational change by 
considering responses within organisations at different levels across periods 
of time. The present study therefore seeks to integrate the insights of 
institutionalist theory with a broader analysis of cultural change in social 
housing organisations.
The above discussion of housing associations illustrates the need for the 
sector to be complemented by a more rigorous theoretical approach than 
hitherto. It is contended that the most useful theoretical approach is grid-group 
cultural theory.
2.3  Applying cultural theory
The above discussion has shown that whilst there are an increasing number 
of studies of the housing association sector post 1988, there is little 
systematic discussion of organisational change or attempt at classification of 
the sector. There are no detailed discussions to date of the different forms of 
organisation and how they have changed from the inside which can allow an 
understanding the DNA of the sector.
48This thesis maintains that cultural theory can supply such a framework for 
exploring social relations within housing association environments offering an 
opportunity to analyse organisational behaviour, based upon an 
understanding of patterns of preference formation, values, attitudes, norms 
and judgments amongst individuals and groups.
Cultural theory examines organisational change as the response to four main 
approaches to social organisation. The advantage of cultural theory is its 
ability to circumvent traditional dichotomies between structure and agency. 
Thus there is a symbiotic relationship between structure and culture: 'culture 
is an important source for the formation and sustenance of social institutions 
and vice versa’ (Lockhart, 1999, p.868). The premise of cultural theory is that: 
‘People choose their preferences as part and parcel of the process of 
constructing - building, modifying, rejecting - their institutions’ (Thompson and 
Wildavsky, 1986, p.276). Institutions are thus inherently connected to values 
and attitudes towards social organisation; organisational ‘cultures’ are 
determined by patterns of preferences and social relationships amongst 
organisational actors.
Whilst cultural theory shares a focus on ‘taken-for-granted’ assumptions within 
institutional theory (Di Maggio and Powell, 1991b) it is better equipped than 
institutionalism to account for organisational change as it focuses attention on 
the conflicts between these fundamental ‘ways of life’. Change occurs when 
the cumulative impact of successive external shocks disturbs the expectations 
generated within a ‘cultural bias’.
Making use of Durkheim’s (1951, ch.5) concept of ‘regulation’, cultural theory 
identifies two sets of constraints on human action on the basis of Douglas’s 
(1982) analysis: ‘grid’ and ‘group’.  ‘Grid’ stands for rules and constraints and 
examines the extent to which social life is circumscribed by convention, 
regulation and rule-governed behaviour, characterising the pervasiveness of 
conventions.  A high grid environment is characterised by an ‘explicit set of 
institutionalised classifications that keeps individuals apart and regulates their 
interactions’ (Douglas, 1982, p.203) and determines levels of autonomy
49allowed within social structures. In contrast ‘group’ measures ‘the extent to 
which an individual is incorporated into bounded units’ (Thompson et. al., 
1990, p.5); that is a tendency to form collective or collaborative relationships. 
Group identity sees individual choices as modified by collective decisions 
based on ties of solidarity, cooperation, reciprocity and mutuality.
From this dualist starting-point four different cultural biases are identified: 
hierarchy (high group and grid), egalitarianism (high group, low grid), 
individualism (low group and grid) and fatalism (high grid, low group). The 
thesis will show that each of these has a strong applicability to the housing 
association sector at different points in time, something that has not been 
explicitly acknowledged by other writers. Although some writers identify a fifth 
category (the hermit) resting outside the classifications (Thompson, et al., 
1990), this will not be considered in the present study as by definition a hermit 
does not operate within an  organisational setting.
Figure 2.1 Grid-group cultural theory
+
Fatalism Hierarchy
Grid
Sense of chaos and 
futility; apathy, 
powerlessness and 
social exclusion
Emphasis on strong 
regulation; rule-bound 
institutions; stability and 
structure
Individualism Egalitarianism
-
Spontaneous action; 
transparent, voluntary, 
unregulated 
environment; openness 
and entrepreneurialism
Partnership and group 
solidarity; peer 
pressure, mutualism 
and cooperation
Group  +
Sources: Douglas, 1982; Thompson et. al.,  1990; Stoker, 2004, p.72.
50Egalitarians in general terms adopt an optimistic view of human nature, 
believing that individuals are innately virtuous but are corrupted by evil 
institutions. The central value for egalitarians is the concept of ‘equality’. 
However, the development of an egalitarian ethos creates a number of 
inherent difficulties:
Because these groups lack internal role differentiation, relations among 
group members are ambiguous and resolution of disputes is difficult. 
Because adherents are bound by group decisions but no one has the 
right to tell others what to do, consensual decision-making is preferred, 
and schisms may result when the decision process breaks down (Ellis 
and Coyle, 1994, pp.3-4).
Role definition within a group environment is inevitably imprecise and 
regulations for resolving disagreements are necessarily indistinct. Alliances 
between groups are therefore exceptional, as absolute consensus is a 
necessary condition for effectiveness (Chai and Wildavsky, 1994, p.166). In 
organisational terms, ‘accountability’ is highly praised and is negotiated 
amongst collective members based on the presumption of equal status.
Hence the ‘participation, with decisions based on the direct consent of 
everyone, is the only basis for legitimacy’ (Thompson et al., 1999, p.4).
Within contemporary housing practice, a strong focus on democratic 
accountability is presented as a key measure of organisational effectiveness, 
measured by an audit process determined by solidaristic societies. As will be 
demonstrated, egalitarianism represents an important strand of the 
contemporary housing association sector, expressing the conscience of the 
movement through the management committee as the conduit of an 
egalitarian ethos. Many housing policy initiatives since 1997, particularly in the 
field of regeneration, are founded upon egalitarian assumptions about 
cooperation, partnership, trust and mutuality.
In contrast, an individualist or libertarian cultural bias maintains that humans 
are inherently self-seeking. An individualist culture requires a social context in 
which prescriptions and group boundaries are weakly enforced. The central 
values of an individualistic culture are freedom, choice and flexibility. Due to
51an absence of either regulations or group constraints, actors exercise 
significant autonomy to enable them to freely negotiate contractual 
relationships and ‘make their way up and down the ladder of prestige and 
influence’ (Thompson et. al., 1990, p. 262). Individualists are innately hostile 
to any increase in prescriptions or group pressures as these would be 
perceived as circumscribing opportunities for bargaining and would minimise 
the potential for self-regulation (ibid.). The free market is the most obvious 
example of an organising system that aspires to individualist principles (ibid.). 
Individualists fail to see any conflict between self-interest and collective 
benefit, as they believe that ‘self-interested actions in a system of open 
exchange maximise the welfare of all’ (Chai and Wildavsky, 1994, p. 165). 
Organisational change during the 1980s through various forms of ‘new public 
management’ (NPM) can be seen as introducing considerable scope for 
individualism to flourish in contrast to previous hierarchical models of public 
administration (Hood, 2000; Lane, 2000).
An individualist approach to management is evident in many influential 
(modernist) prescriptions for the voluntary housing sector, placing a high 
value upon risk-taking and creativity, encapsulated in the notion of housing 
association managers as ‘social entrepreneurs’ (Leadbeater and Goss, 1998). 
Such individualism is strongly resonant in contemporary management 
strategies, represented by a desire to develop risk-taking capacities in order 
to allow innovation and creativity to flourish. A feature of the restructuring of 
contemporary housing policy has been the ‘individualisation of risk’ through an 
extension of home ownership at one end of the social scale and the increased 
risk of homelessness at the other (Nettleton and Burrows, 1998). As will be 
shown, the permeation of competition throughout the voluntary housing sector 
has fundamentally changed behaviour from a cooperative endeavour to 
interorganisational rivalry.
As the usual counterpoint to individualists, hierarchists believe in a need to 
regulate, discipline and restrain what they view as opportunistic behaviour. 
Hierarchies are ‘characterised by strong group boundaries and binding 
prescriptions’. The values held by hierarchists include: an emphasis on
52universalism above particularism; deference to superiors and the 
maintenance of order (Thompson et. al., 1990, p.262). For hierarchists 
administrative procedure is adopted as a key value in order to ensure 
uniformity and standardisation through due process. Hierarchists value highly 
stratified social relationships and believe in a natural process of inequality, 
wherein status is earned on the basis that certain groups have obtained 
greater levels of knowledge, skills and experience than others. Rewards are 
therefore distributed and deserved according to a ‘fair’ process, based upon 
transparent principles. A hierarchical model of organisation implies ‘unequal 
roles for unequal members and deference towards one betters matched by 
noblesse oblige on the part of superiors’ (Ellis and Coyle, 1994, p. 3). 
Hierarchists ‘maintain their group unity through rigidly prescribed rules that 
can be attached to formally designated roles of unequal status and power’ 
(Chai and Wildavsky, 1994, p.166). Hierarchists therefore defer to ‘rational- 
legal’ authority and are commonly associated with classic, bureaucratic 
organisational structures (Weber, 1947). The structure of many traditional 
public sector organisations as large, uniform, standardised ‘machine 
bureaucracies’ (Mintzberg, 1983) provides clear examples of classical 
hierarchical administrative forms. The organisational values adhered to within 
hierarchical organisations include: procedural justice; efficiency in carrying out 
routine tasks and management on the basis of standard operating 
procedures.
Much of the classical debate within public administration has been conducted 
on the basis of an attempt to settle disputes between hierarchists and 
individualists. The different biases in housing organisations reflect this 
distinction. Thus, the traditional housing management approach has been 
severely criticised for its strongly hierarchist dimension: ‘top-down solutions 
do not relate effectively to people’s perceptions of what is wrong’ (Young, 
2000, p. 183). Local authority housing policy has often been presented as a 
classic example of hierarchical structure, dominated by rigid departmentalism, 
lacking effective coordination, and managed by professional interest groups 
(such as architects and town planners) (Power, 1987).
53The final and most distinctive feature of cultural theory is the fatalist way of 
life. A fatalist is a person who:
finds herself subject to binding prescriptions yet excluded from 
membership in the group for whose welfare decisions are made. She 
may have little choice about how she spends her time, whom she 
associates with, what she wears or eats, or where she lives and works. 
The fatalist, or isolate, endures the social isolation of individualism 
without the autonomy, the constraint of hierarchy without the support of a 
loyal group (Ellis and Coyle, 1994, p.4).
Fatalists believe human nature is unpredictable. ‘Never knowing what to 
expect from others, fatalists react by distrusting their fellow human beings. 
This suspicious view of human nature justifies their fatalistic exclusion from 
the other three ways of life’ (Thompson et al., 1990, pp.34-5). Fatalists tend 
to act upon the metaphorical assumption of ‘life as a lottery’, viewing events 
as arbitrary, capricious and outside the control of human agency. Fatalists 
thus ‘see their behaviour as completely constrained by unvarying forces within 
their environment’ (Chai and Wildavsky, 1994, p. 164) and consequently see 
themselves as powerless to shape outcomes. Fatalism is a ‘learned response 
to a social environment in which there is only a tenuous connection between 
preferences and outcomes’ (Ellis, 1994, p. 127). Driven by a sense of 
powerlessness where individuals are both subject to severe constraints and 
denied the opportunity to influence events through collective endeavour, 
fatalists will often tend towards conspiracy theories of organisational change, 
where consultation is seen as tokenistic, symbolic and largely meaningless. 
‘What distinguishes fatalists from adherents to other ways of life is not the 
desire for a better life but the feeling that fate and society conspire to prevent 
them from improving their situation’ (Ellis, 1994, p. 132).
Fatalism can be seen as a judicious response to certain organisational 
situations where individuals perceive themselves to be powerfully constrained 
by rules and regulations, yet without any strong collective bonds to their 
colleagues.
54A fatalistic bias can flourish only where social institutions sustain that 
bias as an adaptive and rational posture. In a world in which there are no 
escapes and few rewards, passivity and resignation are more rational 
and adaptive than the individualist’s incurable entrepreneurial optimism 
(Ellis, 1994, p. 132).
Believing they have little or no control over events, the only rational strategy 
for fatalists is to ‘minimise the expenditure of resources and to act in a 
noncooperative manner no matter what the circumstances’ (Chai and 
Wildavsky, 1994, p.164). Within social policy, fatalism manifests itself through 
concepts such as the development of a ‘culture of poverty’ (Lewis, 1966) or 
‘dependency culture’ (Dean and Taylor-Gooby, 1992). A widespread response 
adopted by individuals and groups located within a fatalist culture is a strategy 
o f‘quiescence’ (Dunleavy, 1977).
Front-line staff in particular are susceptible to fatalism. Fatalists ‘do the 
minimum amount of work necessary to retain their jobs, and they do not 
voluntarily comply with any attempt to alter their routines because they see 
such changes as plots to reduce their standard of living’ (Chai and Wildavsky, 
1994, p. 164). As will be shown, such attitudes are common-place amongst 
experience of front-line housing association workers, serving as a crucial 
‘reservoir of social discontent’ (Lockhart, 1999, p.869).
As Hood (2000) contends ‘grid’ and ‘group’ are ‘central to public management’ 
(p.8); the four social solidarities can be seen as permeating organisations like 
letters running through a stick of Blackpool rock (Thompson et. al., 1999, p.9) 
helping to understand how decisions between alternative courses of action 
are made; how performance can be evaluated; why organisations adopt 
particular structures and how they respond to changes in the external 
environment. Cultural theory has a particular relevance in analysing claims 
about ‘modernisation’ advanced by proponents of ‘new public management’; 
namely that modernisation does not necessarily equate with beneficial change 
and progress (Hood, 2000, p.206). Cultural theory helps to explain why 
housing associations have taken certain decisions in relation both to their
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organisational change will result in unanticipated consequences.
2.4  Cultural relationships and organisational change
One of the main benefits of cultural theory is that it allows consideration of 
unintended policy consequences and understanding of the dynamic effects of 
cultural clashes. The polar opposites are mutually reinforcing with each 
dependent on the other. Cultural theorists claim that these opposites provide 
a comprehensive and universal classification of cultural possibilities. The 
different ways of life are sustained and defended by individuals in order to 
maintain a meaningful interpretation of everyday life.
Cultures are developed and sustained in contrast to alternative options. ’If one 
culture is to stay distinct, it needs to be defined in opposition to other cultures’ 
(Douglas, 1996, p.42). Thus, each has its own strengths and weaknesses but 
the differing cultures exist ‘in a state of mutual antagonism in any society at all 
times’ (ibid., p.43). This suggests that the organisational identity of the 
housing association sector is as likely to be encapsulated in negative as in 
positive terms; historically this identity has manifested itself as providing an 
alternative to the inflexibility of bureaucratic municipal landlords.
At the same time, no single cultural bias is likely to be dominant at any one 
point in time. Just as no individual will be exclusively an egalitarian or 
individualist, institutions contain different cultural elements existing in 
contradistinction from one another. Indeed, cultural theorists maintain that to 
adhere to one single bias will be unsustainable over any period of time. For 
example, egalitarianism taken to extremes will result in control by elite groups; 
adherence to hierarchy can lead to charismatic leadership, which is a feature 
of individualism. Cultural theory suggests that beyond a certain point 
convergence on a single management model is not only implausible but also 
impossible. Each of the available options has strengths and weaknesses, but 
‘incompatible administrative values cannot be pursued simultaneously...and 
none can ever win over its competitors by a knock-out’ (Hood, 2000, p.20). As
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impose increasing tensions and organisational conflict endemic.
If cultural theory can be shown to have a relevance to contemporary housing 
organisations, one of its key insights will be to explain organisational change 
as the result of inevitable competition between rival views of the world. For 
example, fatalists play a central role in the other cultural biases, mainly as a 
warning against other competing doctrines.
All marginal groups, whether the poor, the underclass, the homeless, or 
the proletariat, are vitally important in the contest between rival cultures.
If the poor lack the talent, industriousness, or character possessed by 
the more successful members of society, the successful entrepreneur 
can justify his own position and the system that placed him at its apex. If 
these groups are systematically oppressed by the dominant groups, they 
stand as a permanent indictment of the injustice of the current regime. 
The meaning of the downtrodden’s experience is thus contested and 
constructed by others in order to advance their preferred ways of life 
(Ellis, 1994, p. 119).
Hierarchical organisations have been most vulnerable to sustained assault 
from the NPM models which have been strongly influenced by theories of 
‘budget maximisation’ (Downs, 1967; Niskanen, 1971; 1973) and ‘rational 
choice’ (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962); frameworks which have themselves 
been based heavily upon (individualist) assumptions of ‘self interest’
(Dowding, 1991; Dunleavy, 1991). Within housing policy, the zenith of 
hierarchy was a modernist desire to create Utopian solutions to social 
problems, implemented through municipal authorities as agents of public 
policy (King, 1993). Following Coyle (1994, p.35) who looked at environmental 
policy, table 2.1 sets out how cultural theory can be applied to an analysis of 
contemporary housing policy.
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Hierarchical Egalitarian Individualist Fatalist
Key value Order Equality Liberty Apathy
Key actors Professionals Citizens Consumers,
customers
Clients
Response to Centralise, Decentralise, Market Withdrawal,
uncertainty expertise, simplify, discovery, alienation,
standardisation, participate competition, social
uniformity choice exclusion
Ideal Everything in its Self-sufficient, Prosperous, No ideal state
community place,
representative
institutions
empowered,
cooperative
independent
Models of Stuctured Fair share Selectivity, Coercive,
social intervention, requirements, targeting, atomistic,
housing estate renewal, neighbourhood filtering, punitive,
legislation management choice-based
systems
dependent
Source: adapted from Coyle (1994, p.35)
The table illustrates how a cultural analysis helps to categorise a range of 
interventions in housing policy. These interventions can be classified on a 
scale from high intervention (hierarchy) to negligence (fatalism). As the table 
shows, within each way of life can be found examples of housing 
management intervention. As mentioned above, each way of life is in conflict 
with the other but at the same time the alternative ways of life are required in 
order to justify and legitimise other cultural biases ‘either to make up for 
deficiencies, or to exploit, or to define itself against’ (Thompson et. al., 1990, 
p.203). The divergent ways of life therefore define themselves by contrast with 
the others. Furthermore, each bias has both strengths and weaknesses or 
‘Achilles heels’ (Hood, 2000, p.28). Thus:
we tend to formulate ideas about reform through a process of reaction 
against what we see as an unsatisfactory status quo, rather than 
beginning the process of institutional design from a genuinely “zero 
base” (Hood, 2000, p.11).
Cultural theory is particularly useful when applied to an environment of 
organisational change. Unlike institutionalism it presents a theory of change 
as a ubiquitous feature of organisational behaviour (Thomson et. al., 1990,
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and flowing but no way of life ever wins’ (p.83).
As housing associations operate within an environment which has been 
described as undergoing revolutionary change since the late 1980s, through 
the restructuring of tenure, the abolition of the traditional local authority 
provision role and sizeable growth of influence, this model of organisational 
change is particularly appropriate. For housing associations conflicting values 
and attitudes are manifested in continual dilemmas about organisational 
expansion, geographical retrenchment, the definition of management 
functions and institutional identity.
These ideas have a strong resonance within a sector characterised by 
‘discontinuity’ (Malpass, 2000b) and ambivalence. As mentioned earlier, there 
have been widely differing accounts of the extent of organisational change 
with some writers viewing the sector as almost unrecognisable (Malpass, 
2000a, p.270) and others denying that substantive organisational 
transformation has occurred (Cope, 1999, p.345). Cultural theory can provide 
a more convincing model of organisational transformation in the housing 
association sector than existing accounts by offering more substantive 
explanations of the unintended consequences of managerial reforms.
2.5  Overcoming the criticisms of cultural theory
The above discussion has outlined the main justification for selecting the 
cultural theory framework to apply to a study of organisational change in the 
housing association sector. However, a number of criticisms of the cultural 
theory model should be considered. The first criticism is a lack of detailed 
empirical application, which has led Sabatier (1999) to argue that the model 
has not been fully worked out.
However, this criticism ignores insights cultural theory has brought to a 
number of areas such as the management of risk (Douglas and Wildavsky, 
1982; Adams, 1995), environmental policy (Schwarz and Thompson, 1990),
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policy (Hendriks, 1999). Cultural theory has also been applied to an analysis 
of local governance (Stoker, 2004). Although two studies have attempted to 
apply cultural theory to housing policy (Jensen, 1998; Perri 6, 1998) such 
studies have been narrowly focused on egalitarianism (in the case of Jensen) 
and the issue of risk (Perri 6). Cultural theory is thus becoming an increasingly 
important tool of contemporary political science which can have a clear utility 
to the housing association sector.
The work of Hood (2000) has provided an important illustration of the 
application of cultural theory to public management. Hood contended that it 
‘can be applied in a very direct and practical way for identifying and thinking 
about a range of polar control processes in public management’ (Hood, 2000, 
p.223). He saw cultural theory as providing a framework for creative thinking 
about different approaches to organisation and a guide to the diversity of 
practical ideas within management theory. However, the weakness of Hood’s 
study is that it is conducted at a relatively abstract level; there is little 
discussion of the application of these ideas within specific organisational 
contexts and by reference to specific actors.
The current thesis further develops existing empirical applications of cultural 
theory. It shows how an analysis of organisational change within a particular 
organisational context reveals how hidden assumptions, justifications and 
preferences help to determine organisational direction, based on historical 
reasons and cultural values, many of which are overlooked in discussions of 
organisational development. In particular it explores what constitutes the DNA 
of housing associations through a detailed analysis of responses to the 1988 
changes from a variety of perspectives, including those of senior staff, middle 
managers and front-line workers.
A second criticism that can be levelled at cultural theory is that the typology 
generates excessive simplification by attempting to place individuals and 
groups into narrow and limiting categories. However, cultural theory does not 
consider the types as ‘boxes into which individuals must be fitted but rather
60modes of argument and perspectives that individuals choose among as they 
justify their lives to themselves and others’ (Ellis and Coyle, 1994, p.11;
Coyle, 1994). It therefore does not simply adopt a classification of 
psychological types; individuals will fall within a variety of cultural behaviour 
within a single week, let alone a lifetime (Stoker, 2004, p.73).
The different cultures therefore do not constitute sharply defined groups of 
individuals, but different points of views or ‘cultural biases’, offering 
predispositions to certain forms of behaviour and preferences for particular 
organisational forms in which the adversarial element is central: ‘each culture 
in this analysis is thought to be strongly in competition with its alternatives’ 
(Douglas, 1997, p. 128).
Cultural theory can shed light on the multiple forms of rhetoric deployed within 
contemporary management practice (ibid.) Douglas (1997) overcomes the 
criticism of simplification by presenting the notion of culture as dialogue, but 
one which is driven by the principle of adversarial competition. Think of 
culture as essentially a dialogue that allocates praise and blame. Then focus 
particularly on the blame’ (Douglas, 1997, p. 128).
Cultural theory maintains that there are no inherent measures of 
organisational success or failure, each is a judgment made within the context 
of a specific cultural bias. Thus: ‘catalogues of blunders and dysfunctions in 
public management are often cited, but what cultural theory can do is help to 
clarify who sees what as crippling failures and what kinds of organisations are 
predisposed to what kinds of failure’ (Hood, 2000, p.13). Thus: egalitarian 
cultures are vulnerable to schisms that are notoriously difficult to resolve; 
hierarchalist cultures have a tendency towards rigidity and inflexibility; 
individualistic cultures are at risk of corruption and fatalists are liable to 
organisational inertia.
The charge of simplification can be overcome by demonstrating that the 
classifications of cultural theory allow an understanding of the complexity of 
different organisational types in the housing association sector. It is
61particularly important to be able to provide some kind of explanation of 
organisational change in the housing association sector; as shown above 
most discussion to date have simply assumed that as there was such a wide 
variety of organisational forms that any kind of generalisation would be futile. 
Consequently concepts and classification are desperately needed in this area. 
These concepts also provide a means to understand organisational behaviour 
and responses to change. The thesis maintains that the cultural types provide 
a basis for understanding organisational development at different periods of 
time; in particular how founding principles of the sector were based on a 
culture of individualism; how a new wave of organisations in the 1960s 
emerged on the basis of egalitarian values; how the 1970s saw an emergence 
of hierarchy and how fatalism became associated with housing associations in 
the 1980s. This combination of cultural values provided a basis for 
understanding the organisational changes after 1988.
2.6  Conclusion
This chapter has considered existing approaches to the housing association 
sector and housing management practice and shown the limitations of these 
models. The first and most common explanation of the sector has come from 
practitioner accounts which are by definition atheoretical and obsessed with 
best practice recommendations which can be applied wholesale to the sector. 
The second form of explanation has come from historical accounts which 
have either been based upon distinct organisations or have relied on a 
concept of ‘discontinuous’ change. These historical accounts have resisted 
drawing generalisations or classifications of a diverse set of organisations.
Managerialist models represent a third form of explanation which have 
pointed to some of the trends since the 1980s but have neglected to explain 
the complexity of organisational change. Managerialism tends to assume a 
culture of individualism has developed in the housing sector as a new 
organisational paradigm, distinct from local authority hierarchy. Moreover 
managerialist models adopt a highly normative and over-idealised approach 
to organisational change.
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organisational culture has developed through the development of partnership 
arrangements and new forms of urban governance. These accounts also 
share a tendency towards idealisation of the post NPM fragmentation of the 
housing sector.
Finally institutionalists have provided accounts of historical development and 
have used models to path dependency to effect to explain organisational 
change and stability, yet they also have neglected the impact of culture and 
thus experience difficulty in accounting for change within an organisational 
context.
What the above accounts share is an emphasis upon how housing 
associations have replaced bureaucratic local authorities and are seen as 
representative of a general paradigm shift in public sector management to 
post-bureaucratic forms of organisation. These approaches rest on the 
premise that organisational change has been in a low grid direction. Whilst 
this assumption reflects the rhetoric of organisational change (for example 
through NPM models and discourses of partnership and innovation), as will be 
shown these notions are not borne out in empirical analysis. In particular the 
above accounts fail to provide an explanation of organisational change from 
the inside. An understanding of cultural change therefore requires a 
framework that can consider the different and competing cultural attributes 
within the social housing sector.
In order to understand the diverse manifestations of organisational change 
cultural theory can provide an analysis of the different approaches to housing 
management practice that acknowledges conflict, consensus and variation. 
The use of cultural theory makes it possible to place both historical and 
contemporary debates within specific organisational contexts. Acknowledging 
the inevitability of conflict between the competing approaches, it allows us to 
understand problems and dilemmas faced by housing managers more clearly. 
The theory helps to explain the bewildering range of historical and current
63debates about effective management within the public sector (Hood, 2000). 
Situating management thinking within a geographical and temporal context, it 
offers a framework for the analysis of organisational behaviour within housing 
associations.
The value of the application of cultural theory to housing associations lies in 
its acknowledgement of the strengths and weaknesses of the different ways of 
life. Thus, individualism offers the possibility of improving incentives through 
rigours of competition, but can result in a lack of trust and demoralisation 
(particularly where targets are set at unrealistic levels). Egalitarianism offers a 
commitment to equity and is often seen as a valuable objective by staff. 
Egalitarian cultures stimulate debate but in practice achieving consensus is 
difficult and there are insufficient mechanisms to resolve deep-seated 
conflicts. Hierarchy ensures predictability and standardisation, with an 
emphasis on entitlements. However, it also entails rigidity and inflexibility. 
Fatalism is a neglected but important feature of housing management 
practice. It may appear negative, engendering increased levels of hostility and 
suspicion. However, fatalism may prove a judicious response to a bewildering 
level of management change and help to counter some overstated claims 
made about the benefits of organisational change. Each of these cultural 
biases has important implications for housing organisations and the 
management of change.
As an uncertain and contested profession, housing management offers wide 
scope for analysis. In looking at this area of housing practice, this thesis aims 
to overcome some of the criticisms levelled at cultural theory, namely that it 
does not have a clear empirical application and is over-simplistic. In contrast 
this thesis provides empirical evidence to which the theory can be applied. In 
particular, cultural theory helps to avoid simplistic explanations of 
organisational change in the housing association sector. The following 
chapters therefore provide the historical background and empirical evidence 
to understand the variety of management change in the housing association 
sector.
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THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE HOUSING ASSOCIATION ‘MOVEMENT’: A 
CULTURAL AND INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
...the environment in which community and voluntary groups operate is 
not a rational one. Indeed there is a case for arguing that the unique 
selling proposition of the voluntary and community sector is its very 
unpredictability; that there should be space for chaos in a universe in 
which too much is already being pinned down for evaluation and 
measurement (Deakin, 2001, p. 33).
3.1  Introduction
The voluntary housing sector has often been viewed in idealistic terms 
(Garside, 2000, p.2) with writers minimising its weaknesses and overstating 
its strengths. Often viewed as ‘the acceptable face of social housing’ 
(Kleinman and Roberts, 1991), there has a generally been a neglect of critical 
views of the sector with housing associations viewed as philanthropic, 
charitable agencies run by well-meaning benefactors. In a period when 
housing associations played a marginal role in housing provision, the neglect 
was unimportant, but is no longer justifiable at a time when they have 
assumed a position as the main providers of new social housing. The 
intention of this chapter is therefore to understand the various influences that 
constitute the organisational DNA of the sector. Looking at organisations in 
the London area, it considers the significance of the diverse origins, 
ideologies, cultural influences and individual and collective values that have 
served to constitute organisational identity.
The chapter has two main objectives. The first is to outline the cultural history 
of London housing associations, offering definitions and an account of the 
institutional history of distinct organisational types. Corresponding to the 
biases of cultural theory, the discussion identifies four different periods of 
organisational development. Whilst each of these phases contains evidence 
of other cultural biases, the decades under consideration are identified by
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comprised the first phase, represented by the philanthropic organisations 
founded in the 1880s and continuing with the small number of housing 
associations founded in the inter-war period. A second influential phase 
comprised egalitarian organisations, emerging with the housing associations 
founded in the 1960s and continuing amongst a black and minority ethnic 
housing sector in the 1970s. The third phase saw an emerging hierarchalism 
as government became more closely connected to the sector in the 1970s. 
Finally the 1980s saw an increasing sense of fatalism due to a changing 
resident profile and more challenging management task.
The second objective is to outline the reforms instigated by the 1988 Housing 
Act, which brought to an end an age of innocence for the housing association 
sector, in bringing these organisations to the centre stage of housing policy 
and introducing the classic managerialist principles of competition, 
disaggregation and incentivisation to the sector. This injection of individualism 
therefore needs to be understood against the background of a complex sector 
comprising the four main cultural biases.
3.2  The Historical Neglect of the Voluntary Housing Sector
The significance of housing associations in policy terms is a relatively new 
development. Described as ‘an almost forgotten corner of the housing 
system’ (Harloe, 1995, p.290) until the 1980s the standard view of housing 
associations was that they filled the gaps where public and private housing 
had failed to meet need adequately. Associations therefore occupied a 
complementary but firmly supplementary role as a ‘second best option’ (Best, 
1997, p. 103) behind municipal provision and ‘tolerated rather than 
encouraged’ (Malpass, 2000a, p.265) by post-war governments.
The historical neglect of the sector emanates, in part from the exclusion of 
housing associations from the post-war welfare state after 1945 (Garside, 
2000, pp.72-3). Two main reasons have been advanced for the 
marginalisation of the voluntary sector from mainstream housing provision.
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central government objectives at a time of widespread need (following two 
world wars) as they were viewed as more easily controlled than voluntary 
sector organisations. Secondly, the voluntary sector itself lacked ambition and 
did not see its function as a large-scale housing provider (Best, 1991, p.143). 
Both of these assumptions are no longer valid. In conjunction with a wider set 
of trends in social policy, where ‘the voluntary and for-profit sectors are 
expected to substitute for state delivery’ (Taylor, 1994, p.64) government 
policy since 1988 has sought to promote the voluntary sector as the main 
provider of new social housing. Housing associations have themselves 
enthusiastically embraced their role at ‘centre stage’ (Langstaff, 1992) of 
contemporary housing policy.
3.3  A Cultural History of the Sector
Four central themes can be identified corresponding to broad periods in the 
development of the sector. Although there is no strict delineation of the 
different periods, they serve as a useful explanatory device to illustrate how 
the sector developed over the course of the twentieth century.
3.3.1  Individualism: a philanthropic sector (1890 to the 1960s)
There originally existed two main types of housing organisation at the end of 
the nineteenth century: the model dwellings companies and the charitable 
trusts (Malpass, 2000b, p. 198). Although the model companies no longer 
exist, their description as ‘5 per cent philanthropists’ referred to the expected 
return on their investment (Tarn, 1973). Depicted as ‘near capitalist’ 
organisations (Garside, 2000, p.64) these landlords demonstrated a strong 
commercial bias.
The end of the 19th century saw a significant growth of housing activity, 
motivated by concern about overcrowding, health and sanitary conditions 
amongst the working-class (Gauldie, 1974) and London has been seen as the
67‘heartland’ of the  second type of organisation, the philanthropic trusts 
(Morton, 1991, p.30):
The work of the philanthropic trusts set an example of what could be 
achieved in terms of the improvement of living conditions for the 
‘labouring classes’ at a time when state action on welfare was still 
anathema to political leaders and the philosophy of laissez-faire 
prevailed (Cope, 1999, p.8).
The larger philanthropic organisations such as Guinness and Peabody relied 
on a lower rate of return than the five percent commercial philanthropists 
(Garside, 2000, p. 52) and these organisations were seen to have a 
detrimental effect upon the smaller commercial organisations as their size and 
economies of scale enabled them to outbid competitors (Garside, 2000, p.
53). A key objective for these organisations was that housing for the working 
class groups could be ‘sanitary, affordable and profitable’ (Garside, 2000, 
p.51, emphasis in original).
Nevertheless, the philanthropic organisations charged rents considerably 
higher than were feasible for those in poverty. In the 1880s the income of 
Peabody Trust tenants was estimated at over 23s a week compared to an 
average income in London at the time of 18s (Morton, 1991, p. 14). It was for 
this reason that the 1890 Housing of the Working Classes Act was designed 
to produce dwellings ‘cheaper than Peabody’ (Morton, 1991, p.16). Within 
central London high building costs acted as a constraint on letting rented 
property. Thus, ‘either the accommodation did not produce sufficient return to 
attract profit-making landlords...or the rents that achieved acceptable returns 
were too much for poorer households’ (Best, 1991, p.143).
The philanthropic Trusts were privately financed, self-regulated and largely 
unaccountable. A defining feature of these organisations was their hostility to 
government intervention and there was little doubt that the core identity of the 
philanthropic associations was based upon a private sector ethos:
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private landlords, the associations saw themselves as pioneers 
demonstrating how responsible landlords, and discerning investors, 
could meet the needs of those on modest incomes...demonstrating that 
good-quality homes could be achieved by private enterprise (Best, 1991, 
p.143).
These early attempts at housing provision were driven by the interventions of 
committed individuals, offering substantial endowments to enable 
philanthropic activity to be undertaken. Table 3.1  illustrates that four of these 
Trusts continue to have significant numbers of properties in 2003.
Table 3.1: The Philanthropic Housing Trusts
Housing Trust Year of foundation Initial endowment (£000) Stock in 2003 (no of 
homes)
Peabody Trust 1862 150 17,000
Octavia Hill Housing 
Trust
1864 - 3,500
Industrial Dwellings 
Society
1885 - 1,200
William Sutton 1889 1,500 16,000
Guinness Trust 1890 250 25,000
Samuel Lewis Trust 1901 400 19,000
Source: Housing association Annual Reports, Malpass, 2000a, p.53, Malpass and Murie, 
1999, p.30.
Substantial conflict between public and private sectors was apparent in the 
development of the early housing associations. Thus ‘on both sides... there 
was hostility and irritation between government and the voluntary housing 
sector’ (Garside, 2000, p.55). For local authorities, especially in the London 
area there were complaints about empty sites inherited from the Metropolitan 
Board of Works and ‘the politicisation of the housing question after 1890 
brought something near contempt for the voluntary sector’ (ibid.). The origins 
of an adversarial relationship between the voluntary and statutory sectors can 
therefore be traced back to the 19th century.
By 1910 the Peabody and Guinness Trusts had built over 7500 dwellings 
(Wohl, 1977, pp.360-361) and constituted a dominant force in the early
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voluntary sector in London were provided by these commercial philanthropists 
(Morris, 1999; Garside, 2000, p.52). The voluntary housing organisations 
were also working in an environment where there was no financial assistance 
from the State and effectively no government housing policy (Malpass, 2000b, 
p.211).  In 1915 there were only 24,000 council houses in Great Britain 
(Merrett, 1979, p.26) half of which were in London where the council stock 
was equivalent to only about a quarter of the voluntary sector stock (Malpass, 
2000b, p.201). Until the outbreak of the First World War, local authority 
housing was extremely rare and the majority of councils built no property until 
after 1918 (Malpass, 2000b).
Organisations such as Peabody and Samuel Lewis refused to accept 
government subsidy. The Guinness Trust would only accept government help 
if it was provided ‘without undue restrictions being imposed as a condition of 
such help’ (quoted in Garside, 2000, p.62). The William Sutton Trust proved 
an exception in attempting to gain funding; arguing unsuccessfully that its 
approach could not be distinguished from a local authority (Garside, 2000, 
pp.62-3). However, the general reluctance to accept state funding and 
consequent regulation, in the belief that this would compromise their 
independence, ensured that these organisations were destined to play a 
peripheral role in the reconstruction programme following the First World War.
Crucially, established with the aim of providing good quality accommodation 
to the ‘respectable’ working class (Hills, 1987, p.3), the early housing 
organisations could afford to be discriminating about their client group and to 
adopt flexible and discretionary approaches to decision-making. This 
discretion resulted in criticism that they were failing to reach those in the 
greatest need (Malpass and Murie, 1999, p.30). Significantly, they did not see 
their role as providing for the poorest groups in society groups in the greatest 
need but rather as giving assistance to deserving individuals at slightly less 
than market rates.
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sector objectives of slum clearance and benefited from public monies through 
the Public Works Loan Board which by 1914 had lent nearly £2.5 million to 
housing societies in England (Garside, 2000, p.54). Nevertheless, these 
organisations demonstrated their hostility to regulation by complaining that 
their work was being ‘clogged with conditions’ (Burnett, 1978, pp. 175-6).
The First World War represented a significant epoch in the history of housing 
policy. Although by 1917 the voluntary sector had provided twice as many 
homes as local authorities in England and Wales (Garside, 2000, p.59) after 
the war local authorities became the main providers of social housing 
(encouraged by central government). This period witnessed a rapid increase 
in municipal provision alongside a failure by the voluntary housing sector to 
maintain the momentum it had established. The ‘Homes for Heroes’ 
campaign signalled a reversal of roles for the voluntary and statutory sectors, 
with the latter assuming the primary responsibility for the delivery of housing 
policy. Using subsidies available under the Housing and Town Planning Act 
1919, the charitable Trusts and public utility societies produced only 4,545 
dwellings, compared to over 170,000 by local authorities (Malpass, 2000b, 
p.204).
The reversal of roles was illustrated by criticisms that the existing housing 
associations lacked ambition to extend their operations. They were also 
criticised for their failure to respond adequately to the levels of need, apparent 
in the slum conditions of early 20th century London. Thus Tarn (1973) stated 
that the model dwelling companies abandoned their objective to provide for 
the poor (pp. 102-3). The design and management of properties were also 
criticised for their ‘ruthless utilitarianism’ (White, 1980, p.24) and ‘the 
conviction grew that housing should not be left to charitable enterprise but 
should become a state responsibility’ (Gauldie, 1974, p.235).
The approach to housing management practiced by the philanthropic 
organisations also showed strong traces of an individualistic cultural bias. As 
Kemp and Williams (1991) argue ‘the development of capitalist housing
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and early nineteenth centuries...seems to have brought with it a distinctive, 
more impersonal and commercial, management of working-class housing to 
let’ (p. 123). Thus, abandoning notions of what was best for the moral welfare 
of the tenants, landlords encouraged a more detached financial relationship 
which meant that tenants lost legal rights and landlords had a much stronger 
position in determining rent levels, security and eviction proceedings (ibid.). 
Thus ‘the mass of the population occupied their dwellings from 1838 to 1915 
at the whim of their landlord’ (Nevitt, 1970, p.131, cited in Kemp and Williams, 
1991, p. 123). Decisions about who to allocate property to, when to carry out 
repairs and decorations and to allow delays in rent payments were all 
informed by a commercial imperative (p. 124).
These individualistic approaches to housing provision were strongly 
advocated by Octavia Hill, who was a highly-influential late Victorian figure 
working to improve housing conditions in central London. Octavia Hill 
pioneered an estate based approach which combined property management 
and social work, developed from 1865 onwards (Darley, 1990). Regarded as 
the founder of modern housing management, Hill demonstrated hostility to 
state intervention on the basis that it was ‘indiscriminate’ and ‘open to abuse’ 
(Clapham, 1997a, p. 30; Garside, 2000, p. 54). Thus ‘throughout her life 
Octavia had a horror of careless charity, which encouraged sloth and 
imprudence in the poor, and locked them into a condition of permanent 
dependency’ (Whelan, 1998, p.6). Her individualism is shown in the hostility 
shown to any kind of organisational structure. Most of her work was carried 
out in the ‘privately rented, profit-orientated housing market’ (Kemp and 
Williams, 1991, p. 122). Needing to ‘have the absolute discretion to do as she 
saw best’ (Whelan, 1998, p.8) her approach represented a classic 
individualist style of management.
Whilst the inter-war period is generally regarded as a period of failure for the 
sector in terms of an ability to develop substantial housing stock (Malpass, 
2000a, p.81) housing associations did had some success in undertaking
72action in the London area in the 1920s and 30s. For the most part, the 
voluntary housing sector confined its efforts to combating problems 
associated with urban slums. Table 3.2 illustrates the formation of a number 
of new associations in these two decades including, Kensington Housing 
Trust; St. Pancras Housing Association and St. Marylebone Housing 
Association (Malpass, 2000a, p.86).
Table 3.2: The ‘pioneering’ associations
Housing association Year of foundation Stock in 2003 (numbers of 
properties owned)
Kensington Housing Trust 1922 2,400
St. Pancras (later merged 1924 4,600
with Humanist HA)
English Churches 1924 11,000
St. Marylebone 1926 -
Islington and Shoreditch 1934 1,000
Source: Housing association, Annual Reports
Acting primarily on their own initiative, these organisations encouraged the 
rehabilitation of Victorian properties in inner-city areas. However, these 
associations failed to capitalise upon their early period as ‘pioneers’ of 
housing policy (Best, 1991) and housing associations continued to be 
marginalised. The common perception of associations was that they had done 
‘some important new work but with only a modest quantum of extra homes to 
show for their efforts’ (Best, 1991, p. 146). The extension of the municipal 
sector after the 1930s, despite the activity of many voluntary organisations 
meant that the housing societies were ‘steadily excluded from any significant 
role, retreating to lobbying, advisory and propaganda activities’ (Garside,
2000, p.72). These organisations were criticised for their ability to affect 
housing conditions in local neighbourhoods:
Of the older housing associations only the Kensington Housing Trust 
(KHT) had sought to increase awareness of the housing problems in the 
borough and to put pressure on the Council (Holmes, 2005, p.22).
73The individualism of the early housing associations was not only associated 
with a low-grid ethos (through hostility to government intervention) but also 
through a low group identity. The charitable trusts chose not to join the 
National Federation of Housing Societies on its formation in 1935 (Malpass, 
2000a, p.264) suggesting that they saw their role essentially in terms of 
pursuing their separate organisational objectives rather than as part of a 
cooperative endeavour.
Housing associations were not seen as part of the Atlee government’s 
solution to the post-war welfare state; unlike local authorities they were not 
viewed as ‘plannable instruments’ by the Housing Minister (Nye Bevan) and 
they quickly found themselves peripheral to the extensive council building 
programmes of post-war housing policy (Holmans, 1987).
The development of ‘cost-rent’ and ‘co-ownership’ schemes in the 1960s has 
been seen as constituting the first modern generation of housing associations 
(Malpass and Murie,1999, p.73), established with a grant of £25m to provide 
loans. Despite this funding arrangement, the underlying motive was an 
attempt to provide social housing without public subsidy. However, these 
initiatives soon came to be regarded as failures: the cost rent schemes failed 
due to high land prices and interest rates (Cope, 1999, p. 10) and the co- 
ownership schemes (which offered owners a share in the increase in the 
market value of their properties) were unsustainable in the significant 
increases in property values in the 1970s (ibid). Although these schemes 
were discontinued they provided an important embryonic initiative for the 
privatisation drive of the late 1980s. They were also significant in that they 
began the process of establishing the principle that housing associations 
could provide management services in addition to conventional landlord 
functions (Malpass, 2000b, p.208).
The individualist roots of the sector comprised two main organisational forms 
(the model dwelling companies and charitable trusts). Whilst the former
74ceased to exist early in the twentieth century, the latter remain as major 
players and retain important connections to their past (Garside, 2000). There 
has been a tendency amongst some influential commentators to 
underestimate the connections between past and present housing 
associations. Hence historians such as Malpass (2000b) express the view 
that to apply the term ‘housing associations’ to Victorian organisations is both 
'anachronistic and misleading’ (p. 196). However, the discussion has showed 
that these housing organisations share important historical continuities with 
their modern counterparts with many organisations existing as substantial 
organisations into the twenty-first century; for example the two largest 
Charitable Trusts (Peabody and Guinness) have become the largest 
associations operating in the London area with over 15,000 units each (NHF, 
1997).
3.3.2  Egalitarianism: a campaigning sector (1960s and 1970s)
The marginalisation of housing associations in post-war housing policy meant 
that the voluntary sector adjusted its emphasis in order to establish itself in 
the role of an effective interest group, campaigning for housing improvements 
in inner city areas (Jones, 1985). However a second phase in the history of 
housing associations emerged as a response to the perceived conservatism 
and inertia of the older philanthropic associations such as Peabody and 
Guinness Trust, who were seen as ‘moribund, old fashioned and irrelevant’ 
(Malpass, 2000a, p.142). The older established organisations had been 
criticised by a House of Commons select committee for their overly cautious 
development programmes (Milner Holland, 1965, p.44). The Milner Holland 
Committee report suggested that the contribution of housing associations was 
likely to remain of limited significance:
Since the Second World War...the contribution of housing associations 
has been marginal...  It will continue to be in the nature of an emergency 
measure. It is not a pattern for a large scale contribution to London’s 
housing by the housing association movement (cited in Holmes, 2005, 
p.43).
75The establishment of the Housing Corporation in 1964 provided a stimulus 
which enabled associations to make use of subsidies and loans for the 
purchase, rehabilitation and conversion of old houses and new dwellings 
(Balchin and Rhoden, 2002, p.229). This resulted in a ‘new wave’ of 
organisations which were ‘increasingly being seen as the key players in new 
policies for urban regeneration and in breaking the monopoly of local 
authorities as the only providers of socially rented housing’ (Holmes, 2005, 
P-70).
A further important incentive to these campaigning organisations was the 
establishment of the interest group, Shelter, in 1966 (Seyd, 1975).  This 
organisation was able to exert a strong influence upon the emerging housing 
policy community. Shelter had a dual function. Primarily established in order 
to provide grants to social landlords, the organisation became increasingly 
critical of the ‘conservative and undemocratic’ activity of many existing 
organisations, believing them to be failing to meet the needs of inner-city 
homeless groups (Seyd, 1975, p.419). Thus the second objective was to 
function as a pressure group to influence government policy and campaign 
around the issue of homelessness (Jacobs et. al., 1999). Partly fortuitously, 
the foundation of Shelter coincided with the showing of a powerful drama, 
Cathy Come Home (Seyd, 1975; Malpass, 2000a, p. 142). The impact of the 
film and the establishment of a new organisation struck a popular chord and 
helped to construct a consensus that a radical, collective response was 
needed to address problems of homelessness and poor housing conditions in 
the face of bureaucratic indifference and private sector hostility. In addition 
key individuals, with an interest in the housing association sector (such as the 
Rev. Bruce Kenrick, the founder of Notting Hill Housing Trust) played an 
important role in campaigning for the introduction of a statutory duty upon 
local authorities to provide accommodation for homeless households through 
the 1977 Housing (Homeless Persons) Act (Seyd,  1975).
This campaigning, interest group activity marked a period of radical attempts 
to find local, practical, inclusive strategies to social problems which reflected a 
wider distrust of corporate bureaucracy and scepticism of professional
76expertise. The influence of writers such as Jacobs (1961) in the United States 
or Ward (1974) in Britain; the work of Schumacher (1974) and the ‘anti- 
psychiatry’ movement associated with lllich (1976) exercised an important 
influence upon egalitarian urban policies. Research undertaken on behalf of 
the Community Development Project in the 1970s (CDP, 1977) demonstrated 
a high level of suspicion of bureaucratic management systems. These ideas 
provided fertile ground for the development of a housing association collective 
‘movement’ devoted to locally based solutions and eager to pursue a radical, 
critical pressure group function.
The role as part of a ‘third arm’ or ‘third sector’ provision (Mullins, 1997a), 
demonstrated a wish to carve out a distinct identity separate from both 
welfare bureaucracies and profit-seeking landlords. The specialist skills of the 
housing association sector offered the benefits of a ‘pluralist approach to 
subsidised provision’ (Best, 1997, p. 103) and coincided with a period of 
increased tenant activism in the 1960s; squatters’ movements played a 
leading role in improving housing conditions in inner city areas and rent 
strikes were undertaken by council tenants (Murie et. al., 1976). The 
development of a number of new and dynamic ‘rehabilitation’ housing 
associations (Best, 1991) had the effect of reinvigorating the sector. Table 3.3 
illustrates how many organisations had their origins in this period.
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Housing association  Year of foundation  Stock in 2003 (numbers
of homes)
Family  1961  25,000
Battersea Churches and Chelsea  1962  1,300
Ealing Family  1962  7,500
London and Quadrant  1963  23,000
Metropolitan  1963  15,000
Notting Hill  1963  14,000
Community  1964  2,500
South London Family  1964  11,500
New Islington and Hackney  1965  6,200
Paddington Churches  1965  8,000
North British  1965  42,000
Hyde  1967  30,000
Croydon Churches  1967  1,300
Richmond Upon Thames  1967  3,000
Circle 33  1968  17,000
Newlon  1968  4,000
Shepherds Bush  1968  4,500
Presentation  1968  4,500
Centrepoint  1969
Acton  1969  7,200
Sanctuary  1969  5,000
St. Mungo Community  1969  1,000
Habinteg  1970  2,000
Community  1972  2,500
London Cyrenians  1972
Look Ahead  1973  1,810
Threshold Housing and Support  1975  3,100
Network  1975  6,000
Springboard  1975  6,000
Soho  1976  650
Source: Housing association, Annual Reports
These organisations formed the core of the core of the major developing 
associations in the London area. Perceiving local authorities as more problem
78than solution they ‘saw themselves as a distinct, modernising force within the 
housing association movement’ (Malpass, 2000a, p. 144). They gained an 
impetus from dissatisfaction with the comprehensive slum clearance schemes 
implemented by municipal authorities during the 1960s (Dunleavy, 1981; 
Power, 1993) and their ability to develop incrementally through rehabilitation 
programmes was a key attribute. Thus:
The value of preserving communities, and conserving properties, was 
increasingly emphasised as a better alternative for many areas than 
wholesale clearance and replacement with council estates. System- 
building techniques and industrialised methods turned public sympathy 
away from the tower blocks, immense estates on the periphery of 
towns, the concrete walkways and sometimes brutal design; the 
painstaking and piecemeal renovation practiced by housing 
associations gained popularity accordingly (Best, 1991, p.152).
Their existence at the interstices between state and market succeeded in 
reinforcing their sense of legitimacy (Back and Hamnett, 1985). 
Simultaneously they avoided the disapprobation attached to private landlords 
in inner-city areas and they were motivated by a desire to tackle the problems 
of slum landlords such as Perec Rachman in West London (Kemp, 1997). A 
history of one of these rehabilitation organisations (Paddington Churches 
Housing Association) outlined the experience of residents in the West London 
area in the 1960s. It described
elderly, long-standing residents who felt more and more insecure by the 
day, as their homes were bought and sold over their heads. Many 
suffered harassment from landlords. Foreign-based property speculators 
stalked the area, looking for a quick killing (Mantle, 1995, p. 25).
Between 1968 and 1988, half of all housing association investment was 
devoted to the acquisition and rehabilitation of street properties (Best, 1997, 
p. 107), illustrating a piecemeal approach to urban renewal in contrast to the 
comprehensive development schemes of municipal landlords.
Many of these rehabilitation organisations were influenced by religious 
institutions, for example the Catholic Housing Aid Society was highly
79influential in the establishment of the pressure group ‘Shelter’ (Malpass, 
2000b, p.208). Most of the associations with ‘family’ in their title also owe their 
origins to religious movements (ibid.). The influence of religion within the 
church organisations was clear at the outset of many of the ‘new wave’ of 
housing associations. For example, the reverend Bruce Kenrick, founder of 
Notting Hill Housing Trust wrote in 1965:
We make no secret of the fact that we see the Trust as a fragment of the 
church. A fragment whose dynamic is enshrined in the sacrament we 
celebrate together (Kenrick, 1965, cited in Holmes, 2005, p. 16).
Similarly, a history of Centrepoint housing association describes their spiritual 
origins in 1969: ‘We went ahead without planning permission. In fact we only 
consulted two people; the Holy Spirit and Westminster Council Rodent 
Officer...We had little more than £30 in the bank when we started’ (quoted at 
www.centrepoint.orq.uk). These explicit religious motivations were soon to 
disappear from the objectives of these organisations. What remained was a 
strong collective ethos, coupled with a rejection of bureaucratic working 
practices:
All those who worked with the [Notting Hill Housing] Trust in these early 
years recall the strong ‘buzz’ of creativity and breaking new ground. The 
excitement came in part from being in close day-to-day contact with the 
community, working to find solutions to the acute and complex difficulties 
which people were experiencing. Responsibility was delegated. Staff 
were encouraged to be innovative. All this encouraged a very high level 
of commitment and enthusiasm (Holmes, 2005, p. 17).
Concerns about racial discrimination in the allocation of council housing 
became prevalent in discussions of housing policy in the 1970s. A number of 
studies, which demonstrated unintentional, ‘institutional’ discrimination despite 
stated objectives, questioned the hierarchical management systems 
developed by local authorities (Henderson and Karn, 1987; Smith, 1989). 
Although applied to organisations embracing equal opportunity policies and 
making public commitments to equal treatment, a number of research studies 
indicated persistent patterns of discrimination through the unintended 
consequences of policies designed to minimise unfair treatment of minority
80ethnic groups (Jeffers and Hoggett, 1995; Law, 1996). Thus, Jacobs (1985) 
has shown how many Labour controlled local authorities were reluctant to 
offer tenancies to colonial immigrants and their British born children. Other 
studies revealed persistent, institutional discrimination in the allocation of 
council housing in the London Borough of Hackney (CRE, 1984), Birmingham 
City Council (Henderson and Karn, 1987) and the London Borough of 
Lambeth (Jeffers and Hoggett, 1995).
Problems were viewed as endemic within hierarchical local authority 
structures and organisations were encouraged to develop more equitable 
systems of allocation, discretion and service delivery (Harrison, M., 1995; 
Harrison with Davis, 2001). The consequence was the formation of a number 
of specialist black and minority ethnic housing associations, established by 
local community activists, designed to challenge entrenched interests of 
white, middle-class policy makers (Sarre et. a/., 1989).
Associations were therefore able to capture niche markets in providing 
housing for specialist groups who had been excluded from either fully private 
provision through direct prejudice or who had experienced institutional 
discrimination via state bureaucracies. Thus, associations developed an 
expertise in providing accommodation for individuals with disabilities, 
sheltered housing for the elderly and general needs housing for black and 
minority ethnic groups (Henderson and Karn, 1987; Smith, 1989). A strong 
egalitarian ethos became attached to voluntary sector provision, which was 
also evident in the development of a smaller-scale cooperative housing 
movement (Clapham and Kintrea, 1992). In particular this later movement 
helped to create a further wave of organisations from within black and minority 
ethnic communities in London. Table 3.4 illustrates the emergence of a 
specialist housing association sector in the 1970s, alongside a later wave of 
organisations (assisted by a Housing Corporation black and minority ethnic 
strategy) in the 1980s.
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Housing association Year of foundation Client group Stock in 2003 
(numbers of 
homes)
Habinteg 1970 Disability and 
wheelchair users
2,000
John Grooms 1970 Wheelchair users 1,100
West Hampstead 1973 Temporary housing -
Look Ahead 1973 Vulnerable groups 1,810
Ujima 1977 Black and minority 
ethnic
4,200
Spitalfields 1979 Bangladeshi
community
300
Solon Wandsworth 1982 Cooperative 1,000
Cara 1983 Irish community 370
ASRA 1984 Asian community 2,000
Labo 1984 Bangladeshi
community
350
Innisfree 1985 Irish community 320
North London Muslim 1986 Muslim community 450
Inquilab 1986 Black and minority 
ethnic
650
Croydon People’s 1989 Black and minority 
ethnic
-
Shian 1989 Black and minority 
ethnic ex-offenders
300
Golden Lane Housing 1998 Mental disability -
Source: Housing Association, Annual Reports
The legitimacy of the rehabilitation housing associations rested on their small- 
scale operation and local profile. Thus, the view gained prevalence that 
housing associations ‘managing less than 1000 dwellings, are more popular, 
and always more successful...The high standard of service ...  is thought to 
stem from the fact that they are small-scale not large-scale landlords’ 
(Nuttgens, 1989, p. 109).
82Advocates of housing associations were keen to convey an image of ‘value- 
based’ organisations (NFHA, 1995) operating effectively to meet housing 
need. From this perspective, these associations were diverse, proficient, 
locally based institutions, unaffected by the problems of inefficiency, 
unresponsiveness and rigidity associated with the ‘bureaucratic paternalism’ 
(Hambleton and Hoggett, 1987) or ‘public landlordism’ (Cole and Furbey,
1994) of the state sector.
An egalitarian philosophy provided a strong rationale for the majority of 
contemporary London housing associations. The ethos of a voluntary housing 
movement was largely constructed around a commitment to improving the 
social welfare of disadvantaged groups and providing specialist 
accommodation. These objectives continued to play an important role in 
constructing a sense of mission for contemporary housing associations. This 
core identity remained central to ‘vision’ statements, rooted in the 
organisational history of the London associations. This egalitarian ethos was 
used to deflect other criticisms, such as the lack of accountability of housing 
associations. However, this independent, voluntary, campaigning ethos began 
to conflict with another important pressure within the sector, which, since the 
1970s, became more pronounced.
3.3.3  Hierarchy: housing associations as agents of the State (the 1970s)
Although not commonly associated with hierarchy, the management style 
adopted in many housing associations can be traced to a high-grid and high 
group approach. From their origins in the late nineteenth century, a powerful 
strain of paternalism was evident in some of the philanthropic associations, 
manifested not only in terms of individualism and self-help but also in a 
strongly interventionist style of management. Thus, the trustees of Peabody 
Housing Trust expressed their aspiration as attempting to reform the 
‘intellectual, moral and social welfare’ of their residents (quoted in Garside, 
2000, p.50). Some organisations such as William Sutton Trust, which merely 
provided ‘sufficient and suitable’ accommodation without trying to produce
83improvements in resident behaviour, were accused of encouraging moral 
degeneracy (Garside, 2000, p.50).
The management approach adopted by many of the early housing 
associations was predisposed towards a coercive and judgmental style, 
heavily influenced by the figure of Octavia Hill as discussed earlier. Although 
associated with an individualistic approach, there were also strong elements 
of hierarchy in her model of management. Octavia Hill’s methods were 
typified by a strong sense of moral endeavour and a punitive attitude towards 
rent arrears. The Octavia Hill method combined reform of both residents and 
landlords. Her attitude towards her tenants can be summarised in her view 
that ‘the difficulty with these people is not financial but moral...They must be 
trained’ (quoted in Whelan, 1998, p. 5). Thus ‘she rejected the environmental 
argument, claiming that it was not the houses that were the problem but the 
tenants whose destructive behaviour was reinforced by bad landlords’ 
(Garside, 2000, p. 52). The solution was therefore to be found in a 
combination of moral education, emphasising the duties of residents and in 
effective management.
Hill’s methods have been highly influential in formulating ideas about 
management strategies for contemporary housing organisations (see for 
example Power, 1987; Darley, 1990; Whelan, 1998). Although the model of 
management associated with Octavia Hill represents an approach which 
continues to resonate within contemporary discussions of housing and 
welfare policy, her methods have proved controversial with other writers who 
criticised her approach as outmoded and unnecessarily judgmental (Malpass, 
1984; Spicker, 1985; Clapham, 1997). Nevertheless, they have left a strong 
hierarchical legacy in contemporary management discussions about the 
moral dimension of housing management.
Hierarchical strains were evident in some housing associations during the 
1930s. Despite the reluctance of many of the public utility societies to accept 
public funding and thereby compromise their independence, other housing 
associations welcomed the opportunities offered by government subsidies. As
84early as the 1930s, a description of housing associations stated ‘they have 
harnessed themselves to the coach of state and must obey the reins’ 
(Macadam, 1934, p.27, quoted in Garside, 2000, p.75). This quote showed 
that there had been a long tradition within the voluntary housing sector that 
compelled it to adopt public sector norms. Although opposed by many 
organisations the idea that associations represented a part of the state sector 
exercises an important influence on these organisations. However, this strain 
represented a minority pressure in the first half of the twentieth century.
A defining moment in the incorporation of housing associations into a public 
sector environment occurred during the 1960s as housing associations 
expanded their profile through extensive regeneration activity. The 
establishment of the Housing Corporation in 1964 as a government body 
responsible for the financing and monitoring of association activity not only 
provided funding opportunities but also greater government scrutiny of 
association business. In the London area in 1967 the Greater London Council 
(GLC) began to provide funding for the sector and by 1983 they had assisted 
in the provision of 20,000 dwellings, the majority of which consisted of the 
rehabilitation of older properties. Two-thirds of these associations were 
located in inner London and almost 200 housing associations received 
funding through a rate fund contribution in addition to government subsidy. 
The GLC also transferred some its own stock to existing housing associations 
and provided land for future development (Malpass and Murie, 1994, p.91).
The major government interventions in the sector occurred in the 1970s. 
Described as the ‘first major breach in the local authority monopoly of 
provision of subsidised rented housing’ (Malpass and Murie, 1994, p.92, 
emphasis in original) the 1972 Housing Finance Act heralded the more 
substantial changes in the Housing Act 1974 which represented a turning- 
point for the sector. The 1974 Act introduced a generous form of deficit 
subsidy known as Housing Association Grant (HAG) and ‘provided the basis 
for the enormous growth in the role and output of housing associations’ 
(Malpass and Murie, 1994, p.92). The subsidy system offered considerable 
benefits to the sector, allowing it to develop housing on an unprecedented
85scale and insulating organisations from financial risk. However, the receipt of 
state financial assistance also entailed sacrifices:
The introduction of large-scale public subsidy compromised to some 
extent the independence of the movement as inevitably bureaucratic 
controls were imposed as a quid pro quo for the receipt of public funds. 
The year 1974 was not only one which brought expansion, but it also 
marked the end of an era of reliance upon largely voluntary effort and 
charitable donations (Cope, 1999, p.11).
After the 1974 Housing Act associations benefited from minimal development 
costs (apart from that which could be sponsored by the collection of fair 
rents). The financial regime for housing associations was indicative of the 
willingness of governments of all political complexions to support a form of 
subsidised provision not controlled by local authorities, though on a relatively 
small scale.
These legislative changes proved a turning point for housing associations as 
they heralded not only new funding but also more rigorous monitoring 
arrangements, bringing them in line with other public sector institutions.
There was a ‘new policing role’ for the Housing Corporation, which ‘registered, 
monitored and could ultimately control each housing association in receipt of 
public funds’ creating an ‘important linkage’ between the state and voluntary 
sector (Best, 1991, p.153). The Housing Act 1974 also prevented people with 
a financial interest in associations from serving on management committees 
or from paying dividends to shareholders. This was a reversal of previous 
practice (Malpass, 2000b, p.208) and marked a stricter regulatory approach to 
the sector as access to public subsidy became available.
One of the benefits of housing associations was therefore that they could be 
seen as a small but expanding arm of provision that central government could 
more effectively control than the intractable local authority sector. The Act 
introduced an environment that was effectively free from risk, with an average 
of 80 per cent of development costs covered by public funding (ibid., p.209). 
One interpretation was that the 1974 Act ‘virtually transformed housing 
associations into agents of state housing policy’ (ibid.). In similar vein, others
86have written that for housing associations, ‘the majority of their funding came 
from central and local government placing them firmly in the public sector’ 
(Cope, 1999, p.2).
The 1974 Act therefore can be seen to have facilitated the colonisation or 
‘incorporation’ of the sector by state agencies (Mullins and Riseborough, 
2001, p.156). As public subsidy was limited to organisations registered with 
the Housing Corporation, this non-departmental public body was able to 
exercise considerable control and ‘resource dependency’ (Aldrich, 1976) on 
the part of the voluntary sector. Consequently government control of these 
organisations increased dramatically.
The role of the Housing Corporation saw central government exerting an 
unprecedented level of influence over the funding, output and management 
performance of housing associations. Thus, the period since the 1970s ‘has 
seen the evolution of a system which initially involved little more than the 
registration of housing associations, and some rather primitive financial 
controls, into a comprehensive machinery for auditing their performance on a 
variety of dimensions’ (Day et. al., 1993, p.8). Some have argued that this 
process has entailed a corporate culture shaped by a process of ‘coercive 
isomorphism’ (Di Maggio and Powell, 1991b), whereby the sector was 
compelled to accept much higher levels of standardisation and uniformity 
(Mullins and Riseborough, 2001, p. 156).
These hierarchical pressures from central government were exacerbated by 
pressures from local government partners. Local councils had always 
exercised an important strategic role in housing policy, determining clearance 
and improvement schemes, regulating provision, negotiating land deals, 
providing planning permission and offering grants (Goodlad, 1993). These 
arrangements were strengthened in the 1970s by the requirement to act in 
partnership arrangements with local authorities as a condition of receiving 
housing subsidy and resulted in a loss of independence and autonomy for 
London housing associations. The dependence on local government
87institutions also made it difficult for associations to criticise municipal policies. 
Housing associations therefore were given increasingly restricted choices 
about whom they could accommodate and where they could develop 
(Malpass, 2000b). Furthermore, their autonomy was subject to the direction of 
local authority partners through ‘nomination’ agreements requiring housing 
associations to accept increasing proportions of applicants selected by local 
authorities.
Housing associations therefore faced considerable hierarchical pressures as 
they shifted towards a public sector ethos and became more closely involved 
with the State sector. Thus, on the basis of research conducted as early as 
1979 the fact that
most housing associations at that time could fairly be described as 
bureaucracies was unpalatable, but accepted by many Directors. With 
sizeable and growing members of staff, varying levels of responsibility 
and titles, and substantial absolute and differential salaries, the 
association had entered the bureaucratic family (Billis, 1984, p.163).
By the early 1980s, the Housing Corporation was criticised as a tool of the 
Department of the Environment (DoE), having lost its independence, and 
relinquishing its role of lobbying for and representing the housing associations 
(Wolmar, 1982). The Director of the National Federation of Housing 
Associations, stated that the housing association movement is
not a nationalised industry or a public authority...We have obligations to 
hold on to our homes as long as possible...As independent bodies, we 
received...housing association grants...When we took the money we 
never for a moment suspected that by receiving it we had changed our 
status from being an independent body to being a public authority 
(reported in The Guardian, 6/11/82, cited in Balchin and Rhoden, 2002, 
p.236).
The resource dependency on central and local government institutions 
imposed increasing difficulty in retaining an egalitarian identity as interest 
groups, critics of government policy and in exercising their historic 
campaigning role. Hierarchy in housing associations represented an
88additional strain upon their identity as small-scale, responsive and effective 
locally based organisations. The final pressure that can be identified has had 
important implications for the future development of housing associations.
3.3.4  Fatalism: a residual sector (the 1980s)
Fatalism has a long tradition in housing policy, particularly amongst the 
recipients of housing provision. For example, Wohl (1977, p.317) argues that 
despite increasing discontent and working class agitation over housing issues 
in the late Victorian era, activists encountered considerable difficulty in 
stimulating interest amongst slum dwellers in their housing conditions (cited in 
Malpass and Murie, 1999, p.32).
Additionally, Dunleavy (1977) has shown how in place of radical dissent 
against inadequate management systems in the mass housing era of the 
1970s, the response from residents was one of ‘quiescence’ rather than 
protest. For example, with the exception of one or two high profile cases, 
there was no concerted pressure for rent strikes or other forms of collective 
action amongst resident groups in response to the poor performance of local 
authority landlords.
However, the strongest pressure towards fatalism can be found in the process 
of ‘residualisation’ of the sector as it was seen to cater for increasing 
proportions of low income groups, economically inactive households and 
vulnerable groups (Malpass, 1990). Although much debate has revolved 
around the social changes since 1988 (for example, Page, 1993) evidence 
shows that housing associations have historically attempted to cater for 
residents with a lower social status than those housed by local authorities. 
Despite the criticisms mentioned earlier that the philanthropic associations 
catered for a skilled working class, other housing associations were prepared 
to offer accommodation for less affluent groups. In her early interventions, at 
the start of the twentieth century, Octavia Hill was commended for having the 
courage to manage ‘the tenants nobody else would touch’ (Whelan, 1998, 
p.4). Thus, despite her uncompromising approach to rental payment and her
89judgmental stance towards the behaviour of residents noted above, she was 
commended for tackling some of the deep-rooted, problems of disadvantaged 
groups who had often been excluded from council tenancies. A history of the 
William Sutton Trust described their resident group as embracing
the misfit who is not acceptable to the council; the large poor family who 
cannot afford council rents; the immigrant...By accepting these types of 
tenants, the Society helps to release council tenancies for the rather 
better off families who wish to progress from a tenement to a new flat 
(Tims, 1968, quoted in Garside, 2000, p. 74).
The use of housing associations to accommodate groups who had been 
excluded from local authority assistance played an important role in providing 
specialist accommodation for marginal and vulnerable households. However, 
the central point was that these groups traditionally formed a minority of 
housing association residents. Since the late 1970s the social profile of the 
sector has become progressively dominated by disadvantaged groups, to the 
extent where housing associations are now seen as ‘relegated’ to the ‘lower 
levels’ of social housing provision where management and provision were 
more urgent’ (Garside, 2000, p.78). A central theme in contemporary 
discussions of housing policy has been the ‘residualisation’ of social housing 
(Malpass, 1990) whereby subsidised accommodation caters for an increasing 
proportion of tenants who are economically inactive, on low incomes and in 
vulnerable circumstances. Residualisation indicates a stigmatised service, 
which increasingly functions as an ‘ambulance service’ for the poor (Harloe,
1978). Although the thesis of residualisation had normally been applied to the 
municipal sector, others (for example, Page, 1993) illustrated how processes 
of marginalisation and polarisation were becoming particularly acute within the 
housing association sector.
A number of features combined to create a fatalist ethos, dependent on a low 
group and high grid environment. First, the changing client group led to 
pessimistic prognoses for contemporary social housing, warning that housing 
associations are creating the ‘slums of the twenty-first century’ (Balchin, 1995, 
p. 155) and becoming ‘accommodation agencies for the “underclass’” (Cole
90et. ai, 1996, p.8). The residualisation of the housing association sector in the 
London area was primarily a consequence of the application of homelessness 
legislation since the 1977 Housing (Homeless Persons) Act whereby new 
social housing was allocated almost exclusively to statutory homeless groups. 
By definition these households have been classified as in ‘priority need’ 
indicating either that they have dependent children or that they are in some 
other way ‘vulnerable’ (due to illness or old age).
Table 3.5 illustrates the increasing proportion of lettings to homeless 
households during the 1980s showing an almost doubling of the percentage 
of properties allocated to homeless households in the London area. Inevitably 
these new tenancies were provided by the housing association sector as local 
authority supply declined to minimal levels.
Table 3.5: Lettings to homeless households (all tenancies), 1980-1988 
Percentage of all lettings to new tenants
Region  1980/1  1982/3  1984/5  1986/7  1987/8
London 27 32 40 52 53
South
East 18 20 18 23 26
England 16 17 19 15 27
Source: DoE, Housing and Construction Statistics
London had a much greater concentration of marginal groups with around 
twice the proportion of lettings allocated to homeless households than other 
areas of the country. This concentration inevitably increased the 
administrative pressures of managing a residual (and increasingly 
stigmatized) service. As in areas such as London the demand for social 
housing overwhelmed the available supply of accommodation, there was little 
effective choice and a pauperised, vulnerable and increasingly desperate 
client group dominated new lettings with limited scope for flexibility amongst 
social housing providers. Thus ‘it has been estimated in some boroughs that it
91would take over 20 years to house just those on the waiting list at present, let 
alone new applicants’ (Brownhill and Sharp, 1992, p. 15).
Before 1988 housing associations could exert no control over the level of rent 
that they set. The Rent Officer Service determined a figure independently of 
landlord needs. Nevertheless, the ‘fair rents’ registered in the 1970s and 
1980s were increasing far above the level of inflation in order to more 
accurately reflect market rates (Treanor, 1990, pp.4-5). Table 3.6 shows the 
level of increases for housing association ‘fair rents’ up to 1988 in the London 
area indicated a four-fold increase over a fourteen-year period.
Table 3.6: Rent registrations for housing association accommodation in 
Greater London, 1974-1988
Mean registered rent  £ p.a.
1974 336
1975 373
1976 401
1977 463
1978 527
1979 563
1980 635
1981 761
1982 831
1983 919
1984 1,011
1985 1,080
1986 1,157
1987 1,280
1988 1,371
Source: DoE, Housing and Construction Statistics
Additionally, the absence of a ‘right to buy’ for most housing association 
tenants (in contrast to their local authority counterparts) meant that more 
affluent tenants normally chose to leave their accommodation to take 
advantage of the benefits offered by owner occupation. This strategy further 
reinforced the perception of a sector that had become the preserve of an 
impoverished underclass and that housing associations were in danger of 
becoming representatives of a new class of slum landlord.
92A sense of fatalism within the sector became apparent in concerns about a 
loss of autonomy as reflected by the then Director of the National Federation:
Some will say that housing associations sold their souls to the State in 
1974 in accepting both the substantial statutory funds and also the 
burdensome bureaucratic controls, which flowed from this Act (Best, 
1984, p. 182).
Others criticised the regulatory pressures imposed on housing associations: 
‘After the Conservatives gained power in 1979, the Corporation imposed its 
will on housing associations in an unprecedented and damaging manner’ 
(Balchin and Rhoden, 2002, p.234). The sense that bureaucratic regulation 
was becoming overwhelmeng was evident in complaints that the work of 
associations had been ‘handicapped’ and ‘there was a case for less meddling 
by the DoE in the Housing Corporation’s affairs and less interference by the 
Corporation in association affairs, while in contrast there was remoteness and 
communication failure’ (Balchin and Rhoden, 2002, p.235).
The reliance upon government subsidy was thought to have undermined the 
original goals of the movement. Thus, some held that ‘their independence had 
already been severely compromised by more than two decades of state 
funding’ (Whelan, 1998, p.32). The extent of centralised control led to a 
description of the sector as ‘little more than the government’s estate agent’ 
(‘Cracks appear in the foundation’, Investors Chronicle, March, 1994, quoted 
in Whelan, 1998, p.32).  Following from the changes imposed since the 
1970s, housing associations were seen as facing a fundamental crisis of 
identity and legitimacy. In particular their ‘image as small, local, community- 
based and responsive is under severe threat’ (Malpass and Murie, 1994, 
p. 175).
The high grid element necessary to the development of fatalism can be found 
in the acknowledgement that more intensive approaches to management are 
needed to cope with the increasingly challenging behaviour of residents. As 
housing associations are forced to accommodate increasing numbers of
93vulnerable groups, this incorporates individuals susceptible to mental illness, 
physical health problems, harassment or domestic violence. This issue has 
become particularly problematic since policies of ‘care in the community’ were 
introduced in the 1980s, encouraging individuals to remain within their 
domestic environments rather than receiving institutional care in large 
psychiatric hospitals (Means and Smith, 1994; Lewis and Glennerster, 1996).
The overall impact of changes since the 1970s has been that the 
management task within the housing association sector had become far more 
problematic by the 1980s. Two groups have been most affected: the tenants 
themselves and front-line staff. Hence, even before the 1988 reforms a range 
of pressures were resulting in different cultural responses from housing 
associations. These pressures and criticisms were exacerbated by in 
introduction of the reforms in the Housing Act 1988.
3.4  The New Public Management Reforms: the Housing Act 1988
The managerialist reform programme of the 1980s was designed with 
municipal authorities in mind as the chief perpetrators of abuses of 
bureaucratic administration (Power, 1987). In line with other new public 
management (NPM) reforms, the policy solution was therefore to inhibit 
hierarchy within housing organisations by engendering the 
‘demunicipalisation’ (Kemp, 1989) of rented housing provision. In particular 
the 1988 reforms illustrated classic NPM models of disaggregation, 
competition, and incentivisation.
Encouraged by the popular success of the policy of council house sales to 
sitting tenants (Forrest and Murie, 1990) the Housing Minister at the time of 
the 1988 Housing Act argued that further privatisation measures were 
necessary. Thus ‘the next great push after the right to buy should be to get rid 
of the state as a big landlord’ (Waldegrave, 1987, p.8). In similar vein the 
Secretary of State for Environment outlined the key objective of the reforms 
as ‘an increase in the choice available to those who do not want or could not 
afford to own their homes and in particular the breaking up of the local
94authority monopoly in social rented housing’ (Ridley, 1991, p.1). The objective 
of the housing reforms was also to remove the fatalist legacy of previous 
policy: ‘Housing was the area where Margaret Thatcher thought it was easiest 
to start to dismantle the dependency culture’ (Ridley, 1991, p.93).
Government policy looked to the voluntary housing sector to resolve the 
seemingly intractable problem of ownership and management of large 
housing estates. The background to the management reforms of 1988 rested 
upon explicit objectives to dismantle hierarchy, to limit fatalism and to 
engender an individualistic cultural ethos.
The Housing Act 1988 was part of a broader conservative strategy to reform 
both the welfare state and attitudes towards public management. The 1988 
Act was linked to an intensive reform programme incorporating substantial 
changes to the core welfare services of health, education, social security and 
social care. Described as constituting a ‘major offensive against the basic 
structures of welfare provision’ (Le Grand, 1990, p.1) and as ‘critical in the 
history of British social policy’ (ibid.) the Thatcherite reforms of the late 1980s 
have been seen as the apex of the New Right philosophies of welfare 
provision (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992; Malpass and Means, 1993). Based upon 
an extensive ‘marketisation’ of public services (Hutton, 1996, p. 176), this 
reform programme advocated the extension of competition and the 
introduction of ‘quasi-market’ systems into hitherto bureaucratic, state sector 
services (Le Grand and Bartlett, 1993; Walsh, 1995).
The reforms comprised a range of initiatives to limit the power, role and 
autonomy of public sector agencies. Hence, legislation was introduced to 
reduce the power of local education authorities (through the Education 
Reform Act 1988) and to diminish local government financial autonomy by the 
application of a ‘Community Charge’ through the Local Government Finance 
Act 1988. Later legislation extended the reform programme to restructure 
local government finance, including the ring fencing of Housing Revenue 
Accounts, limiting the opportunity of councils to use cross subsidy from their 
General Rate Fund for housing provision (and vice versa) through the Local 
Government and Housing Act, 1989 (Malpass, 1990). Furthermore thestructure of health service delivery was reformed to incorporate an internal 
market and reforms to psychiatric services through the National Health 
Service and Community Care Act 1990. Described as ‘the most significant 
break in the incrementalist tradition of social policy’ since the 1940s 
(Glennerster et. al., 1991) this reform programme aimed at a fundamental 
change in the culture of United Kingdom welfare provision. Although many of 
the components of these legislative changes were highly problematic 
(particularly the failed ‘Community Charge’ legislation, Butler, et al., 1994) the 
cumulative effect of the programme has been hugely significant, resulting in 
an ‘ideological blizzard’ in addition to the ‘economic hurricane’ of the 1970s 
(Le Grand, 1991, p.350). The Housing Act 1988 ‘reflected Government’s 
determination to transform rented housing from a poor quality local authority 
near monopoly to a diversified, privately funded and managed business 
sector* (Glennerster et. at, 1991, p.398).
The 1989 Housing and Local Government Act imposed further constraints 
upon local authorities in terms of their housing capital and revenue spending 
and the cumulative impact of the reforms was to radically restructure and alter 
‘the state’s role in the provision and future management of social housing’ 
(Lambert and Malpass, 1998, p.93). The key objective of the government 
reforms of the 1980s was to transform the bureaucratic culture of core public 
services. As the then Minister of Public Service and Science (William 
Waldegrave) stated, the central question was how ‘to get away from the dead 
hand of hierarchy, where no-one was responsible for success or failure of 
management’ (The Times essay, 26, April, 1993, cited in Page, 1994, p.9). 
The extent of change has been described as follows:
Before 1988, housing associations had a different culture: they were 
quasi public sector bodies working almost entirely with public finance in 
an area governed by public requirements, regulation and accountability. 
Now the new regime expects them to be entrepreneurial, risk taking and 
competitive (Page, 1994, p.18).
The cultural change from an administrative to an entrepreneurial housing 
sector was to be achieved through a number of measures. First,
96disaggregation was ensured by establishing that local authorities would play a 
facilitative or ‘enabling role’, where the provision of new social housing would 
be through voluntary rather than statutory sector agencies (Bramley, 1993). 
The function of local government was therefore to facilitate the development 
of strategic housing objectives rather than to directly deliver services. This 
objective marked a major change in the role and function of elected local 
government, which since 1919 had been the principal agency for the 
construction and management of publicly subsidised accommodation (Merrett,
1979). Housing associations were seen as ideally placed to occupy this role 
as they had gained valuable experience in developing social housing in inner 
city locations since the 1970s (Jones, 1985). As discussed above they were 
untainted by the management failures of the mass housing era and were 
perceived to have retained strong local connections with their communities.
As mainly small-scale, locally based and diverse organisations, housing 
associations were thought to be in a strong position to achieve the necessary 
management improvements.
Competition was ensured by deregulation of private rented housing. The 
policy to reinvigorate a moribund private rented sector allowed profit-making 
landlords to compete on a level playing field with public agencies by removing 
restrictions on rental income. Housing associations were therefore able to 
negotiate their own income streams. Prior to the Act housing association rents 
were registered in advance by an independent Rent Officer Service with the 
remainder of grant issued through public subsidy. Whilst before 1988 housing 
associations had no interest or control over their rental income, post 1988 
future levels of rent became a crucial factor in determining the feasibility of 
business plans. Housing associations were therefore able to compete against 
one another in order to win bids for development funding on a value for 
money basis.
incentivisation was guaranteed through the introduction of the Act was to a 
system of ‘mixed funding’. Public subsidy was reduced in percentage terms 
and associations were compelled to seek private sources of income to
97subsidise their development programmes. Table 3.7 illustrates the sharp 
decline in percentage terms of government subsidy since the late 1980s.
Table 3.7:  Headline grant rates to housing associations,  1988 to 2000
Percentage
1988-89 75-80
1989-90 75-80
1990-91 75-80
1991-2 75
1992-3 72
1993-4 67
1994-5 62
1995-6 58
1996-7 58
1997-8 56
1998-9 54
1999-2000 54
Source: Malpass, 2000a, p.206
Figure 3.1  illustrates the changes in funding arrangements illustrating the 
increasing importance of private finance as the levels of public subsidy were 
reduced. By 1997, the Housing Corporation was providing subsidy of £967m 
(compared to £1.8m in 1994). Finance raised from private sources had 
reached £823m in 1997.
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The combination of a reduction in public subsidy combined with significant 
increases in private finance meant that associations were required to bear a 
greater proportion of development risk, and to make their own provision for 
major repairs. Interest payments on the private loans available were to be met 
through rental income (Harrison, J., 1995). The outcome was that rent levels 
had to increase substantially to take account of the costs of new build 
schemes. The main significance of these changes for the housing association 
sector was therefore to introduce substantial risk into their calculations. Whilst 
under the previous financial regime, they had been largely insulated from the 
consequences of poor management and investment decisions by the 
guarantee of high levels of public subsidy, the new era found exposed them to 
the relentless pressures of a competitive environment. They were forced to 
appeal to a variety of interests and were now entirely answerable for their 
mistakes.
The situation of the voluntary sector at the ‘centre stage’ of mainstream 
housing provision (Harrison, J., 1995) and their dependence on private 
income meant that their approach to ownership, development and 
management had to adapt to these new pressures. They were simultaneously 
expected to occupy a private sector role and to take responsibility for duties 
that were previously the function of public agencies.
The 1988 Act could therefore be seen to have instituted an injection of 
individualism, constituting a ‘reprivatisation’ of the sector (Kemp, 1990; 
Randolph, 1993) with housing associations returning to their origins as semi­
commercial organisations, reintroducing private sector competitive practices 
and seeking business investment. The move from the ‘charitable’ to the 
‘commercial’ (Blake, 1997, p. 175) sector heralded a ‘commodification’ of 
housing policy (Harloe, 1995). As Housing Corporation investment decisions 
became increasingly competitive, ‘the initiative passed to those associations 
willing to adopt more dynamic, aggressive and commercial approaches’ 
(Garside, 2000, p.203).
99However, as discussed above, associations were also seen as becoming 
‘incorporated’ into a new welfare settlement (Mullins and Riseborough, 2001) 
as they fulfilled functions previously carried out by the state sector. 
Furthermore, they found themselves intertwined in complex 
interorganisational networks to deliver objectives (Reid, 1995) within an 
increasingly diverse and fragmented arena of local governance.
A further development in the sector was an increasing internal diversity as 
associations expanded their area of operation into care homes and shared 
ownership schemes; creating subsidiaries and group structures and involving 
themselves in local labour and training schemes. These activities could be 
seen as heralding a return to the pioneering activities of the Victorian 
philanthropic Trusts and societies (Malpass, 2000a, p. 14).
Since 1988, commentators have begun to point to some of the tensions 
inherent in the role of housing associations. For example, some have claimed 
that housing associations ‘can be forgiven for feeling they now face an identity 
crisis’ (Dwelly, 1999, p.6). The fundamental tensions surfacing within the 
sector created new strains upon housing associations resulting in a loss of 
focus and direction and a lack of guidance about the core purposes of these 
organisations. In particular the tensions of occupying a role located between 
‘voluntary’, ‘public’ and ‘private’ dimensions proved increasingly difficult to 
accommodate. A further pressure resulted from the perception that the sector 
occupied a residual status at the margins of social service provision, at the 
same time as it was attempting to play a central role in the delivery of social 
policy.
3.5  Conclusion
The historical discussion has illustrated how before 1988 housing 
associations were a largely neglected tool of public policy and played a 
peripheral role to the municipal sector in terms of provision of
100accommodation. It was this marginalisation that was rectified in the 1988 
legislation.
The story of the housing association sector can be usefully told in terms of 
four main cultural imperatives that have influenced the housing association 
sector at different periods in time. Individualism played a prominent role in the 
first wave of housing organisations, in particular influencing the development 
of the philanthropic Trusts, many of which continue to be significant providers 
in London. In contrast to those commentators who maintain that there is little 
to connect the Victorian philanthropists with their current manifestations, there 
is a clear inheritance from the earlier to contemporary organisations. An 
individualistic approach continued in inter-war pioneering associations with 
less success, but it represented the dominant approach in the voluntary 
housing sector from the beginning of the twentieth century to the end of the 
Second World War and was a key factor in the government decision to give 
housing associations the role as main providers in the late 1980s.
However, the failure of individualism to cater for diverse housing needs in the 
1960s led to a hugely influential egalitarian world-view becoming adopted by 
the newly-emerging London housing associations. These organisations 
became known as the ‘Shelter’ organisations and they subsequently formed 
the core of the major contemporary developing associations. Many founding 
members of these organisations later attained influential positions in the 
housing sector and they subsequently played a highly significant role in 
determining the shape and identity of the housing associations movement. 
Nevertheless, these organisations were not without their critics, in particular 
for their lack of accountability to local communities and this allowed a later 
wave of egalitarian organisations to emerge in the 1970s, with minority ethnic 
community based housing associations playing a leading role.
Nevertheless, despite the success of many egalitarian initiatives, a less 
commented feature of the housing association sector was an increasing 
hierarchicalism following the 1974 Housing Act. The Act introduced complex 
subsidy arrangements and a system of regulation and monitoring
101arrangements administered by the Housing Corporation. Whilst allowing 
organisational growth on an unprecedented scale the 1974 legislation also 
introduced growing concerns amongst those working within the sector that 
housing associations were becoming agents of government policy and thus 
losing their traditional ‘low-grid’ identity.
An emerging fatalist ethos became associated with a fourth phase of 
development in the early 1980s, connected to a changing client group for 
housing associations. The fact that the sector was perceived to be catering 
for residual and marginal group of residents ensured greater management 
challenges at the same time as the sector experienced decreasing levels of 
autonomy through the regulatory system.
These four phases of development laid the foundations for the reform 
programme of the 1980s. The success of the housing association sector in 
the 1970s and 1980s encouraged government Ministers to extend their role 
as instruments for delivering social housing. However and despite some of 
the hierarchical tendencies noted above, their general experience in small- 
scale rehabilitation programmes and incremental developments at the local 
level meant they were poorly prepared for the demands of the late 1980s. The 
1988 Act provided a key turning-point when housing associations were thrust 
centre stage as the main providers of new social housing. The reforms 
established housing associations as increasingly important constituents in a 
changing local governance, with local authorities relegated to a strategic 
enabling role. In particular the 1988 Act resulted in an injection of 
individualism into the sector and exhibiting a classic NPM style programme of 
reform entailing a disaggregation of the sector, increased levels of 
competition and incentivisation towards more effective performance. The 
central organisational change in the post 1988 period was therefore intended 
to shift housing associations in a ‘down-grid’ direction back towards their 
philanthropic, largely autonomous origins. Housing associations can therefore 
be said to have come full circle back to their individualistic roots.
102However, what is much less clear is how these reforms have affected 
organisations over the almost twenty year period since the reforms were 
introduced. The following chapters therefore examine how the implementation 
of the 1988 Act affected contemporary housing associations by reference to 
more detailed empirical analysis.
103Chapter 4
SWIMMING WITH SHARKS: INDIVIDUALISM IN HOUSING
ASSOCIATIONS
To the extent that their governing bodies and managers draw 
satisfaction from increasing their market share - and the evidence of the 
trend towards ever larger associations suggests that this motive is 
indeed at work - so they are behaving more like for-profit organisations 
(Day and Klein, 1996, p. 12).
4.1  Introduction
The idea that housing associations represent ‘one of the outstanding success 
stories of the last twenty years’ (Klein and Day, 1994, p. 18) can primarily be 
attributed to their achievement in effectively repositioning themselves as the 
main providers of new social housing and in generating substantial 
investment through private sector agencies.  As seen in the previous chapter, 
since the 1970s the sector had increasingly been brought within the remit of 
central government through regulation and public subsidy. The selection of 
housing associations as the preferred vehicles for government policy in the 
1980s resulted in what has been called a ‘re-privatisation’ of housing 
associations (Randolph, 1993) returning them to an era when state 
involvement in housing provision was negligible. Chapter three also showed 
that the key significance of the Housing Act 1988 was the introduction of a 
number of concepts that were hitherto considered unfamiliar to housing 
association managers. These concepts included increased ‘competition’, the 
management of ‘risk’ and ‘private finance’.
This chapter considers the injection of individualism within the housing 
association sector, through the removal of bureaucratic controls in order to 
facilitate organisational change and a culture of entrepreneurship. Housing
104associations are said to have been subject to a greater immersion within the 
market than other public services (Walker et. a/., 2001, p.1) and have been 
encouraged to see themselves as social businesses. The purpose of the 
chapter is to consider the causes and effects of an individualistic culture 
through a detailed analysis of the responses of senior managers.
4.2  An individualist approach to organisational design
Individualism has been seen as ‘one of the major sources of intellectual 
dynamism in public management over the past 30 years’ which has ‘to a large 
extent displaced the Weberian approach as a ruling orthodoxy for public 
management in the English-speaking world, and to some extent beyond’ 
(Hood, 2000, pp. 101-2). Although unrestrained rivalry and competition are 
ultimately incompatible with organisation (ibid.) a number of core themes can 
be identified in an individualistic organisational bias. First, individualists 
demonstrate a strong hostility to state bureaucracies and exhibit a general 
distrust of collectivism, centralisation and government intervention. A second 
theme of individualism at a central government level is the extensive use of 
reward and incentive structures. Thirdly individualists pursue the competitive 
provision of public services and share a preference for smaller units of 
government, seeing markets as inherently more effective than hierarchies. A 
fourth aspect of individualism can be found in a stress on transparency and 
publicity, with individuals taking responsibility for core functions.
The presentation of housing associations in the 1980s as flexible, dynamic 
and responsive agencies based upon their voluntary capacity, local 
knowledge and lack of bureaucratic constraints encapsulates these 
individualist themes which formed the central rationale behind the 1988 
reforms. Government policy in the 1980s was designed to replace elected 
local authorities with non-elected agencies and introduce greater use of 
market mechanisms (Walsh, 1995) with housing associations in the forefront 
of this policy initiative. Discussions of management change within housing 
associations have been interpreted as leading both to greater innovation
105(Walker et. al., 2001) and an increased level of competition through a 
relaxation of hierarchical constraints, which have fundamentally altered the 
goals, and purposes of the sector (Mullins and Riseborough, 1997). Heralding 
a ‘new era’ or ‘new regime’ of risk, choice, and market discipline (Malpass, 
1990) the 1988 Act initiated a period of substantial transformation for housing 
agencies.
4.3  The individualist ethos in housing associations since 1988
The changes introduced in the 1980s have been interpreted as both deeply 
rooted and irreversible. Prior to the 1988 Act, housing associations existed in 
a zone of ‘comfort’ (Walker, 1998) where they were entitled to a level of 
funding which isolated them from risk and market pressures. In contrast, the 
post 1988 environment focused much greater scrutiny upon management 
performance and the delivery of key objectives. Considerable pressure was 
placed upon voluntary organisations to compete for contracts for development 
funding, to win bids and to perform effectively. The difference between the 
earlier and later periods was summarised by a Director of a large London 
association in the following terms:
I think there has been an enormous sea-change since 1988. The fact 
was that previously a gifted amateur could develop housing 
associations. There was an extremely generous system of capital 
grants. Being slightly tongue in cheek, all you needed was a good arts 
degree and a manual and you could go away and do it. The mistakes 
you made were borne by the public Exchequer. Not any more. 
(Interview no.6, 11/2/97)
Housing professionals were in no doubt that the post 1988 regime heralded 
qualitative differences in housing service delivery and led to fundamental 
transformations in roles and relationships within the sector. As another senior 
manager of one of the largest London associations commented:
Prior to the 1988 Housing Act you had a neutral system of housing 
association grant allocation, provided on the whole particular criteria 
were followed. It made no difference whether you were large, medium or 
small, well off or badly off, efficient or inefficient, because the rent and
106the overall grant rate were established independently. Post-1988 the 
performance of the organisation, its costs, its effectiveness, its ability to 
raise private funds have all made a difference... As a result the 
competition is now ferocious in some areas (Interview no. 12, 8/4/97).
An individualistic culture, based on ‘ferocious’ competition, represents one of 
the dominant images of the contemporary housing association. As one 
commentator has stated: ‘Housing associations have adopted a business, 
rather than a voluntary, ethos in order to survive in the new “market” for social 
housing’ (Harrison, J. 1995, p.67). Housing associations were forced to adapt 
to the demands of a new professional public sector culture, which was itself 
shaped by the pressures of entrepreneurialism. The new environment placed 
a high premium on financial skills, effective risk management and creative 
managerial talents. An indication of the scale of change can be seen by 
attitudes towards organisational identity. As a senior manager of a large 
London association expressed it: ‘Before 1988 we were a charity that 
happened to be a landlord. Post 1988, we are a landlord that happens to be a 
charity’ (Interview no.6, 11/2/97). Organisations were beginning to see their 
core business as the responsibilities of a large-scale landlord, ensuring 
effective property management systems within an environment largely 
dominated by the competitive demands of market mechanisms.
4.4  The drivers towards individualism
Individualism was the stated objective of government policy resulting from 
deregulation and the introduction of financial incentives and disciplines. These 
pressures are considered below.
4.4.1  The discipline of private finance
The success of housing associations in generating and managing private 
financial markets has led to the sector being characterised as generating the 
‘first and most effective private finance initiative’ (Cope, 1999, p. 134). A new 
professionalism was required of association staff which placed great 
emphasis upon business skills, treasury management, entrepreneurialism and
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than local authorities to cope with the new environment due to their autonomy 
and flexibility (Hills, 1989, p.264). The demands of private finance inevitably 
gave a much higher profile to staff with expertise in financial management. 
Association managers faced an environment where they had to make 
judgements about rent levels, sources of future income streams, ensuring 
adequate provision for major repairs and the need to determine new market 
opportunities (Malpass, 2000a, p.211; Pryke, 1994; Chaplin et. a/, 1995, 
p.11). The disciplines of private finance were strongly promoted at 
government level and mentioned in the policy framework proposed by the 
Housing Corporation. The new financial regime introduced by the 1988 Act 
has required associations to raise an increasing proportion of the funds 
needed for new investment’ (Housing Corporation, 1994b, p.5)
The period immediately following the introduction of the 1988 gained notoriety 
as it became associated with a ‘dash for growth’ (Randolph, 1993; Cope,
1999, p. 148) wherein associations struggled to compete with each other for 
favourable development opportunities. Ambitious Chief Executives and senior 
managers put considerable effort into winning competitive bids and thereby 
raising their organisational profile in the crucial period when development 
funds became available on an unprecedented scale. The ‘development boom’ 
of the early 1990s heralded a ‘cash crisis’ and considerable disruption to the 
output of dwellings in 1990/91  (Randolph, 1993, pp.42-4). This crisis was 
viewed as a ‘major implementational failure of the new Act, effectively stalling 
its impact by two years’ (Randolph, 1993, p.44). The period reflected what has 
been described as a ‘develop or die’ mentality (Walker, et al., 2001, p.36) 
amongst housing association managers in the early 1990s where the sole 
objective of managers was to pursue organisational expansion in order to gain 
access to development funds and to assert organisational status.
The ‘competition mania’ (Malpass, 2000a, p. 241) of the early 1990s offered 
substantial temptations to senior managers to expand their development 
portfolio exponentially and thereby enhance their status by demonstrating 
their aptitude within a private sector financial context, with access to private
108finance described as ‘almost too easy’ (Malpass, 2000a, p.240).
The subsequent withdrawal of funding from the Housing Corporation acted as 
a limitation on the expansionist tendencies of these housing associations. 
Nevertheless, the perceived necessity of continual growth to generate an 
impression of central actors within the new local governance of housing has 
been an important motivating factor for contemporary housing associations. 
Managers viewed the need to demonstrate value for public money as one of 
the most important pressures upon housing organisations. In the early 1990s, 
housing associations faced strong pressures to appeal to private sector 
lending institutions. The Chief Executive of the National Housing Federation 
acknowledged this latter pressure:
The big policy risk that the government saw, and therefore wanted to 
secure more power to the Corporation, was making sure that private 
finance flows continued, by effectively giving assurances to the private 
sector that their money would be looked after (Interview no. 12, 8/4/97).
Thus, the pressure to demonstrate that associations could deliver value for 
money services necessitated new sets of procedural safeguards. Private 
loans of between £10-20m were commonplace in the mid 1990s and 
associations were keen to reassure private lenders of their competence and 
financial stability. Lenders also became accustomed to scrutinising the 
curriculum vitae of voluntary committee members before agreeing to loans 
(Malpass, 1999b).
A financially driven imperative also affected investor behaviour, with some 
backers keen to develop their skills in housing policy:
What we have found is that, almost without exception, [investors] have 
employed specialist housing teams, as this is such a big market to 
them...They have got a very good perception of what is good quality 
housing stock, what is not such good quality, which housing estates are 
going to bring management problems, and so on. (Interview no.7, 
Director, 25/2/97)
The relationship between housing associations and financial investors was
109seen as a mutually beneficial one. As investors began to view housing as a 
new business opportunity, they looked to evaluate investment options and 
carry out risk assessments, which had important implications in terms of 
decisions about which schemes to fund. Many housing professionals felt that 
investors would naturally be guided by ‘bottom-line’ financial calculations 
rather than philanthropic social policy objectives. Thus, ‘their overriding 
interest is a financial one and in protecting their position’ (Interview no.7, 
25/2/97). Some managers were concerned that the original ethos of the 
housing association sector would become lost within an environment driven 
primarily by financial imperatives.
Housing association managers mentioned the pressures of private finance as 
the single most significant causal factor in determining cultural change in 
housing associations. Many managers enthusiastically grasped the 
opportunities offered by the ability to raise substantial sums in private 
investment and to compete effectively in a market environment. This ability to 
manage private finance was therefore viewed as a key performance indicator. 
For example one manager of a large housing association claimed: ‘people will 
say that if we are cutting the mustard in the City, we must be effective’ 
(Interview no. 10,  13/3/97). Another manager proudly stated: ‘we now owe 
more money to the City than we do to central government’ (Interview no.6,
11/2/97). These statements showed the extent to which managers were 
content to view their obligations in financial terms rather than as part of a 
subsidised state sector. One of the main benefits of introducing extensive 
sums of private finance was the perception that this would enhance the 
autonomy of housing providers, expressed as follows:
The obvious change is that we now have to stand on our own two feet 
financially...we are increasingly trying to make sure that we are 
becoming less and less dependent on government money. (Interview 
no. 14, 10/9/97)
Part of the attraction of this financially driven culture was a desire to associate 
organisational status with the ability to operate autonomously. As one 
manager explained:
110We’ve been around a long time; financially the organisation is pretty 
strong. We’ve had the ability to raise a lot of money to reinvest into the 
existing stock or its new initiatives...we will be looking at schemes to 
enable us to step outside of just being reliant on public funding. I think 
you can almost see the writing on the wall where eventually the 
government would like to give us no money whatsoever (Interview 
no. 14, 10/9/97).
Reductions in public subsidy were therefore seen as much an opportunity as 
a threat to the sector, indicating the extent to which managers welcomed a 
culture of individualism, one that was not dependent on government largesse.
Housing associations increasingly perceived themselves as private 
businesses (albeit in a non-profit sector) with obligations to a diverse set of 
stakeholders. The senior managers of large, developing associations in 
particular were keen to establish a position as significant agents in financial 
markets, responsible for organisations with a turnover of several millions of 
pounds per annum. As the Chief Executive of one of the leading national 
associations expressed it in 2001, there was little effective choice about the 
direction of contemporary housing associations:
Orbit Housing Group has a turnover of £70 million, assets of £700 million 
and employs over 900 people. That’s a sizeable business. We have a 
not-for-profit ethos but have to run the organisation as a business. We 
are there to provide a service to the customer at a cost-effective price. 
The business ethos has to underline everything. I don’t see how we can 
approach it any other way (quoted in Inside Housing, 8/6/01).
Inevitably organisations faced considerable pressures from managing large 
sums of public and private monies. As a consequence of these financial 
pressures, accountability was defined primarily in monetary terms, with the 
overriding objective ‘to ensure financial probity’ (Interview no.3, 12/8/96). Thus 
associations were obliged to account for their financial management, but 
beyond this, they had much greater opportunity to raise money and to choose 
projects for development. This entailed a much wider definition of their social 
purposes and stakeholders. A revealing comment expressed they way in 
which a resource dependency had shifted from central government to private
111sector institutions:
we are totally dependent on our funders. So one has to begin to 
develop a relationship with the banks and building societies that are 
funding us and the key area is our business plan...if circumstances 
change and we need to change the business plan that can’t be done 
unilaterally. We have to go to our funders and make a business case 
(as opposed to a case in policy terms) that stacks up (Interview no.7, 
25/2/97).
This dependence illustrated the extent to which financial backers exerted a 
crucial influence upon organisational strategies. The involvement of new sets 
of stakeholders in housing service delivery saw a shift in power away from 
elected representatives towards private financial institutions. The relationship 
between housing associations and private lenders therefore became central, 
necessitating flexible business plans that offered both opportunities and 
constraints. Housing associations had to be able to impress financial 
institutions that they were competent to deliver outcomes and to manage 
effectively within a highly competitive fiscal environment.
One of the key changes after 1997 for London housing associations was the 
process by which properties were transferred from local authorities on either a 
partial or full basis, through what was termed ‘large scale voluntary transfer’ 
(LSVT). This process marked a significant shift in the proportion of property 
owned by housing associations and local authorities. The use of local this 
process whereby councils dispose of property to housing associations has 
been claimed to be ‘changing the face of British social housing’ (Walker, 
1998a, p. 124).
Transfers from local authorities now represent 25 per cent of the total stock 
holdings in the social housing sector and have led to the sector being 
redesignated as registered social landlords (RSLs) (ibid.). Between 1988 and 
2001, 117 councils in England transferred almost 600,000 dwellings into the 
RSL sector (Malpass and Mullins, 2002, p.681). This process involved the 
creation of a large number of new or subsidiary ‘transfer’ organisations. In 
London by 2001, eleven boroughs had completed a partial transfer of stock
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properties (the Housing Corporation, 2002c). Commentators stress the 
importance of the stock transfer initiative in shaping the culture of the sector:
Transfer housing associations have increasingly come to influence the 
culture of the housing association sector as a whole, and arguably, 
social housing more broadly. In particular, they stand for a more single- 
minded focus on asset management and business planning, for an 
entrepreneurial approach, and for efforts to involve tenants in 
governance (Pawson, 2004, p.9).
Senior managers broadly welcomed the financial challenges offered by the 
stock transfer process. As an example, a Director of one transfer organisation 
commented:
I’ve spent the last eleven years trying to manage housing and to 
develop investment in a financial straightjacket that was getting tighter 
and tighter and had absolutely nothing to do with any valid investment 
concepts. It was all to do with controlling government expenditure, 
controlling public sector spending and carrying through the priorities of 
a government who did not have social housing anywhere near the top 
of its agenda (Interview no.7, 25/2/97).
The benefits of stock transfer were that managers had no longer to be 
dependent upon ideological preferences of local and central politicians. For 
managers operating within a local authority environment the hierarchical 
constraints had proved extremely frustrating. In contrast, the opportunities 
offered by transferring stock to a new housing association environment 
carried distinct advantages.
An indication of the way that associations had begun to perceive themselves 
was demonstrated in the following comment from the Chief Executive of a 
medium-sized association:
We have started to look at ourselves as a business. It isn’t that we are 
a woolly, comfy housing association. We are a big business... We have 
millions of pounds worth of stock and land and we have to manage that 
and deliver in an effective way. You have to have business skills to do 
that (Interview no. 16, 8/10/97).
113Housing association managers were keen to demonstrate their facility as key 
players in financial transactions, operating within a dynamic and exciting 
world of corporate finance far removed from the mundane and routine 
practices of traditional housing management.
The Labour government of 1997 extended financial pressures by including a 
proposal in the 2000 Green Paper (ODPM, 2000) to pay grants to private 
developers, despite extensive lobbying from associations (Kendall, 2003, 
p. 144). This meant that the competitive aspects of the 1988 Act were likely to 
be further enhanced by extending competition not only within the voluntary 
sector but to other private sector institutions.
4.4.2  New risk factors
One of the main changes that the 1988 Housing Act imposed upon housing 
associations was that government took the decision that it would no longer 
guarantee schemes with grant subsidy. Whereas prior to 1988 associations 
were insulated from financial burdens by a generous subsidy system, post 
1988 grants were predetermined and cost overruns were the responsibility of 
individual organisations (Walker and Smith, 1999). As a textbook discussion 
of contemporary housing finance expresses it:
An organisation pursuing a policy of total risk avoidance would soon 
experience corporate stagnation and decline - “nothing ventured, nothing 
gained”. This means that the enterprising housing association should not 
be seeking total risk avoidance so much as effective risk management 
(Garnett, 2000, p.353, emphasis in original).
Managers adopted a pragmatic attitude towards the demands generated by 
the new risk culture. They accepted that there were inherent dangers, but at 
the same time broadly welcomed the opportunities offered, in contrast to the 
limitations of the pre-1988 procedures. A common view expressed by 
managers was that past practices had become too hierarchical with 
excessively cumbersome procedural arrangements. As a consequence, 
innovation had been discouraged, partly due to a lack of competition and
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the two periods in the following terms:
We tended to go from one year to the next, before the 1988 Act, 
because we knew the funding was going to be available through the 
Approved Development Programme. With the transfer of risk from the 
Housing Corporation (who used to bail out housing associations if they 
made huge deficits) to housing organisations, there is a greater 
emphasis on managing that risk and to ensure the Board is completely 
in control of strategy. Most of my experience in the last ten years is that 
people become aware of long-term planning (Interview no.11, 21/3/97).
A Chief Executive of a stock transfer organisation cheerfully maintained: ‘we 
were a government agency and we are not now’ (Interview no.7, 25/2/97) 
indicating that the mere fact of change from public to private sector provided a 
sense of liberation from bureaucratic constraints.
Managers were favourably disposed to a risk culture, viewing it as providing 
opportunities to pursue innovative management strategies through a wide 
diversity of practices. The limitations of the previous environment were 
characterised in the following way:
Like very many other housing associations we felt that because we 
were a charitable organisation that was in itself enough to prove that 
we were a good organisation...We made a worthwhile contribution, but 
were not able to demonstrate it (Interview no.11, 21/3/97).
The implication was that managers needed to show that they were able to 
cope with the new demands of an environment that imposed substantial risks 
and an important indication of a changing approach to risk management was 
the desire to expand organisational areas of operation in the form of a 
diversification of tasks and responsibilities. In the mid 1990s housing 
associations became increasingly willing to diversify their activities and 
encouraged to form profit centres and in order to do this, associations had to 
form group structures to separate their charitable activities from their 
profitable enterprises.
This tendency to diversify the organisational sphere of activity was manifested
115in a number of ways. First, associations became involved in Private Finance 
Initiative activities to generate additional income. Second, they became 
involved in market-rented housing to identify new opportunities to increase 
their supply of accommodation and form partnerships with private landlords. 
Third, housing associations became involved in the development of student 
accommodation and key worker schemes. These examples showed how 
associations were turning their attention to new areas of operation and thus 
seeing their core business in much broader terms than simply providing 
housing for low income groups and extending their approach to the 
management of risk.
The tendency for housing associations to see themselves as part of wider 
regeneration initiatives was also indicative of a changing organisational 
culture towards a lower collective identity and less regulatory control. As the 
policy officer of the professional body for housing managers (the CIH) 
acknowledged, the diversity of the sector created a new range of demands 
and challenges:
If you look at housing associations now, it’s not just social housing. For a 
lot of associations there’s increasing involvement in a range of activities 
from commercial enterprises through care services to supporting 
neighbourhoods...When I joined the movement in 1977, it was value- 
driven with clearer simple objectives and organisations. There was more 
unity in promoting something they believe in (Mark Lupton, quoted in 
Inside Housing, 8/6/01).
The management of risk has therefore become embedded within the 
contemporary culture of the housing association sector. As the main 
regulatory body for the housing association sector, the Housing Corporation 
acknowledged the extent to which organisations needed to anticipate future 
uncertainty. The Housing Corporation requires
all RSLs to have a formally approved framework for managing risk. This 
will include risk mapping, and also cover financial modelling, business 
planning, project appraisals, market assessments, and the use of 
internal audit (The Housing Corporation, 2000b, p.1).
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associations paid the costs of this risk culture in the mid 1990s. For example, 
West Hampstead housing association (WHHA) experienced significant 
problems as a consequence of experiments with temporary housing schemes 
(Housing Today, 23/11/00) resulting in an accumulated deficit of £11.5m 
(Inside Housing, 27/9/02).  A report produced by the London Borough of 
Camden was highly critical of the lack of transparency within the sector: ‘we 
considered that WHHA operated within what we characterised as a blanket 
cloak of secrecy’ (LB Camden, 2002, p.5). These problems eventually led to 
the organisation being taken over by a new organisation formed from one of 
the large London associations, Paddington Churches Housing Association.
The level of risk was also criticised in a report from the National Audit Office 
(2001) which found that housing association boards ‘could not be trusted to 
provide reliable information about their organisations’ (The Guardian, 
19/4/2001). The study found that when the Housing Corporation inspected 
their self-assessment returns, 45 per cent of housing associations had to be 
reclassified from a ‘satisfactory state’ to ‘cause for concern’ or ‘cause for 
serious concern’ (The Guardian, ‘Housing associations “cannot be trusted"’, 
19/4/2001). The report stated:
Weaknesses in self-certification might underestimate the extent of 
financial risk in the sector. We were concerned that many registered 
social landlords...listed as satisfactory might have warranted 
reclassification as observation or supervision cases, had they been 
visited and their returns been independently validated (National Audit 
Office, 2001, p.23).
Associations saw themselves as extending their areas of activity, accepting 
considerable risks in order to exploit new market opportunities. Senior 
managers viewed these risks as calculated, whilst others concluded that the 
sector was unable to adapt to these new risk factors.
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An important pressure towards an individualist cultural bias was the sense 
that many senior housing association staff saw themselves as business 
managers rather than social workers, competing in a competitive environment 
that required more ruthless entrepreneurial skills.
An early indication that senior managers were moving in an individualistic 
direction was given in the early 1980s when one manager wrote of a tendency 
for the issue of accountability to ‘excite some ill-founded sense of guilt within 
the breasts of housing association members’ (Mellor, 1983, p.85). Such a 
view maintained that housing associations should embrace available 
opportunities and should not be overly worried by concerns about their 
legitimacy.
Senior managers in the post environment 1988 stressed that they had learnt 
innovative entrepreneurial skills which had fundamentally changed the nature 
of their work. One manager of an association formed through the process of 
stock transfer suggested: ‘one member of staff said a few months ago that 
she used to work in social housing but she doesn’t now’ (Interview no.7, 
25/2/97). This statement illustrated the way in which the new organisational 
environment has altered perceptions of service delivery, to the extent that an 
understanding of the concept of ‘social housing’ provision now referred to 
very different sets of activities. In general terms changes tended to be viewed 
more positively by senior-level, strategic managers than by front-line staff. 
Thus, the introduction of private finance clearly affected they way that staff 
viewed their role within housing associations, as well as influencing external 
perceptions of these organisations.
The notion that housing associations had become very different kinds of 
organisation was consciously adopted by a number of large housing 
associations in an attempt to differentiate themselves from earlier 
incarnations:
118What we’ve succeeded doing in the last three years is developing a 
culture where people are more externally focused. By that I mean people 
are not simply focused on dealing with the bits of paper that cross their 
desk, but are concentrating on delivering the outcomes that are required 
by the work that is presented to them (Interview no.5, 24/9/96).
Such organisations chose to portray themselves as entrepreneurial, with the 
ability to continually innovate and improve service delivery. As one manager 
expressed it: ‘I think “entrepreneurial” is never resting on your laurels and 
trying to do things better and cheaper’ (Interview no. 10, 13/3/97). The purpose 
of this culture change was to allow staff to ‘measure their own performance in 
terms of their ability to solve the problems tenants bring to them’ (ibid.). One 
way of understanding what this meant for housing associations was to 
contrast these ways of working with previous (hierarchical) working methods. 
For one manager the previous culture could be expressed in the following 
terms:
A culture of what you might call ‘hanging up your brain with your coat’. 
People would perhaps come in and simply carry out tasks on an 
instruction-by-instruction basis and saw their job in terms of complying 
with procedures rather than achieving outcomes (Interview no.5, 24/9/96).
Related to this concern to divorce the organisation from the procedural 
straightjacket of the past was a desire not only to distinguish new and old 
ways of working but also to represent a clear separation between housing 
associations and local authorities. The new environment was therefore offered 
as a contrast to both the bureaucratic public sector environment and the 
traditional amateur nature of the voluntary sector. The view that ‘basically we 
have grown up a bit’ (Interview no. 13, 11/4/97) was used to express the 
positive aspects of working in a more individualistic environment. This view of 
the organisational maturity of the housing association sector was used to 
demonstrate with confidence how associations were now operating in a ‘real 
world’ environment of competition, where organisational failure had serious 
consequences.
119An individualistic approach to management was strongly associated with an 
emphasis on setting and monitoring targets in relation to customer 
specifications. The social business of housing associations incorporated a 
combination of both development opportunities and management skills, 
creating a deliberate and planned rather than reactive strategy. Managers 
were encouraged to exhibit a clear and coherent vision alongside measurable 
indicators of performance. Such approaches implied that staffing and 
recruitment policies needed to be more effectively focussed upon a much 
wider range of skills and expertise that hitherto. Managers acknowledged that 
this would lead to conflicts and tensions between existing and new staff with 
longer-term employees seen as committed to outdated goals and objectives.
Managers emphasised the need for creative thinking and problem-solving 
skills rather than housing-specific expertise. A feature of this trend was the 
open admission, by some organisations, that it was no longer a priority for 
staff to have housing experience. Training strategies tended to focus on 
generic skills.  For example, the training officer of one of the leading London 
housing associations commented that their training programmes now 
incorporate a ’much more holistic, broader range of courses...less about 
content and more emphasis on behaviour’ (Interview no. 19, 8/1/98). Thus, in 
the past training strategies would focus on issues such as ‘housing law, rent 
collection, racial harassment, whereas now we would be talking more about 
customer effectiveness and improving interview skills’ (ibid.). For this training 
officer the competencies required were managerial and not specific to housing 
organisations: ‘we are looking for higher level management skills...People 
able to negotiate, influence rather than experience in running housing’ (ibid.).
A further illustration that housing association senior staff no longer needed 
housing-specific knowledge and skills was provided by the Chief Executive of 
one of the large London associations:
120My own perception is that I have moved away from being a housing 
policy specialist to having to concentrate on the organisation as a 
business, leaving the policy applications to specialist Directors who are 
able to take a more focused view (Interview no.7, 25/2/97)
For many associations the ability to assimilate complex financial information 
and to run public sector business in an entrepreneurial way was valued more 
highly than a detailed knowledge of housing policy with some organisations 
happy to appoint senior managers from backgrounds other than housing.
These problem-solving and decision-making skills assumed precedence over 
traditional housing skills that were seen as largely redundant. The extent to 
which managers welcomed the idea of a social business could be ascertained 
from the following statement:
We have become much more business focused but also a lot more 
customer focused...everything we do in terms of change will always have 
a main tenant focus, I guess that’s good business...you could say we’re 
no longer like we used to be, well good! Whether that means we’re now a 
business and no longer a value-driven, people-driven organisation, I tend 
to think we’re a bit of both now. We’re still a value, people-led 
organisation but with a much clearer business system focus (Interview 
no.8, 26/2/97).
Entrepreneurialism was manifested in the way that managers broadly 
welcomed competition and believed that there was no alternative to 
organisational change: ‘the climate of competition may be a threat, although 
what is worse is the notion that we could sit on our hands’ (Interview no. 10, 
13/3/97). Thus the most dangerous outcome was complacency and an 
inability to change.
A further manifestation of this business culture was the emphasis upon a 
contractual culture. This was expressed through concerns that the 
management of change should lead to a shift in organisational objectives:
The question is: “will it keep me in business? Will it keep my team 
viable? Rather than: “is this the service we want to provide?... To me it
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Underlying it is probably the assumption that it will deliver a better 
service to somebody out there somewhere. However, that doesn’t 
appear to be at the forefront of decision-making. Ten to twelve years 
ago, the view was: “we can house six more families”. You don’t hear 
that anymore. The view is “if we do that we can have ten more 
properties. We’ve won that contract...” (Interview no. 19, 8/1/98)
No longer was the primary objective to meet housing need but rather 
organisations were motivated by a desire to gain an advantage over their 
competitors. The need to win contracts on a competitive bases and thus to 
gain an advantage over other organisations became a defining motivation for 
many contemporary managers at the expense of some of the deeper 
historical roots of these housing agencies.
For many managers, the strength of working in a housing association 
environment was their ability to achieve results within this task-oriented 
environment, thus marking their distinctiveness from bureaucratic cultures. 
This entrepreneurial culture therefore represented a key element of the new 
organisational values found within the housing association sector. The 
following statement from a Chief Executive of one of the major London 
associations encapsulated the new approach to management:
We have very much a ‘can-do’ culture. We don’t turn any opportunities 
away without having a good look at them and saying ’can we do this? 
What is the benefit in terms of our business plan? (Interview no. 16, 
8/10/97)
The business plan therefore became the central mechanism for determining 
organisational purpose and corporate strategy. An emphasis on achieving 
results, on winning contracts and on completing tasks was now the major 
indicator of organisational effectiveness.
Furthermore, a resistance to regulation was strongly evident amongst housing 
association managers: ‘what we don’t want frankly is greater government 
control’ (Interview no.14, 10/9/97). Seeing themselves as providing a social 
business went hand in hand with a hostility to government intervention,
122thereby reinforcing individualist attitudes. A study by the National Audit Office 
found that 60 per cent of housing associations disagreed or strongly 
disagreed that the Housing Corporation had the staff with the necessary 
business experience to regulate the sector (National Audit Office, 2001). Thus 
there existed considerable scepticism that the regulatory body could exert 
effective stewardship over the increasingly diverse sector.
More revealing still was the comment from a Director of one of the leading 
London associations who referred to the ‘problem of having to compete with 
private organisations in the for-profit sector, who did not have the additional 
pressures of equal opportunities and other regulatory hurdles’ (Interview 
no. 13, 11/4/97). Such a comment was highly significant, expressing the view 
that equal opportunity policies were an additional hurdle to be overcome 
rather than the sine qua non of their work.
An example of the way in which fundamental perceptions of social housing 
had changed as a consequence of management reform was given as follows:
Ten years ago you would have regarded two thousand old properties in 
Westminster as a liability. You had to get a housing association grant 
to do them up. Now, when you wander down to the City two thousand 
properties in Westminster are a considerable asset. (Interview no. 6, 
11/2/97)
Such views indicated how the focus of attention had shifted within the sector. 
Organisations thus needed to care for their properties not for the benefit of 
residents, but because they were investments to be protected to enable future 
business.
An entrepreneurial ethos also manifested itself in a search for new markets 
and constant attempts at diversification. This involved many large 
associations extending their activities and areas of operation. The need to 
attain competitive advantage and to manage risk encouraged associations to 
manage in a more dynamic, assertive and aggressive way in some
123circumstances. As one manager observed:
Local authority housing can be seen as the next slum properties. We 
set up in the private slums of the 1960s and 1970s. Now we are merely 
transferring our activity to the public sector (Interview no. 13, 11/4/97).
This statement was used to justify hostility to the hierarchical, municipal sector 
and to legitimate decisions to widen the scope of housing association activity 
to encourage market-rented housing and to become involved in stock transfer 
activity. This activity included bidding for management contracts under the 
previous compulsory competitive tendering regime of the Conservative 
administrations, exploring opportunities for market-renting and temporary 
housing activity. This need to explore new market opportunities meant that 
developing housing associations expended considerable effort in the pursuit 
of innovative and creative strategies. These strategies have taken numerous 
forms, but they have in common a desire to present their organisations as 
forward thinking, entrepreneurial, professional and risk-taking. They were 
often driven by an imperative to impress financial markets, and managers 
emphasised the importance of detaching themselves from hierarchical 
organisational structures.
The introduction of ‘choice-based’ lettings systems in 2002 (ODPM, 2002) 
based around the idea of allowing individuals to bid for preferred properties 
rather than being determined by a process of administrative allocation showed 
the way in which the notion of choice was to play a central role in contrast to 
previous paternalistic styles of housing management. The scheme 
encouraged social landlords to advertise property vacancies in the local press 
and for applicants to bid for accommodation. The choice based-lettings 
scheme was based on growing disillusionment with mechanistic, needs based 
allocation systems and was premised upon a view of consumers as active 
agents rather than passive recipients of welfare.
1244.5 The responses to individualism
The above pressures have led to three major responses within the housing 
association sector. First, individualist minded senior managers see 
themselves as charismatic figures, playing an almost heroic role in providing 
leadership, motivation and vision to inspire staff to take risks and share the 
vision. Second, there is an increase in conflict both between organisations 
competing for scarce resources and within organisations as staff resist 
change. Following from this, the final consequence is the fragmentation of the 
sector, as the growing diversity of organisational aims and objectives made 
the notion of a common housing association ‘movement’ increasingly 
problematic.
4.5.1  Heroic managerialism: the Chief Executive culture
An important determinant of individualistic cultures is the importance attached 
to charismatic leadership skills and strong chief executives as figureheads of 
organisational identity. This kind of individual emerged within public sector 
organisations in the 1990s to ensure effective delivery of services through 
‘steely determination, clarity of vision...flair for persuasion and powerful 
oratory’ (Perri 6 et. a/., 2002, p.74). Housing association chief executives 
increasingly came to present an individualistic image of their organisations, 
through a symbolic appearance of dynamism and problem-solving 
approaches; their embrace of competition and their approach to risk 
management. These cultural trends helped to assist the egos of senior 
managers and further encouraged the image of heroic leadership found in 
many organisational text books (for example Osborne and Gaebler, 1994). In 
many respects these notions of heroism reflected an anti-Weberian model of 
charismatic authority.
In particular the ‘dash to develop’ of the immediate post 1988 era mentioned 
above, was connected to the growth of more individualistic types of senior
125managers, concerned to demonstrate their capacity to facilitate organisational 
growth. However, there was a belief amongst some senior managers that the 
more extreme individualistic tendencies had been tempered through the 
experience of the 1990s. This was illustrated in the following comment from 
the chief executive of the National Federation:
I think there was in that post-1988 period to the early part of the 1990s a 
chief executive culture, which was all about, ‘we are in charge now, we are 
dynamic, we value growth’ and so on. The pendulum swing has gone in the 
opposite direction, but I think it has settled now into a more intelligent 
approach to what organisations are about and the impact of a business 
culture on social outcomes. I tend to resist the argument that housing 
associations have sold out. It overstates the behaviour of the worst and 
regards it as the practice of the most. But I think a chief executive culture 
grew up in a way that made organisations potentially better collegiate ones. 
Some of the power conflicts that we saw paraded all over the housing 
press were a result of power struggles of that sort. (Interview no. 12,
8/4/97)
The symbolic role of leaders became a highly significant approach to the 
management of the voluntary housing sector in the late 1990s. One senior 
manager of a large London association spoke of the job of senior managers 
as having to pay much greater attention to ‘pressing the flesh’ (Interview no. 
13, 11/4/97), implying the cultivation of good working relationships with other 
key individuals had become a key organisational priority. The manager 
continued: ‘this means my job involves attention to things such as marketing, 
risk assessment, public relations, the business plan and the importance of 
close personal links with officers and members of local authorities’ (ibid.) In 
other words a more charismatic approach to leadership based upon the 
personal traits of individual directors and chief executives was expected, in 
order to demonstrate the efficiency, professionalism and problem-solving 
ability of an organisational figurehead. Such managers emphasised how 
personal contact and effective social relationships were essential in order to 
ensure desired organisational outcomes.
A prime example of heroic managerialism can be found in the issue of 
salaries and compensation payments awarded to senior members of staff
126compared to front-line staff and voluntary committee members. The demands 
of an entrepreneurial culture were believed to require high levels of 
investment and remuneration for senior managers, further detaching 
associations from their historical roots. As one manager commented, ‘we 
need additional managers to run finance, however anybody good wants lots of 
money’ (Focus group no. 1, 2/6/99). These levels of remuneration have led to 
anxieties amongst other staff that the disproportionate attention to financial 
rewards has detrimentally affected the ethos of the sector. Table 4.1 
illustrates increases in the level of remuneration awarded to some of the top 
managers in the social housing sector. These levels of remuneration led to 
suspicion about the motivation of senior managers, with individuals perceived 
to be far removed from the philanthropic origins of the associations.
Table 4.1 Housing Association Chief Executive Remuneration, 1997-2002
Housing Association 1997,
£000
2002,
£000
% increase
Peabody 91 121 33
London and Quadrant 90 124 38
Paddington Churches (now Genesis Housing 
Group)
87 100 15
Circle 33 81 113 39
New Islington and Hackney 60 81 35
Shepherds Bush 49 80 63
Source: Noble Financial Publishing (1998); Inside Housing, Survey of Chief Executives, 
27/9/02
The above figures contrasted starkly with salaries for front-line staff. A survey 
conducted by Housing Today magazine calculated that the average pay of a 
front line housing officer in London in 1999 was between £17,500 and 
£21,500. The survey showed an average pay increase for chief executives in 
1999 of 7 per cent compared to an increase of 3 per cent for front line staff 
and increases in average earnings of 5 per cent (Housing Today, 25/11/99). 
The survey also showed that chief executive salaries rose at twice the rate of
127rent increases for 1999 (ibid.).
The housing press expressed anxiety about the dangers that senior managers 
would be viewed as corporate ‘fat cats’ reaping the benefits of ‘lavish junkets’ 
and ‘over-generous remuneration packages’ (Housing Today, 17/12/98). By 
implication the recipients of these benefits would hold ideals far removed from 
the original voluntary objectives of the housing association movement. A later 
report from the National Audit Office criticised the compensation payments 
offered to Chief Executives following from merger arrangements and stock 
transfer activity (National Audit Office, 2001). A later survey in 2002 found that 
the average housing association chief executive (with a mean salary of 
£91,655) earned more than the highest paid council director of housing, with 
council directors often responsible for greater numbers of tenants (Inside 
Housing, 27/9/02).
These individualistic approaches to management were replicated in 
recruitment strategies, particularly at Board level. For example, in the 
appointment of key individuals a member of the management committee of a 
medium-sized London association commented:
Housing associations were and still are small cliques. The committee 
members all knew each other and that was how I was recruited...The 
pattern in housing associations is to recruit by word of mouth. Even 
though they advertise vacancies, it is still word of mouth (Interview no. 
22, 27/11/98).
Thus, from this viewpoint, housing associations only paid lip-service to equal 
opportunities requirements about recruitment. Others warned of the potential 
excesses of this notion of the heroic manager by stating: ‘All organisations will 
obviously be driven by personalities, but one shouldn’t turn personality into an 
industry’ (Interview no. 12, 8/4/97).
The heroic manager was also seen in the role that housing associations 
played in regeneration schemes. For a number of commentators the success 
of such schemes, were a crucial indicator of organisational success and were
128contingent upon the individual dynamism and forcefulness of chief executives. 
Thus a neighbourhood renewal manager explained that ‘we know that 
regeneration depends upon a personality cult’ (Interview no. 42, 17/2/03).
4.5.2  Inter- and intra-organisational conflict
An inevitable consequence of increased levels of competition was a marked 
decline in cooperation and the emergence of a less mutually supportive 
environment. One manager expressed the problem in terms of a discrepancy 
between internal and external identities. This was emphasised in the following 
way:
Quite often there is a public and private stance taken by people. Publicly, 
they sign up to the need for a level playing field in terms of competition. 
Privately, they say that they want something else and indeed work and 
lobby, either to the Corporation or in some cases direct to government 
ministers, saying ‘we are better at this than x, y or z. Give the money to 
us and you will get more out of it’ (Interview no. 12, 8/4/97).
A central theme that was often stressed by managers was that although 
housing associations operated on a superficial level on the basis of a 
commitment to mutuality and cooperation, in the final analysis organisations 
were guided by a strategy of the survival of the fittest where competitive 
objectives took precedence over collaborative endeavours. The competitive 
environment heralded an instrumental relationship where organisations would 
only cooperate if it was in their self-interest. Information was thus perceived 
as a resource to be traded.
Within the housing association sector, the pressures of competition were 
mentioned by several managers and were seen to lead to both positive and 
negative outcomes:
I think the unresolved issue is the question of competition. The extent 
to which there is a public and private face of organisations. That the 
public face says we are involved in partnerships, and very many are, 
but compete like hell often to get into partnerships with other 
organisations. I don’t know that there is any way of putting that genie of
129competition back into the bottle (Interview no. 12, 8/4/97).
For the above manager, there was a suspicion that certain organisations 
functioned according to a hidden agenda raising a problem of trust within this 
new environment, identified in public policy more generally (Coulson, 1998; 
Taylor-Gooby, 2000). Relations with partners were clearly problematic in this 
environment. One manager when asked about partners replied ‘you mean our 
competitors?’ (Interview no. 9, 5/3/97) implying the relationship was less than 
collegiate. This view reinforces the suspicion that there exists a disjuncture 
between the public and private faces of partnership working. The same 
individual, when asked, refused to provide a list of organisational 
weaknesses, which were described as ‘classified information’ (ibid.). This 
attitude of suspicion that others could gain a competitive advantage could be 
seen as one of the primary outcomes of the post 1988 regime. A particular 
concern with the current environment is the extent to which competition will 
affect the sharing of information between organisations. One manager 
provided the following example:
You used to go to a housing conference and mention a problem to 
colleagues and the response would be ‘I know how to fix that’. Now they 
will say ‘I’ll sell it to you’ (Interview no. 8, 26/2/97).
The growth of individualism influenced the willingness of organisations to 
provide honest and open information about their operations. The strategic 
priority for managers was seen to be the need to obtain competitive 
advantage in a wider market. Benefits would thus accrue to departments and 
ambitious individuals eager to further their career prospects. A further 
consequence was that organisational transparency was likely to suffer within 
such an environment. Thus, the Director of a large developing association, in 
diplomatically phrased language, accepted that: ‘we are a touch frugal with 
information’ (Interview no. 9, 5/3/97). Yet another manager expressed it as 
follows: ‘I think the housing association world isn’t as open as it used to be. 
People would quite happily share information, knowledge before’ (Interview 
no. 11, 21/3/97). The implication here was clearly that the culture of openness 
and trust had dissipated due to the range of commercial pressures and a
130perception that contemporary housing associations needed to cultivate a 
competitive advantage over their rivals at the expense of other organisational 
priorities.
Associations were keen to portray themselves as willing to work with other 
organisations and to be seen as equal partners. However, in practice a highly 
competitive and adversarial culture would often overwhelm attempts at co­
operation. An increasing number of associations were perceived as 
aggressive organisations demonstrating predatory behaviour, for example in 
preparing bids for local authority contracts under the Compulsory Competitive 
Tendering regime of the mid 1980s until 1997. This predatory behaviour was 
intensified by the demands of private finance and cultures of risk 
management. In particular the practice of associations encroaching on others’ 
territory and seeking new markets in other local authority areas had created a 
number of inter-organisational tensions. There was thus a growing tendency 
for supposedly co-operative relationships to be more commonly viewed as 
based on rivalry and the need to gain a competitive advantage over others. 
Relationships were often characterised as based on a mutual suspicion, with 
clear boundaries over what could be shared. Managers seemed constantly 
aware of the need to gain a tactical advantage over their rivals. They were 
willing to co-operate up to a point, but there was always a line beyond which 
they were forced to adopt a more ruthless strategy. As another manager 
stated:
With regard to other associations there is an important role as part of a 
consortium. But at other times, for example in considering sites [for 
development], the situation is absolutely ‘gloves off (Interview no. 13, 
11/4/97).
The perceived lack of transparency resulting from a much more competitive 
also generated substantial conflict. Quoted in the professional housing press, 
the Chief Executive of one of the largest national housing associations (Orbit) 
expressed the following sentiment:
My own view is that the sharing of knowledge and experience that used 
to be part of the movement’s ethos has disappeared and everybody
131wants to make money at every turn...nostalgia is a wonderful thing but it 
was much different prior to 1988. There was much more openness 
(quoted in Inside Housing, 8/6/01).
In particular, staff felt that an environment characterised by rivalry and 
suspicion had undermined the former cooperative styles of working. For 
example: ‘the culture is very cut-throat and competitive. It promotes operating 
by divide and rule’ (Interview no. 25, 4/5/99). As part of a discussion on the 
future of the social housing sector, one outer London Chief Executive (who 
had taken the decision to leave the National Housing Federation, see below) 
gave his view of how the sector had changed: ‘When you sit in meetings with 
chief executives they are all playing their cards very close to their chests. It’s 
not partnership. It’s quite the opposite’ (Tom Mannion, quoted in Inside 
Housing, 8/6/01). Suspicion between organisations was a common 
experience amongst housing association managers: ‘For RSLs the problem is 
the competitive element. There is real mistrust between RSLs which is to the 
detriment of service provision’ (Interview no. 36, 8/1/03).
Additionally, relations with local authorities were viewed as increasingly 
strained. Local authority staff were highly critical of the extent to which 
housing associations had moved away from their traditional functions. Thus, a 
local authority neighbourhood renewal manager emphasised the extent to 
which housing associations had become assimilated into a private sector 
culture.
Housing associations are social enterprises, but they put enterprise 
before delivery of social capital. In that sense there is not much 
difference between their management and that of a private landlord.
They are interested in delivering more houses but their tenants do not 
get the level of support they need. We [the local authority] are not perfect 
but at least we have the infrastructure to deal with it. We have 
accountability through political membership...[within housing 
associations] the lines of accountability are very dissipated (Interview 
no.42, 17/2/03).
Particular disputes between housing associations and local authorities 
emerged over rent levels, affordability, allocations and ‘cream skimming’ 
(Bartlett and Le Grand, 1993, p.31) where housing associations were able to
132exclude residents thought likely to be problematic or disruptive. As the 
Director of a large London association suggested:
Allocations policy is a central issue as part of the gatekeeping function. 
We are consciously trying to create balanced communities. This often 
causes conflicts with the local authority where we are accused of 
‘cherry-picking’, that is not meeting the greatest need (Interview no. 13, 
11/4/97).
Housing association staff perceived that their work was undermined by third- 
party intervention from local authority staff who had little understanding of the 
needs of their individual organisations. Similarly a common perception 
amongst council staff was that housing associations were not accountable to 
the wider community and had a lack of understanding of the broader picture of 
the circumstances of the local authority.
A proposal from the ‘G15’ group of the largest London associations illustrated 
this tension about allocating properties according to housing need. The G15 
group wished to ensure that at least 15 per cent of local authority nominations 
were given to key workers to ensure more balanced communities. However, 
the (local authority) chair of the association of London directors of housing 
was quoted as saying ‘it fails to recognise that this is a zero sum game...I 
think that housing associations have failed to engage meaningfully in 
combating homelessness’ (Chris Wood, quoted in Inside Housing, 12/12/03).
Local authority staff felt resentful that associations were offered a privileged 
status as ‘self-perpetuating oligarchies’ (Davis and Spencer, 1995, p.6) and 
not subject to the same level of scrutiny or regulation as councils. An example 
of local authority suspicion towards the housing association sector can be 
illustrated by the following comments from the retiring Director of Housing at 
the London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham:
The majority of RSLs have real governance problems, the committees 
are largely self-appointed and the people who run them often have no 
real understanding or personal experience of what it’s like to be an RSL 
tenant or to be poor...Some RSLs are incredibly patronising bodies 
who...see their role basically as being lady bountifuls. And then you get
133the new modernising RSLs whose rents have become so high they trap 
people in poverty. So you have old-style RSLs that are patronising and 
pathetic in many ways and the new ones that have lost their way 
(Interview with Barry Simons, Housing Today, 16/3/00).
The above quotation illustrated a measure of satisfaction that housing 
associations had fallen from a formerly elevated moral pedestal. A 
widespread concern that associations had usurped their position within local 
housing policy could be found amongst local authority staff.
Conflicts were evident not only with local authority partners but also with other 
stakeholders. Thus, in the example of a failed stock transfer on the Aylesbury 
Estate in Southwark associations were criticised by the chair of the 
Architecture Foundation: ‘There’s an assumption that they know what people 
want...I think they have become too arrogant in the way they feel they can 
deliver what people want... If they are going to be one of the main vehicles to 
deliver housing they have got to get their act together’ (‘Associations told to 
learn “humility”’, Inside Housing, 21/1/02).
Furthermore, many critics of housing associations expressed a high degree of 
scepticism about the ability of associations to deliver key objectives and their 
overall management performance. Writing in the housing media, the MP 
Gerald Kaufman complained: Too many housing associations are riddled with 
complacency and too many are inefficient and unaccountable’. Kaufman 
complained that the sector was carrying out a function (as the sole provider of 
new social housing) for which it was not equipped. ‘It was not their job, was 
not meant to be their job and they are far from marvellous at carrying it out’ 
(Housing Today, 10/10/02). Associations could thus be portrayed as 
representing the worst excesses of a ‘quango culture’ and an appointed state 
sector. One consequence of this level of suspicion was a detrimental 
relationship between different associations.
A significant feature of the new environment was the extent to which it had 
changed the behaviour of management committees. Suspicion and a lack of 
transparency could be witnessed through the example of some members of
134associations sitting on management committees of other organisations. In 
these instances, members were asked to leave meetings until confidential 
information had been discussed (Interview no. 6, 11/2/97). Conflict was also 
evident between management committee members. The following comment, 
from a committee member and community activist of one of the large Shelter 
organisations provided a useful example of these conflicts:
Housing associations are supposed to be meeting the needs of poor 
communities, but you need to look at where committees are elected 
from. People who sit on committees are not generally local people, 
tenants, people who run voluntary organisations or black groups. They 
are people such as bankers, accountants. People who don’t live or 
work in the area and I don’t think are particularly interested in the area 
(Interview no. 23, 18/2/99).
Not only was conflict endemic within organisations, but there was much 
greater scope for intra-organisational conflict. As a neighbourhood manager 
explained:
Financially we are in competition with the voids [or empty property] 
team... We have a run in with them and then we get the tenant from hell. 
It looks bad on the rent collection or the voids performance (Interview no. 
48, neighbourhood officer, 14/12/03).
These levels of rivalry required a need to assert primacy in terms of 
performance indicators; success was therefore dependent on ‘who is the most 
aggressive with the figures’ (Interview no. 48, neighbourhood officer,
14/12/03).
In addition, senior managers felt frustrated by the constraints imposed by 
stakeholders seen as less enthusiastic about the rate of change. Disputes 
were magnified between those who embraced a ‘forward-looking’ business 
culture and others who were keen to emphasise the social objectives of the 
sector. One front-line housing officer maintained:
The organisation has become more like a corporate entity and I resent 
that. We have lost our direction. For example the emphasis on 
Community Development may be useful, but I do not feel it makes the 
best use of our limited resources (Interview no. 29, 8/12/00).
135The tendency for housing associations to appoint Board members on the 
basis of their financial expertise rather than their ability to be representative of 
a community constituency raised further conflicts. These disputes were 
manifested at board level between those with a flair for business management 
and those wanting to retain a sense of organisational tradition. Stories of 
tensions between senior managers, committee members and local authorities, 
resulting in a number of resignations began to surface in the 1990s. One 
senior manager expressed his concern in the following way:
I think some of the conflicts of the early 1990s were as much about 
ambitious Chairs of organisations as they were about ambitious Chief 
Executives (Interview no. 12, 8/4/97).
The above statement illustrated a level of concern expressed that ambition 
was not confined to executive officers. Some housing professionals felt that 
Board members were now in a more favourable position then before to shape 
corporate objectives to meet their own personal agenda. For example, 
increases in salary levels to attract private sector staff have created tensions 
between those whose aim was for business excellence and others who 
placed a higher value on commitment to community development objectives.
Some managers were less enthusiastic than others and were more 
circumspect about the implications of a more profit-oriented approach. In 
particular concerns were expressed about the implications in political terms, 
where housing associations were seen to replace elected agencies (i.e. local 
authorities) as service providers. As one manager commented:
People do not understand what is meant by ‘the rigours of the 
commercial sector’. Also, is this what our stakeholders want of us? Do 
they actually want us to be hard-nosed commercial organisations? If 
we depict ourselves as such, will we lose political respect? (Interview 
no. 6, 11/2/97)
Such concerns led to conflict within organisations and a common source of 
tension emerged between staff who welcomed a business culture and those
136interested in retaining core values. As the management committee member of 
a medium-sized London association stated: ‘For some organisations 
“business” means rent increases’ (Interview no. 22, 27/11/98). The tensions 
between providing a supportive and caring social service, set against the 
requirement to maximise rental income and to ensure an effective, 
professional social business produced incompatible objectives. As one 
member of staff commented, the trend in her organisation was to ‘focus on 
financial matters and a need for robust arrears control. Staff are now called 
“income maximisers”’ (Focus group no. 1, 27/5/99). Additionally, housing staff 
demonstrated a strong belief that they were attempting to shoulder the burden 
of too many varied responsibilities for which there were inadequate levels of 
training and support. Thus: ‘we should not get caught up with nannying and 
hand-holding’ (Interview no. 29, 8/12/00).
Proposals for payment to Board members also indicated a source of conflict 
and a further shift away from the voluntary origins of the sector. These 
proposals have been strongly resisted by many within the sector, but the 
Housing Corporation and Chartered Institute of Housing both identified a need 
for reform as a response to the changes in the governance of housing. This 
debate about appointing ‘professional’ board members has resulted in severe 
conflicts between housing associations and the Housing Corporation with 
press coverage predicting that housing associations were on a ‘collision 
course’ with their regulator over the issue (The Guardian, 22/3/01). The 
proposals met strong resistance from a number of Chief Executives 
concerned that the voluntary ethos of the sector would be abandoned (Inside 
Housing, 25/10/02). Nevertheless, by 2003 the Housing Corporation had 
changed their position and proposed that Chairs of the largest associations 
could earn up to £20,000 per annum if a business case could be made (the 
Housing Corporation, 2003a).
4.5.3 Institutional fragmentation: the end of the ‘movement’?
A final consequence of the increased sense of individualism amongst
137organisations in the social housing sector was the unwillingness to 
characterise the diverse housing association as any longer constituting any 
sort of movement. One indication of this change has been the resignation of 
one outer London housing association (Irwell Valley Housing Association) 
from the National Housing Federation. The ostensible reason for the 
cancellation of membership was the ‘southern bias’ of the Federation and a 
statement from the association claimed that there was no longer a movement 
but a ‘housing business’. The Chair was quoted as criticising Federation 
conferences where ‘people pontificated about the same old thing’ (quoted in 
Inside Housing, 1/6/2001). The Chief Executive of the organisation was 
quoted as follows: The Federation still operates as if it were a movement; a 
lot of enlightened wonderful people all working together. But it is a different 
world out there...There is a housing business but no movement. That finished 
in 1988’ (quoted in Inside Housing, 1/6/2001). Although this decision did not 
promote a flood of applications from other associations to cancel their 
membership of the Federation, this decision marked a significant blow to the 
collective identity of the sector. The level of fragmentation was expressed by 
one senior manager who commented that the ‘fissiparous tendency is much 
clearer since the [post 1988] changes’ (Interview no. 12, 8/4/97).
A number of  writers commented that by the late 1990s the housing 
association sector no longer possessed a coherent identity as common 
organisational purposes were eradicated over a relatively short time scale:
within ten years the association ‘movement’ had effectively been pulled 
apart, with members expressing increasingly disparate views over their 
most appropriate future role (Blake, 1997, p. 182).
138The fragmentation of the sector was most clearly apparent in the early 1990s. 
Reflecting on his initial appointment as Chief Executive of the National 
Housing Federation, Jim Coulter commented:
When came in, and in the first two or years of the financial regime, up to 
about ‘92 or ‘93, there was a real risk of fracturing...People were not just 
competitive, they were nearly hysterical (quoted in Inside Housing, 
24/6/05).
An indication of the low level of collective identity was illustrated by the fact 
that senior managers expressed frustration that the constraints of the 
traditional cultures of the sector prevented them from exploring business 
opportunities.  For example, a manager of one of the large London 
associations complained that:
We have loads of ideas, but it is also about how to pull those together 
into a co-ordinated strategy. I think that sometimes board members and 
residents don’t understand what a broad business it is (Interview no. 16, 
8/10/97).
The lack of identification as part of a common movement engendered by the 
culture of individualism may have the result of ‘making it harder for housing 
associations to act collectively in resisting the annual reductions in the levels 
of their grants, the imposition of unwanted regulations or pressures to take up 
roles with which they are uncomfortable’ (Best, 1997, p. 116).
Many managers expressed concern about the longer-term impact of change 
and the tendency towards isolation. A frustration that old ways of working 
could still exercise a dominant influence was expressed in the following way:
There is a lot of focus on costs which in some ways has meant people 
focusing inwards and into their own team and department and 
becoming less corporate and more: ‘I need to look after my own little 
business’. I can see that happening in senior manager attitudes: ‘what 
effect will it have on my own little business?’ Not: ‘is that for the good of 
the [organisation] as a whole?’ (Interview no. 19, 8/1/98).
139The above comment illustrated the way in which the focus of association 
activity had shifted towards a business ethos rather than a social welfare 
model. The pressures of competition were such that the key objective of 
housing association activity (to provide affordable housing to families in need) 
had become lost in the attempt to sustain competitive advantage.
Individualists were those who embraced risk, welcomed the autonomy offered 
and who were energised by the challenges of new corporate cultures. As has 
been observed, the competitive culture has created enormous dilemmas for 
the notion of a housing association ’movement’:
Constant financial pressures and high levels of competition can bring 
insecurity, a loss of confidence and a less pioneering and imaginative 
approach...this enlarged sector may lack the sense of social 
significance, solidarity and creativity which characterised many of the 
struggling housing associations of the past (Best, 1997, p. 119).
The leading housing associations, with the largest development programmes 
and closest access to government decision makers, have been described as 
‘very akin to private sector developers’ (Lowe, 2004, p.58). The larger 
organisations were described as ‘powerful associations...not simply being 
driven by government policy but...able to choose what they become involved 
in’ and ‘not simply reacting to government directives, but increasingly able to 
shape them’ (ibid.). Although Mullins and Riseborough (2000) contend that 
there was still a strong sense of social purpose and respect for the history of 
voluntarism amongst the more influential organisations, this reflected a 
defining of their ‘territory’ rather than shaping strategy and management style 
where commercial judgments and business efficiency demands had a clear 
priority (2000, p.85). The growing tensions between organisations about the 
future role and direction of the sector have meant that the notion of a 
collective organisational identity is becoming increasingly untenable given the 
interest of the larger organisations to pursue their own self-interest. The sense 
that housing associations had become detached from their historic role 
demonstrated the extent to which organisations pursued individual goals 
without regard to the broader collective objectives of a voluntary sector ethos.
1404.6 Conclusion
Individualism was a key aim of the Housing Act 1988 and in effect returned 
housing associations to their philanthropic origins. The emphasis on ‘mixed 
funding’, the introduction of an uncertain environment and the use of 
associations as the main providers of new social housing imposed a number 
of significant pressures upon associations returning these organisations to 
their individualist roots. The 1988 reforms resulted in an irreversible set of 
processes wherein rivalry, conflict, new markets and large salaries became a 
permanent feature of the housing association sector. Individualistic cultures 
were permanent, far-reaching and highly attractive to senior managers. 
Individuals were attracted by what were seen as high ‘fat cat’ salaries, seeing 
themselves as ‘heroic’ entrepreneurs. They were attracted by a removal of 
unnecessary red tape, offering opportunities for risk-taking and innovation.
However, individualism brought its own difficulties, including a perceived lack 
of accountability in the sector and highly confrontational relationships between 
housing associations and between management committee members and 
Chief Executives. Moreover, responses to the legislative changes in the early 
1990s showed that individualism was pushed to a peak and the government 
had to intervene. The ‘competition mania’ and ‘dash to develop’ amongst 
senior managers led to a cash crisis for the Housing Corporation in the early 
1990s. Unfettered competition resulted in a number of cases of fraud and 
concerns were expressed at the unaccountable nature of the sector. These 
developments indicated that an individualistic culture was not sustainable over 
time; Government was not prepared to continue to offer unlimited subsidy and 
increasing concerns were expressed at the direction of change within the 
sector. In that sense housing associations were victims of their own success. 
Figure 4.1  indicates the direction of change towards individualism amongst 
the majority of housing associations in the wake of the Act.
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142Chapter 5
THE NEED FOR ROOTS: EGALITARIANISM IN HOUSING
ASSOCIATIONS
Governing boards...carry a special responsibility as the guardians of the 
organisation’s sense of social mission...Housing associations (to adapt 
Burke) represent an implicit contract between past, present and future 
generations. It is therefore the particular responsibility of governing 
bodies to ensure their integrity of purpose, whatever the current 
pressures and temptations, by defining the criteria of performance to 
ensure that new ways of meeting goals do not displace those goals 
themselves (Klein and Day, 1994, p. 32).
5.1  Introduction
As discussed in previous chapters, the Housing Act 1988 presented 
significant challenges to the housing association sector. Its importance can be 
viewed in two ways. On the one hand, the Act can be seen as an example of 
a ‘punctuated equilibrium’ (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; Krasner, 1984; 
Peters, 1999, p.68) whereby the balance of the housing association sector 
was disturbed by a radical reform, which fundamentally reshaped its 
institutional development. On the other hand, housing associations can be 
viewed as ‘path dependent’ (David, 1986) or locked into certain patterns of 
behaviour to the extent that they have predetermined directions, which have 
been highly resistant to change. One way of exploring this dichotomy is to 
analyse the extent to which the original goals have been discarded or 
retained. How far has organisational change amended their core principles? 
What remains of their original purposes and values?
In order to understand the trajectory of change, it is necessary to explore the 
historical development of some of the key organisations active in the current 
environment. The concept of ‘sedimentation’ (Tolbert and Zucker, 1999,
143p. 175) can be used to analyse the ways in which the cultures of contemporary 
organisations comprise a number of objectives, but are decisively influenced 
by a need to demonstrate their allegiance to original purposes. Current 
practices develop from a historical context; a study of underlying attitudes can 
explain how basic values are formed and maintained through organisational 
narratives. Such biographies of organisational development illustrate how 
institutions respond to current and future challenges. Organisational culture 
comprises a complex set of current and historical norms with contemporary 
practices permeated by ‘layers of values and understandings deposited from 
earlier times’ (Peters, 1999, p. 104). Cultural change therefore involves not 
only the rejection of past practices, but equally importantly a decision to retain 
the core and distinctive characteristics of historical organisational identities. 
Although organisations may be transformed over time, they retain much of 
their past history. They are not entirely confined by the past but over time 
redefine themselves as well as reflecting their historical development. 
Organisational change therefore ‘involves developing new understandings 
and symbols that are not incompatible with those that were in place before’ 
(Peters, 1999, p. 104). Such a view conflicts with interpretations that see little 
resemblance between previous and current incarnations of the sector, where 
organisational change is viewed as a radical transformation to create an 
entirely new entity.
Conventional interpretations of organisational change in the housing 
association sector perceive the 1980 reforms as representing a historic break 
or ‘paradigm shift’ for housing associations (Walker, 1998a, p. 108). Thus, 
writers spoke of a ‘new regime for housing finance’ and a ‘shift from comfort to 
competition’ (Walker, 1998b) with the 1980s reforms marking a ‘revolution’ in 
housing policy (Cowan and Marsh, 2001, p.6).
Thus, the new, dominant housing associations had rejected their heritage, 
resulting in ‘increasingly tenuous links between the super league 
organisations and the traditional values of voluntarism’ (Malpass, 2000a, p.7). 
According to these analyses the consequence has been a fundamental and 
irreversible change in the organisational culture of the sector:
144Voluntary housing has been changed, virtually out of recognition, 
transformed to the point where the voluntary element is of symbolic 
relevance only, and there is no evidence to suggest that this is likely to 
be reversed in the future (Malpass, 2000a, p.272).
However, whilst such views lay great emphasis on the profound nature of 
change, they fail to account for the continuities with the past found amongst 
many contemporary voluntary organisations. As discussed in chapter three, a 
crucial period in the development of the sector was the experience of the 
London housing associations in the 1960s. These organisations carried a 
strong notion of organisational identity as they assimilated the management 
reforms of the late 1980s.
The objective of this chapter is therefore to consider how the historical 
egalitarian cultures of housing associations have survived and how this ethos 
provides both opportunities and constraints in guiding organisational 
behaviour. The chapter is divided into two sections. The first considers the 
main pressures towards egalitarianism, namely the historical legacy of the 
housing association sector, the governance structure and the need for 
partnership working. The second section discusses the effects of 
egalitarianism seen as organisational conflict, false expectations and 
ultimately self-destruction.
5.2  The pressures towards egalitarianism
Egalitarianism rests on high group and low grid relationships. Egalitarian 
organisations are likely to display a strong sense of social solidarity and to be 
resistant to central regulation and control. Institutional values are governed by 
peer pressure and a strong sense of ownership and attachment to group 
objectives within cooperative relationships (Stoker, 2004, p.72). The ideal 
form of egalitarian organisational design is that of a communitarian, radically 
decentralised, self-governing unit (Hood, 2000, p.120). Egalitarian 
approaches to organisation are said to involve three main elements: group 
self-management, control by mutuality and maximum face-to-face
145accountability (Hood, 2000, p.122). As will be shown, the traditions of the 
housing association sector strongly emphasise these aspects of 
organisational design.
5.2.1  A low grid sector: the historical legacy
The housing association sector in London is primarily comprised of small 
organisations. Over 400 of the 440 housing associations in London have less 
than 250 units. Whilst the most obvious manifestation of egalitarian values is 
in the co-operative housing sector (which is not part of the present study) the 
values of cooperative housing associations have permeated many of today’s 
mainstream organisations; some of which originated from tenants 
movements. Thus Notting Hill Housing Trust emerged from the struggle by 
residents against the exploitation of Rachman in West London (Milner 
Holland, 1965) and Circle 33 Housing Association worked with the Holloway 
Tenant Cooperative to form a campaign to buy empty private properties in an 
increasingly gentrified inner London area (North Islington Housing Rights 
Project, 1976; Power, 1988b). The fact that a large proportion of senior 
executives who began their careers in the 1960s, at the time of campaigns 
against private landlords and the coercive nature of local authority slum 
clearance programmes has helped to shape the values of many of the largest 
London based organisations (Cope, 1999, p. 10).
As shown earlier, housing associations historically defined themselves largely 
by their hostility to central hierarchical regulation. Their organisational identity 
was forged by the image that they offered a flexible and responsive approach 
to public policy in contrast to municipal landlords. An underlying principle of 
the sector was its basis in independent, small scale and locally based 
organisations:
A ‘small is beautiful’ philosophy combined with an interest in community 
involvement and ‘power to the people’...seemed more achievable 
through the more intimate structures of a localised housing association 
(Best, 1991, p. 152).
146An enduring commitment to community initiatives was evident in the Shelter 
organisations, which continued to produce material reiterating their roots as 
radical, campaigning organisations, preventing homelessness and meeting 
housing need. Possessing a specialist local knowledge, rooted within local 
communities and founded by local activists, in large part they were formed as 
a contrast to the established philanthropic associations (Malpass, 2000a, 
p. 144) which were more inclined towards individualistic goals.
The main focus of the community-based housing associations was on small- 
scale rehabilitation schemes emphasising their role as local, responsive and 
idealistic organisations. In particular, housing associations were keen to 
stress their autonomy from central government; a relationship marked by a 
strong level of mistrust. Speaking of his period as Chair of the Housing 
Corporation in the early 1980s, Sir Hugh Cubbitt referred to ‘a time when I 
was doing my bit to persuade the government that housing associations were 
not all communist cells and trying to persuade housing associations that 
government was not all Genghis Khan’ (quoted in Inside Housing, 2/7/04).
At the time that proposals for change were being formulated in the 1980s, 
housing associations vigorously protested their independence in the face of 
growing pressures to conform to a central government agenda and act as a 
replacement for state welfare agencies. This resistance was manifested by a 
reaction against what was seen as an excessive and burdensome regulatory 
regime. As an example in the early 1980s the federation representing the 
housing association sector stated:
Controls must not stifle the initiative and flexibility of the Movement. 
Attempts to regulate all aspects of association behaviour are not only an 
extravagant use of resources, but in the end destroy the speed, 
efficiency and sensitivity, and ultimately the purpose of associations 
themselves (NFHA, 1983, p.6).
147Regulatory constraints were countered by organisational responses that re­
emphasised a commitment to core objectives of flexibility, responsiveness 
and local autonomy. A history of Paddington Churches Housing Association 
(PCHA) illustrates how the desire to remain faithful to their core objectives 
continued to have strong reverberations:
PCHA had grown into a substantial organisation, but still retained its 
soul. During the 1980s, as the pressures of political and economic 
change intensified, the need to maintain this attribute became ever more 
important (Mantle, 1995, p. 21).
One of the distinctive marketing strengths of associations was that they were 
better equipped to meet local needs than their local authority counterparts. 
Attempts to constrain the autonomy of the sector were thus seen as inimical 
to the core values of the London associations. In a similar vein, the 
introduction of common accounting procedures (the Statutory Form of 
Accounts) in the early 1980s was seen to impose intolerable pressures: 
‘creating an enormous burden of extra administrative work without a clear and 
more comprehensible result than the previous arrangements’. An antagonism 
to rigid rules and regulations was strongly held by many within the sector, 
leading the federation to assert that ‘associations will always resent external 
supervision, scrutiny and control’ (NFHA, 1983, p.6). Thus, before the 
introduction of the 1988 Act their professional identity was determined by a 
strong sense that they would resist hierarchical governance.
An official history of one of the 1960s organisations (Paddington Churches 
Housing Association, PCHA) endorses a statement by its founder that ‘I 
regard what I do as the fulfilment of a ministry’. This statement was seen as 
representing the ‘spirit’ of the association (Mantle, 1995, p.21). This 
organisational history illustrates how the desire to remain faithful to their core 
objectives continued to have strong reverberations.
This theme of retaining a core organisational identity in the face of 
fundamental change represented an important incentive for many 
contemporary housing associations. Those associations with ‘Church’ in their
148name were founded by religious groups, carrying a strong moral imperative to 
improve social conditions in the London area. These origins played a central 
role in determining the response to later proposals for change. The history of 
Paddington Churches concludes with a quotation from a regional manager of 
the association:
The bigger you are, the harder it is to keep in touch with people. But, if 
you are committed to what you are doing, and you can remember what 
your roots were, you can do it...you can keep in touch (quoted in Mantle, 
1995, p. 39).
These historical roots can be seen as the bedrock of today’s social housing 
sector. Despite experiencing rapid and intensive organisational changes their 
origins remain firmly established within the contemporary organisational 
culture. The core identity of these organisations was intrinsically connected to 
their local presence and their roots as small-scale, responsive landlords. Their 
origins in fighting against injustice, particularly amongst profiteering private 
landlords represented an enduring organisational ethos, particularly at Board 
level.
Ten years after the introduction of the 1988 Housing Act, associations 
continued to derive considerable benefit in emphasising their historical origins. 
In a foreword to a collection of Octavia Hill’s writings, the Chief Executive of 
the Octavia Hill Housing Trust stated: Two years ago we decided to begin 
each Committee of management meeting with a reading from something 
either by or about Octavia’ (Ounsted, 1998, p.v). The statement showed how 
the vision of the organisational founder continues to exert a strong influence 
upon contemporary strategies. This comment was instructive as Octavia Hill 
had long been regarded as a controversial figure amongst housing 
professionals, criticised for her authoritarianism, middle-class paternalism and 
judgmental moralistic approach to her tenants (Malpass, 1984; Spicker, 1985; 
Clapham, 1997). Notwithstanding the substantial criticisms, managers were 
keen to emphasise their continuities with earlier periods at times of 
organisational transformation.
149The extent to which the community development function is inherently related 
to the historical legacy of many housing associations can be seen in a 
research study of a number of contemporary developing associations (Smith 
and Paterson, 1999). The study concluded:
For the majority of associations participating in the research, the key 
factor influencing the nature of their community investment activity is 
their cultural and historical roots. Some were established as a result of 
their community activity and were clearly intended to act as social or 
community-based organisations. Others were set up with the specific 
aim of taking a holistic view of the needs to the community they serve 
with a clear recognition - reflected in their rules - that housing is only a 
small part of what is important to their tenants (Smith and Paterson, 
1999, p.6).
What was significant here was that many of these housing associations 
always saw their mission as broader than simply providing accommodation. 
They therefore had a much wider sense of their community role than 
traditional local authority landlords. For some writers, contemporary housing 
associations were simply engaged in a process of ‘mythologising a common 
sense of history and purpose’ in order to preserve housing associations 
monopoly access to government capital subsidies (Mullins, 1997; Mullins et. 
al., 2001, p. 618). According to these accounts, the concept of a shared 
history and common purpose was simply seen as an opportunistic attempt by 
the voluntary housing sector to take advantage of the benefits of funding 
systems. In contrast, the sector has always viewed their position as 
egalitarian in principle. For example, interviewees from black and minority 
ethnic organisations stressed that the roots of housing associations were 
founded upon a strong tradition of community involvement:
I think there is a group of housing associations, who in terms of culture, 
background, history are very much geared towards community 
empowerment. These area housing associations...have  largely fought 
on the campaign of providing better housing for poor working people and 
also on the premise of anti-poverty; all these people were interested in 
the common good (Interview no. 24, 18/2/99).
150However, despite the emphasis on their strong community links, mainstream 
housing associations were often criticised for their complacent attitude 
towards equality and in particular issues of race. In a report published in the 
early 1980s, the response of housing associations was criticised as tokenistic, 
remote and perpetuating disadvantage (NFHA, 1983b). The consequence of 
the dissatisfaction with the mainstream sector was seen in the development of 
new organisations that specialised in service delivery to minority communities. 
These organisations are commonly referred to under the generic term ‘black 
and minority ethnic’ (BME) organisations. Defined as organisations with at 
least 80 per cent of governing bodies drawn from minority ethnic communities, 
these organisations carried an egalitarian torch into the 1980s. In London 
there are 35 such organisations owning a total of 15,300 units (Hammond and 
Tilling, 2003).
A Housing Corporation (2003b) study emphasised the strong historical roots 
of the BME organisations as ‘often drawn initially by firm political views in 
which the purpose of community empowerment was achieved by the creation 
of well run, professional black organisations’ (p.14). Furthermore their ‘cultural 
identity...is defined as both the desire to house a specific community and the 
retention of a vision of community empowerment as a means to combat 
discrimination'. In general these organisations are seen to have ‘remained 
true to their original aims’ (ibid.). Table 5.1  illustrates the main BME 
organisations operating in the London area.
151Table 5.1: The major black and minority ethnic (BME) housing associations in 
London
Name of housing 
association
Number of units 
owned in 2003
Number of 
local authority 
areas of 
operation
Ujima 4,200 19
Presentation 3,651 23
ASRA 2,021 25
Kush 656 6
Bnai Brith 553 8
Inquilab 537 6
North London Muslim 470 3
Agudas Israel 419 4
Innisfree 400 9
ARHAG 367 11
Spitalfields 352 2
Shian 302 3
CARA 292 4
Labo 240 2
Croydon People’s 214 4
Refugee 168 23
Pathway 159 1
Black Roof 123 2
Ekaya 122 4
Lien Viet 111 4
Westlon 91 2
Odu-Dua 86 3
Source: the Housing Corporation: Register of Social Landlords
This sector has had a relatively recent history. In 1983 there were only 4 
registered black led housing associations out of a total of 2000 in England. In 
1991 the figure had increased to 44 and by the late 1990s there were over 70 
such organisations (Blackaby and Patel, 2003). The table also shows that with 
the exception of three relatively large organisations, the majority are limited to 
a small number of geographical localities. The BME sector as a whole 
continues to emphasise its commitment to collective goals. For example, 
ASRA housing association, an organisation largely catering for the needs of 
Asian communities states: ‘our mission is to empower residents and we 
believe that no one should be discriminated in life by where they live’ 
(www.asra.co.uk).
152These BME organisations can therefore be seen as representative of a new 
form of egalitarianism reflecting wider trends connected to the growth of 
single-issue protest groups. This trend has been pronounced within the 
housing association sector which encouraged the development of a black and 
minority ethnic sector as it struggled to gain legitimacy. For managers working 
closely with minority ethnic housing associations, the benefit was the potential 
to foster a distinctive purpose and identity:
Black housing associations have been born out of anti-racism struggles, 
anti-immigration, conflicts with the police and statutory agencies. If you 
look at the history of black organisations they have been born out of 
struggle and the people on the management committee are those 
community activists (Interview no. 24, 18/2/99).
In contrast to the established analyses of the 1988 Act, housing associations 
have continued to be influenced by their historical origins, which have exerted 
a profound impact on organisational culture and values. Those interpretations 
of housing policy that ignore the historical origins of these organisations 
seriously underplay how the sedimentation of values continues to influence 
their current development. Moreover, in addition to these historical roots, 
housing associations have other influences that affect their philosophy 
towards an egalitarian direction.
5.2.2  The governance stmcture
A distinctive feature of the structure of housing associations is their 
governance by a voluntary management committee (or ‘Board’). It is this 
feature that ensures much of the egalitarian traditions and organisational 
identity is retained. The need to stress the egalitarian credentials of housing 
associations became far more pronounced with the advent of the 1988 Act 
with the perception that associations had replaced democratically elected 
local authorities. Organisations felt a need to demonstrate their legitimacy 
which was achieved through emphasising their (low grid) autonomous roots 
and their commitment to a (high group) collective ethos.
153The legitimacy of housing associations was primarily premised upon the fact 
of having a greater level of face-to-face accountability than the local authority 
sector, through their small-scale basis and geographical location. Their 
governance by community stakeholders was also held to contribute to their 
ability to meet housing need in a more flexible, responsive and accessible 
way than their local authority counterparts. The role of the management 
committee was a crucial element in retaining organisational identity and 
representing this accountability.  Particularly important in this respect was 
their role in maintaining pressure upon senior managers and in acting as an 
organisational ‘social conscience’. The role of management committees can 
be expressed as follows:
It is the function of the members of the governing body to test, to 
scrutinise, and to challenge the recommendations, performance and 
policies of officers, and in the last resort of course, to change those 
officers. In short, they have to be sure to hold their officers to account, 
since otherwise they themselves cannot be accountable for the 
performance of their organisation and cannot fulfil their legal obligations 
(Klein and Day, 1994, p.32).
This definition of accountability sees the function of corporate governance as 
defining core organisational values and principles. Despite the lack of 
democratic credentials through electoral means, housing association board 
members were keen to stress that their legitimacy lay in a more fully 
representative form of participatory democracy.
In the immediate aftermath of the Act and throughout the early 1990s, a 
fundamental criticism of housing associations related to their lack of 
accountability; housing associations were viewed as having a ‘tarnished’ 
image due to their lack of transparency and elitist tendencies (Mullins and 
Riseborough, 2001, p. 162) and there was considerable debate about the 
perceived ‘legitimacy gap’ compared to local authorities with considerable 
attention focused on the governance arrangements of these organisations 
and the composition of management committees. Several studies (for 
example, Nolan, 1996; Kearns,  1997) criticised a tendency to rely on 
patronage where recruitment was conducted on the basis of informal personal
154contacts and a general lack of transparency within the housing association 
sector. One of the main criticisms of housing association management 
committees was that they functioned as ‘self-perpetuating oligarchies’ (Mellor, 
1983, p. 84; Davis and Spencer, 1995). Hence, in most cases elections to 
committees were uncontested and nominations were usually of people 
already co-opted onto the Board.
The role of the Board therefore became crucial in order to demonstrate the 
accountability of the sector as a Director of one of the major London 
associations commented:
Local authority councillors claim they have the moral high ground, they are 
elected, and they are directly accountable to their constituents. They can 
ask “who are these housing associations, to whom are they accountable, 
and to whom are their boards accountable”. I think housing associations 
have some problems in trying to be robust against local authorities as a 
consequence of that (Interview no. 6, 11/2/97).
Housing associations faced a continuing struggle to establish their legitimacy. 
Local authorities were able to impose their will more effectively through their 
democratic mandate, meaning that associations needed to find more creative 
ways of establishing a local legitimacy.
The response to these criticisms in the mid 1990s was to pursue a strategy of 
‘decontamination’ to reassert the democratic credentials of the sector (Mullins 
and Riseborough, 2001, p.162). This strategy meant that organisations were 
eager to show how they could be more accountable to local community needs 
than the statutory sector. These pressures manifested a collective response 
on the part of Board members to emphasise the founding principles of the 
organisation. Their legitimacy was therefore presented as somehow more 
‘genuine’ than the spurious democracy offered by local authority structures 
and Board members were critical of narrow definitions of accountability. The 
following view illustrated how Board members tended to look at the notion of 
accountability:
155The question is, what is the spectrum that is acceptable from democratic 
election at one level through to whatever form of appointment takes 
place in housing associations that is legitimate, and what does that 
legitimacy require as a way of accounting back to those who sent you 
there or in whose areas you operate? (Interview no. 12, 8/4/97).
Legitimacy within housing associations was thus viewed as a dynamic 
process and accountability was understood in broad sense, connected to 
management performance to stakeholders. The problem of legitimacy within 
the housing association context was encapsulated in the following comment 
from one Chief Executive:
By definition housing associations...deliver a different product [from local 
authorities]. I think the interesting question about the legitimacy issue, is: 
“what are the characteristics of the organisations that provide community 
services, and how do they secure their legitimacy”? Is it legitimacy to be 
elected by forty percent of the populace locally and say “that’s it, there is 
no other structure”, or is legitimacy defined in community based 
organisations that work in neighbourhoods? (Interview no. 12, 8/4/97).
There existed a strong determination amongst community representatives and 
management committee members to hold organisations to account and 
ensure that these traditions could be retained. Referring to this egalitarian 
history a representative of the minority ethnic sector commented: ‘for some 
housing associations it has always been there but in their scope to become 
professional they have lost it and they have to be reconnected to it’ (Interview 
no. 23, 18/2/99).
The importance of the Board in retaining the core values was illustrated by the 
Chair of one large housing association when he claimed: The Board is very 
jealous of the things they believe in’ (Interview no. 23, 25/1/99). This pressure 
on the Board to act as an organisational conscience resulted in much soul 
searching about the role and purpose of the management committee. As one 
committee member explained:
There has been a lot of debate internally about who owns the 
organisation. What is the role of the Board? We have moved away from 
a model of the Board being representative of stakeholders (one person
156from this and that local authority, one tenant, one leaseholder from a 
particular area). We have moved away from that on the basis that it may 
look good in political terms, but if those people can’t actually make good 
decisions, then you have a problem. So there is the problem of having a 
more business-like Board, dealing with a complex environment capable 
of actually dealing with strategic issues, some of the imperatives of which 
run counter to wanting to be representative. It is competition versus 
representation (Interview no. 6, 11/2/97).
The centrality of the Board in determining organisational values was viewed 
as particularly important in the case of minority ethnic organisations. Thus, as 
the Director of the Federation representing this sector commented:
They have to provide an effective housing service, so they don’t forget 
where they are coming from. The committee and the staff won’t allow 
them to forget that (Interview no. 24, 18/2/99).
The implication of the above statement was that other mainstream housing 
associations had, through their pursuit of growth, lost their radical edge. It was 
therefore left to the black and minority ethnic (BME) sector to carry the torch 
for an egalitarian housing policy. Such comments reflected the view that the 
BME sector shared a stronger sense of its original purpose and values and 
was more effective than mainstream associations at representing the needs of 
disadvantaged groups. Thus, ‘black housing associations, even though they 
don’t have the financial clout of mainstream associations; they have got what 
it takes to develop this new housing agenda’ (Interview no. 24, 18/2/99)
The role of the Board was also illustrated in the following quote from a 
committee member of a medium-sized London association which illustrated 
the objective that minority ethnic pressure groups wanted housing 
associations to promote:
The important thing is for housing associations to be proactive rather 
than reactive. They have to take on the role of campaigning 
organisations and go back to where they started from: helping those 
nobody looks after; to be a voice for marginalised groups. They are no 
longer that voice (Interview no. 24, 20/11/98).
157Such committee members claimed that today’s housing associations had lost 
their radical, campaigning identity. Furthermore, resistance to proposals for 
Board member remuneration (discussed in chapter four) illustrated the strong 
egalitarian tendencies of the BME sector. Thus one organisation was quoted 
as follows in the Housing Corporation responses to the consultation paper:
‘we believe that this proposal would seriously devalue the concept of a public 
service on which social housing is based’ (quoted in the Housing Corporation, 
2003a, p.4). A similar sentiment was provided from a Board member of an 
unnamed association:
the proposals are far more likely to damage than strengthen housing 
associations!... ] the net result will be no overall increase in the quality of 
board members or governance...but substantial financial and ethical 
costs, a lower reputation and the loss of an ethos which has served both 
associations and communities well (quoted in the Housing Corporation, 
2003a, p.4).
The above quotes illustrated the continuing resonance of an egalitarian ethos 
amongst Board members. Yet the fact that the proposals were nevertheless 
implemented showed the declining influence of these organisations upon 
central government thinking. Nevertheless, the governance structure 
encapsulated the ways in which housing associations were compelled to 
retain their egalitarian credentials.
5.2.3  The strong group: partnership and mutuality
What Hood (2000) terms control through ‘groupism’ implies ‘maximum face to 
face group interactions between public serviced producers and clients, and as 
far as possible a dissolution of the difference between “producer” and “client” 
altogether’ (p.62).
The high group values of the sector can be shown by the need for housing 
associations to emphasise the importance of a common purpose. This need 
has been a particularly strong feature of many housing association responses 
following the 1988 Act. The Act not only increased competition between
158housing associations as discussed in previous chapters; it also introduced a 
strong emphasis upon the principles of partnership and mutuality, seeing 
housing policy as more effectively delivered through a pluralistic network of 
organisations (Goodlad, 1993; Reid, 1995). The Chief Executive of the 
National Housing Federation expressed the view that the most central value 
for housing associations was their commitment to a collective endeavour to 
improve the fortunes of an oppressed group of residents and the strong ethos 
of mutual co-operation:
What’s important is the values-driven focus of not-for-profit housing -  the 
commitment to independence, performance, accountability, equality and 
partnership... These are the characteristics that bind us together’ (Jim 
Coulter, quoted in Inside Housing, 8/6/2001).
These high group values were also stressed in a document produced by 
Notting Hill Housing Trust in the 1990s emphasising how these strategies 
were to be developed. The document states:
As one of the country’s leading housing associations we have learnt, 
through over 30 years of experience, that simply building or refurbishing 
houses is not sufficient to bring new life to depressed communities. Our 
real business is regeneration...We believe in successful regeneration 
based on three key principles: trust, partnership, vision (NHHT, undated,
p. 2).
By the mid 1990s, the need to develop effective organisational partnerships 
with a range of agencies occupied a central position in housing association 
strategies. These partnership models were based on the assumption that the 
delivery of housing services by unitary, monolithic organisations was 
redundant. According to these views, the delivery of housing policy was firmly 
viewed as a collective endeavour. The belief in the value of these partnership 
arrangements was reflected in an assumption that organisational synergy 
would be facilitated through a mode of working which valued mutual respect 
and reciprocity.
By the end of the 1990s, contemporary organisations were placing great belief 
in the efficacy of mutualistic strategies. The outcome of more co-operative
159approaches to management was reflected in the understanding that ‘housing 
policy’ in isolation was ineffective. Consequently:
It could be argued that we will be hearing less and less of ‘housing’ 
associations, ‘housing’ budgets, even ‘housing’ ministers in the years 
ahead. That language has become too tribal for the new regeneration 
era. The emphasis is now on partnership - and a new language is 
emerging as a result: broad agendas, joined-up-thinking, holistic 
approaches and multi-agency agreements (Dwelly, 1999, p.6).
Such claims indicated how the focus of housing association activity had 
moved towards more collective and collaborative models of meeting housing 
need. These approaches were based on a strong model of cooperation and 
self-organising network approaches to management, containing firm principles 
of mutualism and effective joint working. The notion of a new social housing 
agenda following the 1997 General Election was a key preoccupation for 
committee members. One respondent representing minority ethnic 
organisations viewed the New Labour agenda as ‘less to do with making a 
profit and more to do with community reinvestment’ (Interview no. 24,
18/2/99).
A commitment to the principle of mutuality was outlined by a representative of 
the Federation of Black Housing Organisations (FBHO). This respondent 
outlined the organisational objectives in the post 1988 environment: ‘to 
develop a new culture for housing associations, a much more progressive 
culture which takes on issues of ethnicity and gender in communities. That is 
the ambition, to develop a new forum for debate and action...’ (Interview no. 
24, 18/2/99). This view stressed the need for the voluntary sector to play an 
oppositional role, congruent with the views of Hedley (1995) writing of the 
voluntary sector as a whole: ‘the real strength of the voluntary sector is its 
actual diversity and its role must be one of dissent’ (p.111). This concept of 
opposition can serve as an important motif for the housing association sector 
in general as it tackled the dilemmas of becoming an integral part of a 
restructured welfare state system. The radical, dissenting role played by 
ethnic minority organisations, based on a foundation of a collective
160organisational response to government policy was viewed as the distinctive 
contribution of these specialist and generally small-scale associations.
With the election of a Labour government in 1997 the focus of housing 
association activity began to shift from merely providing accommodation to a 
concern with meeting broader social objectives under ‘Third Way’ principles 
that combined social democratic values with liberalism. Initiatives to 
modernise local governance were premised upon primarily egalitarian 
objectives as Stoker (2004) has pointed out. Thus, statements from central 
government (Blair, 1998a and b; the DETR, 1998b; Armstrong, 2000 and 
Brown, 2001) consistently stressed the need to maintain a strong collective 
emphasis in local governance, based upon principles of self-management and 
network organisation; utilising the historical strengths of the voluntary sector. 
Within housing management, egalitarian forms of organisation are commonly 
emphasised as the most effective solutions to the long-standing difficulties 
facing housing estates, by emphasising resident empowerment, reducing 
bureaucratic control and maximising collective organisation (Power, 1996; 
Duffy and Hutchinson, 1997; Somerville, 1998; Leach and Wingfield, 1999; 
Taylor, 2003).
After 2000, housing associations were encouraged to focus upon participation 
in their approach to service delivery as stated by the Housing Corporation in a 
publication entitled Communities in Control:
Our starting point is that participation by residents in the activities of their 
landlord is essential to effective decision-making on services and to 
implementing investment and regeneration proposals...We believe that 
residents should be able to explore and exercise choices that extend 
beyond participation to increased involvement -  that is, involvement in 
how services are managed and how organisations are governed or 
controlled (the Housing Corporation, 2000c, p.2).
This participative style of community governance was extended at central 
government level through the National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal 
(SEU, 2001a) which was designed to harness collective, egalitarian styles of 
policy that utilised the capacities of residents to solve social policy problems.
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sector and private organisations) and the development of New Deal for 
Communities initiatives also attempted to institutionalise a long-term 
commitment to regeneration which placed communities at the centre of 
strategic decision-making, in conjunction with housing association agencies.
Such initiatives helped to place housing associations at the centre of a 
decentralised and pluralistic policy environment, clearly distinct them from 
previous municipal strategies. Housing associations were increasingly 
encouraged to adopt a collaborative approach to housing need, which was 
contingent upon a range of agencies in the public, private and voluntary 
sectors. In theory, these strategies were inclined towards much stronger 
models of group identity both amongst and between housing associations.
5.3  The effects of egalitarianism
Whilst the above discussion has outlined some of the most significant 
pressures towards an egalitarian ethos in the housing association sector, 
many of the outcomes have been very different to those intended. In particular 
an egalitarian culture has had three specific effects: organisational conflict, 
the production of false expectations, and the potential end of egalitarian 
organisational structures.
5.3.1  Organisational conflict
Organisational conflict manifested itself in the post 1988 environment in a 
number of ways. The first of these related to concerns about committee 
structures and composition. Respondents were critical of the pattern of 
committee membership in recent years: ‘You have seen a proliferation of 
men, predominantly accountants’ (Interview no. 22, 27/11/98). Others 
propounded highly critical views about the contribution offered by minority 
ethnic organisations. Thus one committee member of a medium-sized London 
association maintained: ‘empowerment can be measured in the number of 
minority Directors and Chief Executives in housing associations’ (Interview no.
16221, 20/11/98), suggesting that ethnic minority groups were disproportionately 
concentrated amongst lower-level, front-line staff. A Housing Corporation 
report published in 2001 found that ‘BME staff remain under-represented at 
senior organisational levels and on the governing boards of housing 
associations and are mostly represented at junior management, clerical and 
secretarial levels. This is despite frequently being more qualified than their 
white colleagues in higher grades’ (Housing Corporation, 2001c, p.8).
The 1988 Act also exposed some basic philosophical disputes between staff 
and Board members. One indication of this tension was the level of criticism 
aimed by senior managers at Board members. Thus in response to the 
recommendations of the ‘Nolan’ report (Committee on Standards in Public 
Life, 1996), a Director of one of the ‘Shelter’ housing associations expressed 
strong criticism of the complacency of Board members for their elitist 
structures:
I don’t think they have taken Nolan seriously. In some respects they are 
wrapped up in their power bases. They are self-replicating. The way they 
got there is very hazy and convoluted. I don’t think many staff could 
explain how they had been voted on to the Board (Interview no. 13,
11/4/97).
A second area of conflict related to the need to preserve a sense of 
geographical integrity set against a requirement to develop in order to exploit 
new market opportunities. Organisational location was a central feature in 
shaping organisational identity. As Malpass (2000a) comments: ‘the more 
they grew, and the more they expanded their geographical areas across 
which they operated, the more difficult it became for housing associations to 
retain the very characteristics which made them attractive in the first place’
(p.199).
The pressure to develop within a wider geographical scope created a second 
area of organisational tension. By the mid 1990s committee members as 
opposed to Chief Executives were holding the torch for an egalitarian culture, 
expressed in an anxiety that housing organisations were losing their
163distinctive and historical local identities. Powerful emotions were raised about 
the ability of maintaining links with local communities and geographical 
integrity, reflecting the strong belief that a key strength of associations was 
their position within local areas. Such views are congruent with orthodox 
representations of housing associations and their community profiles (Best, 
1997). A study commissioned by the Housing Corporation (Exworthy, 2000) 
concluded that relations between Chairs of Management Committees and 
Chief Executives were generally positive. Nevertheless, conflicts between 
Board members and senior managers were becoming increasingly evident at 
the turn of the century.
One of the main areas of conflict related to the geographical sphere of 
operation of housing associations. As a Board member of one of the major 
developing London associations explained: ‘we can’t expand in numbers. We 
have restricted ourselves to geographical areas. That can be positive and 
negative. It makes it difficult to grab opportunities. We might be too cautious’ 
(Interview no. 23, 25/1/99). Egalitarianism was seen as an opportunity to 
return associations to a period of certainty, where there was a measure of 
clarity about fundamental objectives. At the same time it has proved a source 
of frustration and tension for many contemporary managers. Divisions were 
therefore appearing both within committees and between committee members 
and staff.
The emphasis on growth was a cause of many of the most serious conflicts 
between committee members and senior officers. A common concern was 
that this emphasis on continual expansion and drive to develop at all costs 
was at the expense of broader social goals that were often viewed as the core 
strength of the sector:
We have been involved in buying land before we have got planning 
permission ... on a number of sites. It means that we are able to do 
things fast. We have been very proactive in that respect. We have an 
ability to respond in development and financial terms that make the 
development targets and growth completely overshadow the community 
development side (Interview no.44, management committee member, 
19/2/03).
164The need to retain associations’ local identity became increasingly 
problematic as they widened their sphere of activity and were perceived to 
have lost their geographical integrity (Malpass, 1997b). The need to remain 
within traditional localities raised severe difficulties for associations in areas of 
high demand such as Inner London, where there were extreme shortages of 
supply and opportunities for development were greatly restricted. The Chair of 
the management committee of one of the major London associations 
expressed the problem as follows:
We have a dilemma that these are our core areas, but we can’t develop in 
these areas...We are diluting the perimeters of where you are placed, 
what you believe in. We do have a [geographical] line, but we are 
constantly coming up against this. My view is that staff should be able to 
push and we should be able to say no (Interview no.23, 25/1/99).
A further area of conflict was the need to balance the demands of growth and 
risk against a community development role. Whilst on the one hand staff were 
keen to demonstrate their entrepreneurial skills on the other hand many staff 
felt that these goals came at the expense of delivering an effective housing 
service. These discussions touched upon a fundamental ideological divide 
about the direction and pace of change for the sector.
I think that RSLs have strayed away from being social landlords ...We 
have to recognise that there are people who are vulnerable. If 90 per 
cent of time is spent on 10 per cent of tenants, that is because they need 
it. Otherwise we are looking at things the wrong way round. Too much in 
RSLs has been about development, about new units rather than 
supporting communities or about vulnerability or sustainability. If you are 
not interested in supporting vulnerable people then fine, but don’t 
pretend to be a social landlord, forget about the Housing Corporation 
and call yourself a private landlord. Let’s be clear about being a RSL 
(Interview no.36, community development officer, 8/1/03).
The issue of community development became particularly pronounced after 
the 1997 General Election with the strong focus on ‘neighbourhood 
regeneration’ mentioned in the reports produced by the government’s Social 
Exclusion Unit (1998; 2001). However, the concepts required to progress an 
agenda of community development and resident empowerment created a
165division between the traditional committee members, permeated with a sense 
of organisational history, and the more recently appointed Board members 
who had been recruited on the basis of their ‘professional’, business 
expertise. A Board member of one of the main developing associations in 
London expressed the dichotomy as follows:
Housing associations have an extremely important role in community 
development and they have to spend money to achieve it.... If you look 
at the background of the other committee members you see that it 
doesn’t make them aware of these kinds of issues. Their strength is their 
awareness of money, which is of course important. Their heart is in the 
right place but I don’t think that they truly understand the social and 
community implications of their decisions (Interview no.44, management 
committee member, 19/2/03).
An example of the tendency to exacerbate organisational conflict was seen in 
the response of a long-serving management committee member. This 
individual mentioned how a number of serious disputes between staff and 
board members had erupted over the ‘concentration of power and direction in 
a negative way’ (Interview no. 23, 25/1/99). This member was highly critical of 
a Chief Executive who was perceived to have been concerned with 
accumulating influence at the expense of wider social goals. He continued: 
‘the Board took the view that we had to stop the centralisation otherwise the 
organisation would not be able to be what it was, a very community, tenant- 
involved organisation’ (Interview no. 23, 25/1/99). The attempt to carve out a 
new identity for many organisations, reflecting a community development 
function represented an important area of dispute:
Our growth from 1,200 to 6,000 homes in just ten years is an achievement 
but reflects a number of concerns. I am desperately worried about our 
social and community role. We began as a traditional association but as we 
have grown we have focused too much on growth and not enough on 
community development issues (Interview no.44, management committee 
member, 19/2/03).
Divisions were apparent not only between committee members and staff but 
also within committees themselves. The role of minority ethnic groups in 
ensuring that housing associations remained true to their original objectives
166as local community-based organisations was an important theme in interviews 
with members of such groups. As chapter four illustrated, many Chief 
Executives held out for an individualist identity that allowed them to take 
advantage of the opportunities offered by the business environment.
One of the major weaknesses of egalitarian organisations is a tendency 
towards sectarianism amongst actors and a difficulty in resolving disputes. A 
Housing Corporation inspection report illustrated the inherent tendencies 
towards conflict. Their report on a tenant-led housing association based in 
Brixton (previously a housing cooperative) complained that ‘there had been 
acrimony and factionalism between board members and various conflicts of 
interest between their expectations as residents and their responsibilities as 
board members’ (the Housing Corporation Assessment, 2003).
Management committee members increasingly perceived their role as 
restraining the entrepreneurial impulses of Chief Executives and holding out 
against individualist trends. The committee therefore functioned as an 
egalitarian social conscience, countering the individualistic tendencies of 
entrepreneurial managers. The governance of contemporary housing 
associations could be seen as a process of continual struggle between 
managerial objectives of growth into new areas set against the desire of 
committee members to curb this expansionist agenda. At the same time, the 
constraints imposed by the historical origins of the Shelter housing 
associations in particular were viewed in ambivalent ways with committee 
members acknowledging they faced significant organisational dilemmas.
5.3.2  False expectations
The commitment to ‘co-production’ of public services (Hood, 2000, p. 122) 
whereby citizens were viewed not as passive consumers but as essentially 
involved in provision represented an important strand amongst housing 
associations determined to distinguish the interests of residents and those of 
bureaucrats in central government. The use of strategies which involved 
integrated approaches with a diversity of agencies and with the participation
167of residents was viewed as a significant solution to problems of housing 
management. The premise contained within such analyses is that through 
tenant involvement and wide ranging ‘holistic’ strategies an opportunity is 
offered to avoid traditional paternalistic landlordism and to precipitate 
devolution of power to local communities. Decentralised management 
systems in conjunction with new forms of participatory democracy have 
therefore been strongly advocated by influential commentators on social 
housing management (Hambleton and Hoggett, 1987; Burns etai, 1994; 
Power, A. 1996). According to these arguments, new initiatives can assist in a 
transfer of power downwards to local neighbourhoods offering much greater 
levels of choice and influence in day-to-day decisions.
However, one of the main historic criticisms of the housing association sector 
was that it traditionally paid lip service to the notion of resident participation 
(Cooper and Hawtin, 1998) with associations often portrayed as having a 
complacent view about their community links (Fordham, 1995). An example of 
the way in which the sector had become committed to tenant involvement can 
be found in a history of Paddington Churches Housing Association:
There was a fine line...between housing people and becoming a welfare 
agency. Greater tenant involvement was one way of avoiding 
paternalism, by encouraging people to take advantage of better housing 
to take control of their own lives and not be over-dependent on the 
association (Mantle, 1995, p. 27).
An important manifestation of ‘co-production’ in the sector was the attention 
devoted to strategies of resident empowerment, whereby tenants were 
enabled to achieve their potential through participatory mechanisms (see for 
example Thake and Staubach, 1993; Taylor, 1995). Housing associations 
viewed tenant participation as a necessary condition for effective service 
delivery and as a positive alternative to hierarchy. For example:
There will be a much stronger commitment to involving tenants so that 
the work of the Association is more clearly driven by them and not by the 
administrative convenience of Housing Corporation bureaucracy (St. 
Pancras Housing, Annual Review, 1998/9, p.15).
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requirement to meet the demands of legitimacy identified earlier. In the mid to 
late 1990s housing associations placed themselves in the forefront of new 
models of housing management, aiming to avoid the mistakes of the past 
(largely associated with hierarchical management systems). In particular the 
need to ensure sustainable policy solutions and to contribute to a wider sense 
of community regeneration has been a central theme in contemporary 
housing strategies. These proactive and holistic models of service delivery 
permeated contemporary statements of organisational vision and corporate 
objectives (Power, 1996b; The Housing Corporation, 1997a; Dwelly, 1999).
Additionally, during the late 1990s, housing associations found themselves in 
a new role: not only were they responsible for providing accommodation, but 
they were also expected to act as regeneration agencies. Declarations that 
housing problems did not exist in isolation and had to be connected to 
broader approaches were widely used within the sector and constitute an 
integral part of contemporary housing management practice. These wider 
approaches normally include training; job creation; education and health 
initiatives. A symptomatic example can be found in a statement by one of the 
philanthropic associations:
Peabody anticipates social and economic needs in London and then acts 
to meet them, rather than waiting for change to happen...Peabody is one 
step ahead in the fight to eliminate poverty and social exclusion in 
London...Community spirit is one of the saddest casualties of modern 
life. Peabody is trying to recreate the sense of community found on its 
older estates...Peabody works with residents’ fragmented communities, 
to improve people’s housing and enable them to enrich their lives... 
(Peabody Trust, Annual Report, 1997/98)
The commitment of contemporary housing associations to the concept of 
sustainability is illustrated by the idea that an effective and long-term 
management strategy can produce wider social benefits. Housing 
associations were encouraged to adopt a much wider emphasis on social 
change; they were encouraged to develop strategies under the term ‘Housing 
Plus’ (the Housing Corporation, 1997a) which emphasised the importance of
169wider social objectives. In addition they were strongly encouraged to follow 
models of housing management that devolved power to residents, that relied 
heavily on cooperation between stakeholders and that avoided hierarchical 
forms of governance. These community development approaches, resting on 
low grid and high group assumptions; that the responses should be based 
upon a collective approach and that the response should be free from 
government interference, were seen to be the most appropriate responses to 
neighbourhood problems. For example, referring to a housing association 
estate that had suffered from severe difficulties, a local authority officer 
commented:
Once residents start to be active, and they start to be interested you then 
have a dynamic. You cannot control the permutations that follow from 
this. But you kindle the belief that change will happen. You also start to 
change the psyche of the service providers. Then you begin to alter the 
conspiracy that aspirations and expectations are mutually low where 
residents don’t feel that they have value to deserve any better (Interview 
no.42, 17/2/03).
Although as discussed above, housing associations had long considered 
themselves to be responsible for community development, this social 
investment function represented a qualitatively different role for housing 
associations as they became the sole providers of new housing. Housing 
associations saw themselves as responsible for developing a sense of 
community within local areas but how they were expected to provide this role 
was left unclear. However, what was clear was that the expectations as to 
what they could achieve were far higher than previously. These high 
expectations were reflected in the ability of housing associations to develop 
cohesive community based strategies. Resident participation functioned 
primarily at a rhetorical level as an important prerequisite for housing 
associations. It was therefore only through a shared experience of conflict that 
an effective community response could be pursued. Egalitarian criticisms 
were based around the assumption that mainstream, general needs 
associations had failed in their responsibilities to local areas. Thus, individuals 
working with minority groups tended to view housing associations’ dedication 
to egalitarian goals as mainly symbolic. ‘I think that the commitment is very
170often only skin deep. Once you scratch the surface people are very much 
geared towards development; a narrow view of housing management; a 
narrow view of where they are taking their organisation.’ (Interview no.24, 
18/2/99).
In a similar fashion, black and minority ethnic groups expressed considerable 
scepticism about the commitment of senior managers to the principle of 
equity: ‘managers pay lip service to equal opportunity policies. When jobs 
come up they are given to the people they want’ (Focus group no. 1, 27/5/99). 
The rhetoric of participation and empowerment occupied a central role in 
contemporary housing association strategies and was manifested in 
considerable tensions within the voluntary housing sector, for example in the 
view that the objectives were unrealistic. In particular for those representing 
minority ethnic organisations the emphasis on a ‘Housing Plus’ agenda 
attempted to fulfil highly ambitious objectives:
On the face of it you would see many housing associations saying they 
are keen on Housing Plus and regeneration but I think the key issue is 
whether they have the capacity to do it, either as individuals or 
organisations. Generally it is a very narrow, very parochial sector 
and...there is very little cross-cutting between voluntary, community and 
statutory sectors...that has been the weakness of housing professionals 
and organisations as they try to transform themselves into agents of 
social change (Interview no.24, 18/2/99).
Moreover, there was considerable debate about whether or not it is 
appropriate for housing associations to tackle the broader issues they have 
involved themselves with. For example, Malpass (2000a) contends that 
housing associations should not be involved in anti-poverty strategies and 
should stick to a (narrowly defined) landlord role (p. 273).
The management of partnership arrangements represented many of the 
difficulties and tensions facing the housing association movement. For 
example, Reid (1999) has referred to a ‘new competition’, based upon 
networks of collaborative working requiring effective co-operation and trust. 
However, this new competition is clearly inimical to partnership working; there
171is an essential contradiction between the notions of partnership and 
competition which these concepts are attempting to surmount.
From an egalitarian standpoint, in general terms housing association staff 
were criticised through a distinction between their rhetoric and practice. They 
were viewed as ‘managing communities, rather than being advocates for their 
communities’ (Interview no. 24, 18/2/99, original emphasis). In indication of 
the way that false expectations had developed was expressed by a 
representative of the minority ethnic sector:
It’s about recruiting people into housing from different sectors so they 
can develop the new housing agenda which potentially is quite radical. 
But I think the leadership of housing is not really geared towards that. 
They haven’t got it in their mindset to deal with that...  I think the training 
of housing professionals has been very much focused on developing 
sites, managing houses, rather than working with communities in a 
community development type of role. Certainly in the last ten years 
housing organisations have become much more entrepreneurial, 
motivated by profit (Interview no.24, 18/2/99).
The commitment to resident participation, community empowerment and 
community development raised new expectations of what housing 
associations could achieve. In the (pre 1988) days when they played a largely 
supplementary role to traditional housing providers, associations could afford 
to involve themselves in community development as their expectations were 
not high. They could present themselves as egalitarian social reformers, 
campaigning about housing issues, often criticising the inadequacy of the 
local authority response and its bureaucratic mechanisms. However, as 
associations themselves played the primary role of housing providers, these 
egalitarian objectives became much more difficult to sustain.
Proposals for local authority stock transfer also illustrated how false 
expectations raised the rhetoric of empowerment, where transfers of local 
authority accommodation were supposedly linked to a bottom-up process of 
tenant choice. In practice, however, a positive vote to transfer is almost 
always contingent on a positive campaign to transfer being pursued by the 
local authority. As Pawson (2004, p.6) explains the fact that a rejection of the
172transfer option is likely to incur a heavy financial penalty ‘based on debarred 
access to capital investment’, calls into question the rhetoric of a bottom-up 
strategy.
5.3.3  Self-destruction?
Cultural theory maintains that ‘egalitarian forms of organisation...which 
involve relatively weak formal leadership and rely heavily on communal 
“participative” decision-making involving most or all of the members, are 
chronically vulnerable to collapse if opportunistic members either exit or seek 
to “free ride” on the contributions of a few naive public spirited members, who 
will eventually themselves be discouraged’ (Hood, 2000, p. 10). As housing 
associations have struggled with the demands of change and growth, 
egalitarian structures have become increasingly difficult to sustain.
As seen above, since the late 1980s there have been concerted efforts to 
portray associations as committed to fundamental egalitarian ideals in the 
field of race and housing. However, as housing associations have become 
central to the delivery of housing policy, central government has been 
increasingly reluctant to leave decisions about provision to organisations 
themselves. Thus, many of the strategies have been imposed upon the sector 
by the lead regulator (The Housing Corporation) .The Corporation has issued 
considerable guidance and has advocated a number of black and minority 
ethnic housing strategies (The Housing Corporation, 1992; 1998).
Central government strategies advocated by the Housing Corporation 
illustrate the way in which initially egalitarian objectives, left to individual 
organisations have been taken over by centralised bureaucracies. As 
Harrison (2002) states, the Housing Corporation strategy ‘was virtually unique 
in public policy as an explicit and sustained programme for prioritising the 
funding of service providing organisations run by black people within a large 
“mainstream” budget’ (p. 125).
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towards and away from an egalitarian ethos. The strategy from 1986 to 1991 
in what was known as the ‘Five Year Programme’ was initially to encourage 
the development of new BME housing associations. However, from 1991 to 
1996 a later strategy (‘An Independent Future’) focused on growing existing 
BME housing associations (the Housing Corporation, 2003b) rather than 
encouraging new organisations to develop. This resulted in a decrease in new 
organisations being registered by the Housing Corporation from around 3,100 
in 1989 to around 2,200 by 1994 (The Housing Corporation, 1994b, p.11). 
These figures suggest that by the mid 1990s, government policy was 
designed to limit the growth of new organisations and to consolidate existing 
institutional forms, encouraging mergers of associations rather than funding 
innovative egalitarian groups. The Housing Corporation acknowledged that 
smaller organisations would find difficulty in sustaining a programme of 
expansion:
Many lenders prefer not to lend to small housing associations because of 
the perception, not based on fact that their small size and rapid rate of 
expansion can lead to poor governance and management capability (the 
Housing Corporation, 2003b, p. 12).
Despite the suggestion that such judgements were unfair, the Corporation 
themselves connected failing organisations with egalitarian cultures. For 
example the Housing Corporation (2003b) saw organisational difficulties as 
based upon poor investment decisions by smaller associations and decisions 
to concentrate on non-core housing activities for which they had little 
experience or expertise: The inevitable result was to be placed in Supervision 
by the Housing Corporation’ (p.23). In examining the reasons for 
organisational failure, the Corporation concluded that  ‘many produced poor 
business plans and the culture of infighting and friction within some of the 
Boards left the operational management of the association in a difficult, if not 
impossible situation’ (the Housing Corporation, 2003b, p.23).
Egalitarian organisations were also not thought to be sustainable in the long 
term. The example of the takeover of a small housing association (Walter
174Rodney housing association) by a larger organisation (Ujima housing 
association) in 1986 illustrated the difficulty of sustaining an egalitarian 
cultural ethos. The history of Ujima housing association quoted a former chief 
executive as follows:
The whole thing was an absolute disaster; the impression was given that 
Ujima was gobbling up a smaller housing association and went in very 
heavy handed. It is bad for the community. In my time we always 
supported the development of smaller housing associations and gave 
them a lot of assistance, sometimes at quite a sacrifice to ourselves. Yet 
here was Ujima swallowing a fledgling association in development at a 
time when a lot of people wanted to close down a lot of black housing 
associations (cited in Ross, 2002, p.48).
A Housing Corporation Inspection report issued in 2002 on Solon 
Wandsworth housing association illustrated government thinking about 
suitable organisational structures for the sector. The report criticised Solon 
both for under-investment in their properties and an unrealistically low rental 
policy. The Corporation saw one of the key weaknesses of the organisation as 
their collective structure: ‘Our overall conclusion is that the association’s past 
policies have led to unacceptable and unnecessary risks to tenants and public 
funds. This amounts to a failure of the organisation to manage the business in 
a proper and accountable way’ (www.housinqcorporation.orq.uk). The result 
was that in 2003 it was classified as an enforcement (rather than intervention) 
level supervision case (the most serious level of regulatory concern).
Similarly, an inspection report on Black Roof housing association concluded 
that ‘in general tenant members exhibited a lack of understanding of their 
responsibilities to act in the best interests of the association’ (ibid.).
These cases illustrated how the Corporation found that such organisations 
were either unable or unwilling to deal with their problems, or that the 
problems raised wider issues. The lesson from these examples was that the 
Housing Corporation had grave reservations about egalitarian organisational 
structures.
175This ‘Achilles heel’ of egalitarian organisation can be manifestly illustrated by 
the example of a black and minority association in the late 1980s.  As 
described in its organisational history, the various organisational pressures 
almost resulted in its collapse: ‘It was not housing that was to bring Ujima to 
its knees in 1990, it was internal discord’ (Ross, 2002, p.29).  As the 
organisation grew, there was a perception that it had not matured in 
management terms and that its structure was weakening. ‘The delineation 
between staff and committee which had never been clear, became even more 
blurred as discord grew...As people became more disgruntled some 
committee members went to the press with their complaints’ (ibid. p.29). This 
example illustrated one of the classic tensions within egalitarian organisations, 
where internal tensions cannot be resolved and members find that they have 
to look for external agencies to settle their disputes. ‘Egalitarian organisations 
tend to be short-lived. Procedures may be continually renegotiated among 
equals, and the tendency to split is high, since a group rooted in consensus 
cannot long accommodate dissension as people shift their perspectives’ 
(Coyle, 1997, p.74).
The above examples illustrated the difficulty of egalitarian organisations to 
tolerate dissent; without an overall hierarchical leadership structure there is no 
basis for the resolution of disputes. ‘Egalitarian failures are likely to consist of 
cases where debate cannot be closed, feuding and factionalism goes 
unchecked and the organisation collapses amid a welter of mutual 
recrimination’ (Hood, 2000, p.28). Research carried out into Danish housing 
organisations (Jensen, 1999) illustrated how difficult it can be to sustain 
egalitarian structures:
It takes time to learn the skills needed for participation in collective 
decision making, especially when you have never been listened to or 
counted upon...Egalitarianism is a socially demanding way of life: one 
that is prone to excluding incapable members, or at least to not 
automatically integrating them (pp. 184-5).
In situations where decision-making is equally shared and where 
organisations are facing pressures to grow and to change in radical ways
176organisational conflict cannot be sustained in an egalitarian structure. 
Egalitarian cultures are evidently vulnerable to failure ‘stemming from 
unresolved feuds or collegiality degenerating into coexistence’ (ibid., p.28). 
This can often mean that there is a tendency for members of the group to 
avoid asking awkward questions about the behaviour of colleagues (ibid., 
p.41). These weaknesses are clearly apparent in the experience of the high 
group and low grid cultures evident in many of the smaller housing 
associations where conflict and dissent were unresolved and the solutions 
eventually were for organisations to merge, to adopt hierarchical features and 
ultimately to be placed under the control of a central government agency to 
determine their future.
5.4  Conclusion
The 1988 Housing Act was a highly significant piece of legislation, 
representing a crucial juncture in the development of the sector, but 
commentaries have tended to underplay important continuities with previous 
stages in the organisational growth of housing associations. In particular, the 
cultural bias of egalitarianism remains a central motivating feature of today’s 
housing association sector. Indeed it has become an increasingly important 
theme in the post 1988 environment in response to criticisms that housing 
associations represent an oligarchic and unaccountable force as they have 
replaced democratically elected agencies.
The chapter has shown how the three features of egalitarian organisation 
identified by Hood were clearly apparent in the housing association sector: 
namely, group self-management, control by mutuality and maximum face-to- 
face accountability (Hood, 2000, p. 122). Egalitarianism is clearly embedded in 
the organisational DNA of the housing association sector. In many respects it 
can be viewed as the default position of housing association managers and 
Board members. It therefore represents one of the most important cultural 
values of the housing association sector; it is what makes the sector 
distinctive. Represented through the historical legacy which continues to exert 
a firm hold and through a distinctive governance structure; egalitarianism
177illustrates how the sedimentation of organisational values has taken hold upon 
association cultures. Set within this organisational context, egalitarianism 
since the 1988 Act represents an attempt to return to their historic roots for 
many within the housing association sector. Functioning as an organisational 
social conscience, and helping to remind members of basic values and the 
need to maintain group cohesion, egalitarianism is expressed by the desire to 
sustain a set of core social principles in the face of continuing pressures to 
grow and the perception that associations were in danger of losing their 
distinctive organisational identities. In particular egalitarian responses were 
prevalent amongst longer serving committee members, those with explicit 
political interests and members of minority ethnic groups. Egalitarianism 
continues to play a role within the minority ethnic organisations (representing 
a new type of separatism), at management committee levels, creating new 
types of conflict for the sector. The egalitarian legacy is also apparent in the 
regeneration initiatives implemented under the Third Way’ aspects of New 
Labour social policy. Egalitarianism has always been a feature of certain 
organisational types and this has left a powerful legacy.
The evidence presented in this chapter shows how following the 1988 Act, 
many housing associations made a conscious decision to retain their 
egalitarian roots as low grid and high group organisations, providing a core 
principle and source of motivation for staff working in the sector. In particular 
the management committee functioned as an important conduit for 
egalitarianism. The legacy of these organisations represented both constraint 
and opportunity and provided considerable scope for organisational conflict 
between staff and Board members.
However, at the same time, associations have struggled to strike a balance 
between the need for authenticity and the need to portray themselves as 
organisations transformed into effective social businesses. The discussion 
illustrates some of the key issues and problems facing these organisations as 
they attempt to reconcile conflicting identities and achieve the ‘best of both 
worlds’ (Taylor, 1997) of public and private sector institutions. The 
organisational conflicts evident in the contemporary housing association
178sector have led to considerable debate about whether a cohesive social 
housing sector remains. The view that the sector remains distinctive continues 
to exert strong resonance, but it is apparent these organisations face a 
continual struggle to assert a common view of their direction and purpose.
The National Housing Federation has been complicit in constructing this 
sense of common identity for the sector and assisted housing associations in 
achieving their objectives of raising funds from public and private sectors 
whilst demonstrating a responsible image of the committed social landlord.
Egalitarianism is an enduring feature of the housing association ethos and 
represents a deep-rooted and profound historical tradition which continues to 
function as a determining influence upon a significant number of 
contemporary organisations. The historical legacy of a number of 
organisations can be seen to ensure that egalitarian pressures upon specific 
organisational types within the housing association sector are sustained, 
particularly within those organisations (mainly based in London) which have 
dominated the management and development of contemporary social 
housing. Figure 5.1  illustrates the determination of committee members to 
move associations in a particular direction towards more egalitarian 
objectives.
179Figure 5.1: The pressures exerted by management committee members
(early 1990s)
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Egalitarianism is the cultural value that is the most under threat, by radical 
change, by organisational conflict and by the hierarchical trends manifested 
since the 1988 Act. These pressures mean that the radical organisations have 
found it increasingly difficult to retain their core values and to assimilate the 
changes affecting the sector. Nevertheless, egalitarianism is still strongly 
represented by management committees and in particular amongst black and 
minority ethnic led organisations. The solution for egalitarian organisations 
may be in applying these core values ‘in different contexts and incorporating 
them into larger, cultural hybrids to guard against their vulnerabilities’ (Coyle, 
p.74). Therefore the tendency for organisational merger and assimilation may 
be a means for egalitarians to perpetuate an egalitarian culture and to 
advance further egalitarian initiatives, thereby carving out a new 
organisational identity based on a responsive and empowered client group,
180working in partnership with minority groups in a socially inclusive way. This 
may serve to protect some of the organisational legitimacy that was lost in the 
more individualistic responses to the 1988 Act.
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‘THE GROWTH GAME’: HIERARCHY AND HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS
We ought not to be surprised that organisations resist innovation. They 
are supposed to resist it. The reason an organisation is created is in 
large part to replace the uncertain expectations and haphazard activities 
of voluntary endeavours with the stability and routine of organised 
relationships. The standard operating procedure....is not the enemy of 
organisation; it is the essence of organisation. Stability and routine are 
especially important in government agencies where demands for equity 
(or at least the appearance of equity) are easily enforced (Wilson, 1989,
p.221).
6.1  Introduction
As shown in chapter one, a central theme in the development of 
contemporary approaches to social housing management since the 1980s 
has been the need to develop flexible and responsive alternatives to 
municipal hierarchies. Local authority housing management was effectively 
portrayed as the epitome of a remote, inflexible and oppressive management 
system. At the most fundamental level the criticisms of municipal landlords 
were based upon the rejection of hierarchical management structures. 
Hierarchy in housing provision became equated with poor motivation, 
impersonality and organisational rigidity, and housing associations were 
promoted as positive alternatives to bureaucratic local authority landlords. In 
addition, debates about a ‘new governance of housing’ (Malpass, 1997b) 
were dominated by the theme of network forms of coordination in opposition 
to traditional hierarchical control through local government bureaucracies 
(Rhodes, 2000).
Housing associations were promoted as diverse, locally based institutions; the 
antithesis of hierarchy. This chapter investigates the evidence for this view of 
a radical distinction between bureaucratic local authorities and flexible and
182responsive housing associations. As argued in cultural theory, there are four 
main ways of organising which exist in continuous opposition to each other 
and these tensions have been reflected in public management reforms since 
the 1980s. This chapter presents the evidence for the continuing and strong 
influence of hierarchical coordination within housing associations. Whilst at a 
rhetorical level writers have been keen to dismiss hierarchical approaches to 
management as outdated, the persistence of bureaucratic administration is a 
salient feature of housing practice. The chapter examines the contemporary 
trends in housing management and motivations amongst senior managers 
which, it is argued, lead to hierarchy within the housing association sector, 
identified as regulation and policy centralisation, size and status. The 
obligations upon housing associations to become incorporated within a new 
institutional welfare state settlement further reinforce these hierarchical traits 
in contemporary policy.
The chapter also considers the responses to hierarchy within the sector. 
These are identified as elitism, whereby the voluntary housing sector is 
increasingly dominated by a self-defined ‘premier league’ of large housing 
associations. Many organisations are compelled in the direction of 
organisational assimilation through mergers and takeovers, with larger 
organisations taking over smaller ones. Second, housing association staff 
experience a loss of discretion as opportunities for autonomous decision 
making are minimised. Finally, there is a tendency towards greater 
specialisation of work with a loss of traditional ‘generic’ responsibilities. The 
chapter considers how these consequences may further reinforce hierarchical 
trends towards hierarchy within the housing association sector.
1836.2 Housing management and the critique of hierarchy
Cultural theorists maintain that hierarchy constitutes an essential component 
of organisational behaviour. As Douglas (1994) contends: ‘the distinguishing 
feature of hierarchy is that every decision is referred to the well-being of the 
whole. A whole transcending its parts is what hierarchy means’ (p.225). The 
key elements of hierarchy are task specialisation, stratification of power 
between levels and typically a pyramidal structure. The purpose of 
hierarchical coordination is to concentrate direction and control (Mitchell, 
1993). The central principle of hierarchy is vertical coordination, exercised 
through structures of authority and compulsion, in which status is necessarily 
unequal (Beetham, 1996). The core function of hierarchy is to ensure that 
large organisations can be coordinated by a relatively small number of 
individuals and is linked to Weber’s (1947) argument about the benefits of 
rational-legal authority over other traditional or charismatic forms. Within 
hierarchies tasks are progressively broken down into discrete elements. An 
overall process is therefore divided into a number of sub-processes, which 
collectively ensure that objectives are achieved.
As mentioned above, housing management in Britain has been portrayed as 
dependent upon a hierarchical model of coordination with housing provision 
implemented through local government bureaucracies. It was this model that 
was vigorously attacked in the 1980s under the then Conservative 
administration, culminating in the market led reforms of the Housing Act 1998. 
These reforms were meant to bring an end to local government monopolistic 
provision and to institute the era of locally based housing associations. 
Significantly, many of the objectives of the reforms (if not the detail) were 
accepted by housing practitioners. In particular the critiques of bureaucratic 
styles of housing management have had a far-reaching impact upon 
contemporary housing practice.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s there existed a strong tendency in housing 
management to portray hierarchy as representing the antithesis of 
organisational effectiveness. One of the most influential exponents of this
184view contends that there is ‘internal bureaucratic confusion in a central 
hierarchy controlling an essentially local service’ (Power, 1988, p. 19). Such 
prescriptions equating hierarchy with ineffective service provision have 
become a new form of orthodoxy in management prescriptions for housing 
organisations.  Decisions about the management of housing estates are 
therefore viewed as pragmatic responses to common problems: ‘Logically it is 
only possible to handle such decisions at the local level since it is a practical 
rather than a bureaucratic task’ (ibid.). In similar vein, a textbook discussion of 
housing management change argues for an idealised anti-hierarchical 
organisational structure:
Invert the pyramid, displace the apex, and the bottom of the structure 
becomes the weight-bearing point, supporting the organisation above it. 
This can transform the organisation from one with a ‘permission-seeking’ 
culture to one that enables and supports, one where the staff are trusted 
to get on with the job. Instead of looking upwards for authority, 
permission and resources the front-line staff are provided with a 
supportive raft or base for the execution of their appointed tasks (Belcher 
and Blantern, 1992, p. 44).
Such commentators consider that the solutions to the problems of rigidity, 
inflexibility and lack of responsiveness are to be found in developing new 
organisational structures that are diametrically opposed to traditional public 
sector hierarchies. In particular, hierarchy was viewed as preventing 
managers from exercising their discretion and individual initiative. Autonomy 
was therefore viewed as essential to ensure staff motivation. Such views 
became commonplace in discussions about effective organisational design for 
the housing management task. Hierarchy was presented as a redundant 
model for housing organisations:
It is inappropriate to reinforce the organisation’s protocols and 
established bureaucracy. The opposite is required - namely support and 
encouragement and the kind of detachment that provides opportunities 
for the ideas to grow and flourish (Belcher and Blantern, 1992, p. 46).
Since the 1980s, the absence of hierarchy has therefore been presented as a 
prerequisite for organisational innovation and creativity. The rejection of 
hierarchy formed a dominant theme in good practice guidance from the
185professional body (the Chartered Institute of Housing) (Catterick, 1994; 
Passmore and Fergusson, 1994). Taking their cue from wider public 
management texts, bureaucracy was identified with an absence of managerial 
support; systematic procedures were portrayed as barriers to be overcome 
rather than opportunities to assist effective management. The notion that ‘new 
organisational paradigms’ (Walker, 1998b) had emerged, based on network 
approaches (Reid, 1997) for housing organisations carried the implication that 
hierarchy offered a discredited and outdated model for housing organisations. 
The encouragement of new structures, which removed organisational 
constraints, allowing managers to act flexibly without the rigidities of 
bureaucracy, continues to permeate contemporary management rhetoric. The 
purpose of these managerial approaches is to allow organisations to pursue 
entrepreneurial strategies free of traditional hierarchical constraints. Popular 
initiatives within housing policy such as decentralisation and resident 
participation were thus presented as positive moves away from local authority 
dominated structures (Stewart, 1988; Davies, 1992; Passmore and 
Fergusson, 1994).
6.3  Pressures towards hierarchy in housing associations
At first sight, given the accumulation of criticisms of bureaucracy over a 
sustained period of time, the persistence of hierarchical organisation may be 
surprising. Given further that the development of housing associations over 
the last thirty years in Britain in large part can be connected to a reaction 
against hierarchy, it would be unexpected to find increasing trends towards 
bureaucratic management within the social housing sector. However, senior 
managers in particular emphasised that as a result of the 1988 changes, the 
previous somewhat amateurish ways of working could not continue. As an 
example, a senior manager in a medium-sized London association expressed 
it: ‘Somebody once said to me that working for a housing association was a 
bit like working for yourself. There weren’t particularly tight goals or targets 
other than providing housing for people in necessitous circumstances’ 
(Interview no. 6, 11/2/97).
186The implication was that organisations needed to create more rigorous 
systems and procedures, to ensure that service delivery was placed on a 
more scrupulous, professional basis. Common criticisms were expressed 
about the previous environment, where procedures were based on ad hoc 
methods, and an absence of effective, professional management systems.
The following discussion identifies the basic trends within organisations in the 
London area, which have led to the establishment of hierarchical institutional 
structures.
6.3.1  Regulation and the centralisation of housing policy
The growth of regulation and inspection of the housing association sector 
encouraged uniformity in approach to service delivery, marking a strong 
contrast to the pre-1988 environment. Housing associations had three main 
forms of regulation: first through the Charity Commission and Registry of 
Friendly Societies; second through the Housing Corporation, and later through 
the Audit Commission and Best Value regime; and third through the National 
Housing Federation (NHF) and codes of governance. It can be argued that a 
fourth type of regulation is imposed through the professional standards 
encouraged by the Chartered Institute of Housing (CIH).
For a number of managers, the involvement of central government was both 
necessary and desirable. As a senior manager of one of the larger housing 
associations commented:
If you take the long view of history, the importance of the public money 
level cannot be underestimated. Because if you are to produce 
affordable housing, you need public resources to subsidise the market 
costs. That means the government, whoever it is, will have a very 
strong influence on priorities, often positively, not just negatively 
(Interview no. 12, 8/4/97).
An indication of the need for housing associations to adopt more standardised 
processes was provided in an analysis of the problems faced by a minority 
ethnic association (Ujima housing association) in the late 1980s. A history of
187the organisation quotes a former Chief Executive (Victor Adebowale) as 
follows: ‘it reminded me of the collectives of the 1970s. There desperately 
needed to be a hierarchy. There was a resistance to corporate practice. Ujima 
was still coming to terms with being a formal entity and to do that there 
needed to be a high level of organisation’ (quoted in Ross, 2002, p.29).
The regulatory requirements upon associations, through Housing Corporation 
monitoring, became progressively more stringent during the late 1980s and 
1990s. Thus the Housing Corporation adopted rigorous safeguards to housing 
association practices in the 1990s. ‘Major changes have been made to both 
the structure and organisation of the Corporation; in particular to streamline 
systems and procedures and so improve the quality of the services delivered’ 
(The Housing Corporation, 1994a, p.5). In the mid 1990s regulatory practice 
changed in a number of ways. First, stringent criteria were established for 
registration of new housing associations. Organisations needed to 
demonstrate their capacity to ‘withstand the financial risks which are now 
inherent in developing and managing social housing’ (The Housing 
Corporation, 1994a, p.11). These criteria resulted in a significant reduction in 
the number of organisations newly registered by the Housing Corporation 
which were reduced from around 2,300 nationally in 1989 to around 2,200 by 
1994 (ibid.).
The second safeguard was that a more restrictive process of review and 
analysis of annual accounts was instigated. For example, associations were 
required to submit accounts within a six-month deadline. A third requirement 
was for organisations to submit quarterly financial returns and finally the 
Corporation refined the standards against which overall performance was 
assessed. These standards were developed from the previous requirement of 
‘performance expectations’ (The Housing Corporation, 1989) and 
performance criteria (The Housing Corporation, 1992). Housing associations 
were also required to comply with the requirements outlined in the Tenants 
Guarantee’ (part of the 1991  Citizens Charter), which gave residents the right 
to request a range of information relating to their landlords’ performance. 
These initiatives helped to bring the housing associations under a
188performance regime equivalent to other public bodies (Cm 1599, 1991) and 
later standards were adopted to encourage greater levels of resident 
involvement in decision making processes (the Housing Corporation, 1994c).
Thus, by the mid 1990s, as a senior representative of the National Housing 
Federation expressed it, the level of central control was accelerated: ‘there is 
a much more central relationship between resource allocation, the 
organisations that receive it and desired outcomes than has happened before’ 
(Interview no. 12, 8/4/97). The centralisation process was reinforced in 
successive pieces of legislation (the Housing Act 1988, the Local Government 
and Housing Act 1989 and the Housing Act 1996) as was evident from the 
following quotation:
there are aspects to the 1996 Housing Act which potentially give more 
power or control over associations to the Corporation as an agent of 
Government than before. For example, performance requirements on a 
statutory basis (Interview no. 12, 8/4/97).
These processes were viewed by some as a necessary corollary of 
organisational growth. Thus, a management committee member accepted 
that the process of change since the 1980s involved a new cultural dynamic: 
‘an organisation that has very idealistic aims to start with must inevitably 
become bureaucratic and that must be the driving force within it’ (Interview no. 
20, management committee member, 11/11/98).
The need for oversight, to ensure probity and the efficient use of public 
resources required ever more complex preventive mechanisms to avoid 
corruption, prevent the misuse of public funds and ensure government 
objectives were delivered through the Housing Corporation. These pressures 
arising from government intervention were also mentioned as problematic.
the language of ministers, civil servants and the Corporation...although 
rather sotto voce, was very much: ‘we define the social housing 
product to give to the taxpayer, you are to provide and develop that 
product to the taxpayer’ (Interview no. 12, 8/4/97).
189Changes to the funding regime and the encouragement of uniform and 
standardised procedures such as a ‘Social Housing Standard’ in 1997 
(Housing Corporation 1997b) created a more restricted regulatory context for 
associations. As a representative of black and minority ethnic sector 
expressed it, talking of the environment after 1997:
I think that everything becomes internalised. You need to perform 
effectively because you are over-regulated by the Housing Corporation. 
Therefore if you are not performing well you are not going to get your 
allocation. If you do not get your allocation it has an impact on the 
money coming into the organisation. That has a knock-on effect in 
terms of your borrowing requirements. If the borrowing requirements 
are not serviced it has a knock-on effect on the viability of the 
organisation (Interview no. 24, 18/2/99).
The view that government pressures upon associations were becoming 
increasingly prescriptive following the 1997 General Election was voiced by a 
senior manager of one of the large London associations:
Along with regulation has been a form of codification and specification. 
There is now a huge body of material in terms of housing management, 
which did not exist five years ago and a recognition that housing 
management is potentially a service which can be bought and sold 
(Interview no. 6, 11/2/97).
Reactions to exposure to private finance by organisations without necessary 
expertise meant that government inevitably became interested in the 
performance of associations. By the late 1990s, as a response to a number of 
failures in the sector, the Housing Corporation issued guidance to 
associations warning them of unnecessary exposure to risk and the need for 
effective financial control (the Housing Corporation, 1999a). Evidence of such 
problems was shown by the fact that between 1997 and 2001, thirteen 
housing associations faced serious financial difficulties and were only rescued 
by a merger with financially stronger organisations (National Audit Office, 
2001, p. 15). Examples of such difficulties included: English Churches Housing 
Group, which had to accept supervision from the Housing Corporation as a 
result of a Private Finance Initiative deal that was unsuccessful (Housing
190Today, 1/4/99); supervision and imposition of management committee 
members at West Hampstead Housing Association following the failure of an 
IT system (Housing Today, 23/11/00) and fraud at Family Housing 
Association (Inside Housing, 11/4/01).
These high profile cases of fraud amongst housing association staff in the 
early 1990s were used to justify further centralisation of policy. For example a 
report from the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee (2001) 
strongly criticised the poor supervisory arrangements in the case of fraud 
committed at Focus Housing Association in the West Midlands. The report 
commented: The Corporation acknowledged its inadequacies in its regulation 
of housing association in the early 1990s, particularly in assessing their 
internal controls’ (House of Commons, Public Accounts Committee, 2001,
p.1).
Vulnerability to fraud, corruption and financial insecurity forced the Housing 
Corporation to adopt a far more interventionist strategy of regulation with 
formal inspection introduced for all registered social landlords in 2002 (the 
Housing Corporation, 2002a). From 2003 the regulatory process was 
transferred to the Audit Commission under a newly created Housing 
Inspectorate. This development was designed to separate the funding from 
the regulatory process, yet it served to cement the institutionalisation of the 
housing association sector within the same auditing framework as local 
authorities.
From 1997 the policy environment witnessed a further tightening of regulatory 
control. The introduction of the Best Value performance regime impinging 
upon local authorities to the voluntary housing sector in the 2000 Green Paper 
meant that housing associations would be subject to the same criteria as local 
authorities. This performance regime was highly significant as housing 
associations were for the first time brought under a regulatory process that 
was equivalent to the local authority sector:
191Registered social landlords...should be subject to an inspection regime 
as rigorous and testing as that operated for local authorities by the 
Housing Inspectorate. The Housing Corporation will need to adapt its 
regulatory framework to promote further efficiencies in management and 
responsiveness to tenants by registered social landlords (DETR/DSS, 
2000, para. 7.50).
In addition to the above restrictions, further regulation was instituted in 2000 in 
the form of government controls over rent setting. This policy was a response 
to concerns about rent levels and affordability following the 1988 Act with rent 
levels increasing by over 120 per cent between 1988 and 1997 (Mullins et. a/., 
2001, p.612). Associations were thought to be taking advantage of the 
freedom to charge assured rents on new tenancies which were no longer 
determined by the Rent Officer Service. Such rents on new developments 
were believed to be unsustainable as they were dependent on residents 
receiving full Housing Benefit payments. The result was that the government 
instituted a process of rent restructuring designed to ensure more consistent 
policies amongst social landlords. By 2002 housing associations were 
compelled to move to a system of ‘target’ rents whereby they would no longer 
be able to charge ‘unaffordable’ rent levels (ODPM, 2000; NHF, 2001b). This 
policy marked a clear change from the (individualistic) strategy in 1989 when 
associations were encouraged to maximise rental income on all their 
properties (the Housing Corporation, Circular: HC 60/89). Policy had become 
much more centralised, in order to ensure government objectives relating to 
the ‘affordability’ of rents for low income tenants and the convergence of local 
authority and housing association rent levels (DETR, 2000). Whereas 
previous business plans had been developed on the assumption of a rental 
income over time involving regular annual rent increases above the level of 
inflation, the new regulations further increased the risks associated with 
housing association business management.
The transformation of the role of housing associations from a sector that 
existed at the margins of housing policy to one that was seen as in the 
forefront of the delivery of housing services was accompanied by a greater 
centralisation of policy and extensive regulation via the Housing Corporation.
192At the same time the image of housing associations changed from 
organisations providing locally based services to small numbers of residents 
living in street properties, to large bureaucracies providing services from a 
central office. Their role as agents of government policy therefore implied that 
their traditional autonomy would be compromised by the receipt of substantial 
sums of both public and private finance.
6.3.2  Size
The demands of providing ‘value for public money’ alongside funding from 
private institutions discussed earlier meant that development activity was 
increasingly centred on the larger, “fast track” associations’ (Garnett, 2000, 
p.281). Large associations offered several advantages for funding agencies. 
They were well placed to provide security for the substantial loans offered by 
private financial institutions and they could use cross subsidy from historic 
surpluses on previous schemes that were developed under more favourable 
grant systems. Following the 1988 Act, the then Housing Minister stated:
Associations which lack the right mix of skills for this new and demanding 
world must either stop developing or pool their strengths and resources 
with others (Lord Caithness, 1989, speech to the 25th anniversary of 
Housing Corporation, cited in Cope, 1999, p. 148).
By the mid 1990s managers accepted that the demands of the new 
environment required much more systematic policies and procedures.
Housing associations adapted their working practices in response to the 
previous informal and individualistic practices. Social housing management 
before 1988 was viewed as comprising well-meaning individuals, whose 
management style was unprofessional and haphazard. In contrast managers 
in the post 1988 environment were concerned to manage risk through 
implementing clear standards and procedures:
If we make a mistake nobody comes up and picks up the pieces other 
than ourselves. That means that you simply cannot afford to have people 
ploughing their own furrows or doing their own thing. You have to have a
193clear corporate strategy about where the organisation is going (Interview 
no.6, 11/2/97).
The total number of associations receiving Housing Corporation development 
subsidy declined after 1989 (Garnett, 2000, p.281). Figures for London 
showed that in 1991, 576 housing associations provided around 150,000 
homes, whereas by 1996, 225,000 homes were provided by only 480 housing 
associations (NFHA, 1991; 1996) and by 2003, 279,00 homes were provided 
by around 440 associations (ODPM, 2003).
This trend towards an expanded sector, dominated by a smaller number of 
large organisations went hand in hand with a centralisation of organisational 
structure. The Director of one large association contrasted local authority 
moves towards decentralisation with housing association trends:
In local authorities it has always been about local offices. Well you 
cannot have local offices when you have only got twelve properties [in an 
area]. We don’t think that we need local offices. We can deliver our 
services in a different way (Interview no. 16, 8/10/97).
One of the main reasons for these increases in size was that those 
organisations with a ‘track record’ of experience were more likely to win 
competitive bids (Kramer and Grossman, 1987). These organisations tended 
to be the established, mainstream, large developing associations. This 
development record led to the establishment of a small number of large, 
developing associations bearing the brunt of responsibility for new 
development in the sector.
A key pressure upon housing associations was found in the inescapable 
obligations attendant on the receipt of substantial public and private funding. 
The requirement to account for public money led to the establishment of an 
additional set of structures, standards and procedures which needed to be 
monitored through formal arrangements, guaranteeing probity and 
transparency. An overwhelming priority for associations was therefore to offer 
guarantees of security to financial institutions.
194The increasing importance attached to financial integrity as associations 
assumed greater significance in housing policy and became responsible for 
larger amounts of both public and private money necessitated an emphasis 
on standardisation of outputs and uniformity of practice. These pressures had 
grown since the 1970s when concerns about the competence of voluntary 
housing organisations began to be expressed (Mullins, 1997a). However, the 
post-1988 financial regime accelerated the demands of accounting for an 
unprecedented injection of funds into the sector. The overriding need to 
reduce opportunities for corruption was a fundamental objective following a 
number of well-publicised financial scandals. For example, the experience of 
Circle Thirty Three Housing Trust, one of the major London housing 
associations which was guilty of serious monetary irregularities in the early 
1980s, was mentioned as a cautionary lesson by the Chief Executive of a 
similar-sized London organisation. As this individual commented, the 
experience affected housing associations dramatically and necessitated 
rigorous procedural devices in order to limit financial abuse: ‘Circle Thirty 
Three...was the final nail in the coffin...financial regularity, everything else 
doesn’t matter’ (Interview no.22, 27/11/98).
In order to fund their activities associations needed to expand to retain 
financial viability, achieve economies of scale and to achieve a ‘critical mass’ 
to enable the employment of specialist staff to provide an appropriate range of 
expertise (Billis et. ai, 1994, p.6). The requirement to demonstrate value for 
public money has been seen by many commentators as the primary objective 
for today’s housing association managers. Thus ‘services which can be 
shown to benefit from both economies of scale and keen pricing from 
competition, may well be considered the most successful’ (Pearl, 1997, p.59).
A significant feature of the post 1988 environment was that managers 
believed that these more systematic procedures could actually liberate 
housing associations rather than vice versa. As one manager expressed it:
‘we can afford to take some calculated risks because we are big enough to 
absorb them’ (Interview no. 16, 8/10/97). A necessary condition for housing
195association survival was therefore the ability to retain oversight, to maintain 
central control and to possess clearly written procedures to satisfy financial 
markets. An indication of how this emphasis on performance necessitated 
top-down organisational structures was provided in the following comment 
from a Director of one of the largest London organisations.
The organisation has got very large, it has grown very quickly. It is 
explicitly about growth at all costs. It has grown massively and doubled 
in size. That changes the nature and structure of the organisation. What 
is interesting is that leadership is from the top and the Board and 
Director have a very prescriptive style of management. They are not 
really looking at a management team where there is dialogue and 
exchange of ideas. They are looking at a management team that 
delivers a specified objective (Interview no.22, 27/11/98).
A further incentive for managers was the desire to maintain independence. 
Consider the following comment from a member of staff of a small London 
association: ‘we have no real financial clout and so are at the beck and call of 
partner housing associations’ (Focus group no. 2, 2/6/99). This desire to avoid 
becoming dependent on other large organisations motivated housing 
associations to maximise their involvement in local policy-making and to 
assume control over organisational objectives. As large associations wished 
to establish themselves as a major influence in local activity they looked to 
expand their activities and areas of work. In particular associations wished to 
negotiate with other partners from a position of strength. These pressures 
engendered mechanisms to cope with an increasing level of complexity. The 
ability to compete was contingent on resources and large organisations with 
substantial asset bases would be most effective at maintaining their 
competitive advantage:
I think the thing that has changed most in the last ten years is the need 
to be more creative and entrepreneurial. But creativity is fine as long as 
you have got money (Interview no. 14, 10/9/97).
Innovation was therefore contingent upon financial stability and security. 
These key attributes implied that only a small number of organisations with 
substantial assets were able to develop pioneering management initiatives. 
The same manager commented: ‘we are strong financially, [we have] a big
196strong asset base, the ability to borrow substantial amounts of money to do all 
sorts of things’ (Interview no. 14, 10/9/97). These conditions underpinned all 
future organisational developments and the ability to maintain a continual 
income stream and ensure efficient management of resources was therefore 
perceived as a necessary condition for continued growth and effectiveness. 
This point illustrates one of the classic arguments for economies of scale as 
efficiency criteria and performance measurement became an increasingly 
important part of housing association work. ‘Because the organisation is very 
big, it must have the capacity to take much more. We have to think in terms of 
our unit costs and financial management. We have to think in terms of 
efficiency gains’ (Interview no.23, 25/1/99).
The imperative of ensuring economies of scale also manifested itself in the 
imposition of group structures, mergers and strategic alliances in the late 
1990s. Group structures were seen as an appropriate method for providing a 
legal and financial framework for growth in order to organise diverse activities 
and/or geographically disparate operations (Audit Commission, 2001, p.10). In 
the period between 1994 and 1999, 35 group structures were established 
(NHF, 1999, p.viii). By 2001, three-quarters of all housing association homes 
were part of a formal ‘group’ of two or more organisations. More groups than 
new RSLs were registered in 2000/1  by the Housing Corporation (Audit 
Commission, 2001, p.3).
The social housing agenda pursued by the Labour Government since 1997, 
whilst attaching symbolic importance to diversity, nevertheless continued the 
trend towards sustained growth. Such a view was propounded by a 
representative of the black and minority ethnic (BME) housing association 
sector:
The New Deal, Social Exclusion pronouncements talk about very small 
neighbourhood control. That goes against large housing associations 
which may have headquarters in different parts of the country and not 
having links with local people, local communities. I think government 
macro-policy is going in one direction, but micro-policy in housing is 
going in the opposite direction with the need to deliver rent as cheaply as 
possible. You need to get efficient services and one of the ways around
197that is merging, to achieve economies of scale (Interview no.24,
18/2/99).
Data from the Housing Corporation illustrates how at a national level, the 
sector is increasingly dominated by a small number of large housing 
associations. Thus, the very large housing associations (defined as those with 
over 10,000 units) although less than 2 per cent of the total (numbering 10 
organisations), manage 29 per cent of housing association property. Similarly, 
a growing trend since the late 1980s was the development of organisations 
formed through the process of stock transfer from previously local authority 
owned property. These organisations known as ‘large scale voluntary transfer’ 
(LSVT) associations comprised six per cent of the total but managed a further 
29 per cent of housing units (The Housing Corporation, 2002b). By 2000, 21 
of the 47 organisations with over 5,000 properties were transfer associations 
(Malpass and Mullins, 2002, p.681). In general the larger housing 
associations had a tendency to use debt to finance their asset base and these 
large associations became increasingly dominant within the sector. During the 
1990s, the ‘movement’ consolidated through a process of mergers so that by 
the middle of the decade the ten largest associations managed about a 
quarter of the movement’s total stock and the largest 200 owned three 
quarters of the stock (Garnett, 2000, p.281). Figures 6.1 and 6.2 illustrate the 
dominance of the large associations in terms of turnover and stock.
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The need to ensure that housing associations were effective guardians of 
both public and private finances therefore imposed more rigorous and 
systematic organisational guidelines. The old amateur, friendly ethos, which 
characterised many traditional voluntary housing providers, was clearly no 
longer appropriate to organisations dependent upon large sums of both public 
subsidy and private borrowing. The consequence was the development of 
complex organisational structures, rigid processes, ‘professional’ 
management systems and ‘effective’ line management. The need to reassure 
both central government and private lenders that there would be a competent 
use of financial resources placed a premium upon the acknowledgement of 
the benefits of economies of scale. Housing associations therefore 
rationalised their practices as they became larger and more efficient 
organisations.
Proposals in 2002 to ensure that subsidies were dependent upon meeting 
output targets further increased the drive towards growth. As the head of 
investment at the Housing Corporation warned ‘if they don’t perform... they 
won’t secure allocations’ (‘Corporation to get tough on delivery’, Inside 
Housing, 2/12/02). Such warnings were contingent upon associations 
conforming to specific performance measures, including standards of 
governance, management and development. Housing associations concluded
199that the solution to ensuring performance standards were met was to create 
large organisational structures, with standardised processes minimising the 
problems of risk and benefiting from the substantial funding opportunities 
available. The Barker Review Interim Report, (Barker, 2003), further noted 
that with 1542 associations owning fewer than 100 properties, but with a 
combined stock of 130,946 units, there was scope for greater efficiencies and 
economies of scale if fewer organisations were to own and manage this stock 
(Housing Today, 12/12/03).
6.3.3  Status and policy influence
An important incentive for contemporary housing association managers was 
to ensure that they maintained an influential position in the delivery of local 
welfare services. A central driver of change within housing associations was 
the aspiration to establish that they were major players in new initiatives. In 
their study of housing association change Billis et. al (1994) refer to a 
‘personnel imperative’ where continued growth was seen as an essential 
condition for attracting and keeping good quality staff and management 
committee members. Status was therefore equated with effectiveness, 
creating a ‘feel good factor’ (ibid., p.7) implying that organisational 
effectiveness would flow from an ability to maintain high levels of morale and 
opportunities for staff development. The exponential growth of housing 
associations in the mid 1990s had a significant impact on patterns of 
development and management styles. Associations were forced to become 
more professional and competitive. Their image was redefined as they grew in 
scale. A Director of one of the large London associations expressed the 
contrast between old and new approaches as follows: ‘I think size is a key 
turning point’ (Interview no.5, 24/9/96) implying that quantitative expansion 
had qualitative organisational consequences.
A manager of a smaller specialist housing association indicated the difficulty 
involved in retaining and recruiting experienced staff: ‘as a small organisation 
we have to stretch to bring in staff. We have to grow to attract staff.
Therefore, growth was seen as a necessary condition of being able to
200motivate individuals to join and to stay within the organisation (Focus group 
no.2, 2/6/99). The fact that the post 1988 regime placed housing associations 
in a more central policy role offered opportunities for higher levels of morale 
and incentives to improve performance. Significantly, a certain level of 
standardisation was viewed as a crucial basis from which other (more 
challenging) opportunities for staff development became available. Thus: ‘if 
you are a large organisation that is successful and wins things there are 
opportunities for staff to be seconded. You do get an opportunity to do things 
that are different’ (Interview no. 15, 6/10/97). Such statements contradicted 
conventional views of public management that large organisations act as a 
constraint upon individual autonomy. The emphasis upon organisational 
status was viewed as beneficial both for external perceptions and 
opportunities to win contracts alongside improving staff motivation.
The development of management by contract as a result of Compulsory 
Competitive Tendering (CCT) during the 1980s (abolished in 1997) showed 
how associations were encouraged to seek new avenues of business to 
increase their status. The contrast with traditional housing management was 
expressed as follows by a project manager of one of the large developing 
associations:
It’s actually a very different ball game from managing your own stock. 
You are not setting your own policies, procedures. You have to adhere 
to very strict targets, deadlines and specifications. There are bonuses 
and penalties attached to the management of the contracts. It does 
focus you very much on performance than was otherwise the case. 
You have to fulfil that specification and there is no arguing (Interview 
no. 15, project manager, 6/10/97).
A widespread belief amongst staff and committee members was that housing 
associations were primarily governed by a desire to increase their local 
profile. The fundamental objective for contemporary organisations was seen 
as the desire to increase their size and scope in order to influence the 
emerging policy agenda. As one senior manager of a large housing 
association explained:
201In a word, I would describe the organisation as expansionist. I am not 
sure whether this is due to the idea that we can do things better than 
anyone else or that we want to be a major player. Our role is no longer 
simply to manage our stock. We are attempting to raise the profile of 
the organisation in the community, not just amongst our own tenants 
(Interview no.26, 12/5/99).
This imperative to increase organisational status was manifested through a 
wish to establish associations as innovative, willing to experiment and to 
engage in creative community investment strategies. Therefore, a 
fundamental objective for housing associations was the need to exert an 
influence upon the emerging policy agenda. However, the desire to increase 
organisational status was not universally accepted by housing association 
members. For some, this imperative was viewed in highly cynical terms. For 
example a management committee member of a medium sized association 
commented: ‘It is a game. It is what I call the growth game’. This statement 
referred to the objective to recruit members of staff on one basis alone, 
namely that they could ensure continual expansion. Performance was 
therefore evaluated according to one basic criterion, namely the output of 
development programmes. This individual continued: ‘It is as if the pressure to 
grow has produced a monster. Managers are continually asked “How many 
deals have you struck this month?’” (Interview no.22, 27/11/98). This 
evaluation of organisational performance on the basis of development targets 
at the expense of other, housing management objectives implies that these 
latter functions are likely to be undervalued.
An important indication of the value of contemporary housing associations 
was a sense of their importance in contemporary regeneration initiatives. As a 
Director of one of the large London associations commented: ‘I think our 
distinctive function is that we are in for the duration. We are not a fly-by-night 
operation’ (Interview no.13, 11/4/97). The implication of this comment was 
that some of the competitors and in particular smaller, specialist organisations 
had less of a commitment to professional standards and sustainable 
outcomes.
202Senior managers wanted influence and in order to maintain this influence they 
saw the need to expand. This can be seen as analogous to a ‘bureau- 
shaping’ strategy (Dunleavy, 1991, p. 174) whereby senior managers 
maximise their self interest by increasing status and influence in an 
environment that offered substantial opportunities for growth and 
development.
Managers were enthusiastic about developing strategies for new business, 
seeing it as an innovative and creative part of their work. However, the form 
that new business may take unwittingly imposes a much more systematised 
and inflexible set of procedures. For some staff it was better to work in the 
larger housing associations; there was more of a career structure, there were 
demarcated careers and greater opportunities for training and staff 
development. The professional network of people who worked in the large 
organisations helped to sustain the growth of these large organisations 
thereby increasing status and influence.
At the same time the tendency for housing associations to create new types of 
group structures in order to deliver economies of scale led to concerns that 
this was likely to lead to the marginalisation of tenant representatives who 
mainly participated on subsidiary committees (see Audit Commission, 2001).
6.4  The impact of hierarchy
The above discussion has shown how a number of housing associations are 
demonstrating all the elements of hierarchy identified at the outset of the 
chapter, namely standardisation, rule-following, central control and top-down 
organisational structures.  What are the consequences of a re-emergence of 
hierarchy within the voluntary housing sector? The next section examines how 
these processes are affecting today’s organisations thorough three major 
changes in housing association policies: elitism, a loss of discretion and an 
end to generic working practices.
2036.4.1 Elitism and the premier league
The concentration of activity within a small number of organisations discussed 
above meant that a number of the largest associations were becoming 
increasingly influential in the delivery of housing services. As shown above, 
there was considerable pressure to standardise outputs, to ensure 
accountability for the provision of public money and to guarantee that staff 
had relevant specialist skills and knowledge. Since 1988 there was an 
increasing inequality between housing associations, with the larger 
organisations acting as predatory agencies and using their asset base to fund 
new initiatives. The large housing associations maintained a collective 
impulse coexisting with a high level of rule-governed behaviour wherein 
individual initiative was tempered by the demands of the group.
As an example of encroaching elitism, the Housing Corporation policy 
towards black and minority ethnic associations in the mid 1990s, whilst 
ostensibly supporting smaller and specialist organisations, in practice 
encouraged larger associations to develop partnership schemes with smaller 
players. The policy reflected the difficulty experienced by smaller 
organisations in the funding of their development programmes. Thus, the 
Housing Corporation themselves acknowledged that their policies might ‘limit 
the ability of small, relatively new associations to develop housing schemes 
independently’ (the Housing Corporation, 1995a, para.7.9). The Housing 
Corporation also recognised that there was likely to be an increase in 
‘mergers, group structures, transfers of engagements, partial rationalisation of 
ownership and management patterns or contractual partnerships’ (ibid. 
para.8.16). Such comments heralded a tendency to concentrate resources 
upon the larger, established housing associations and can be seen in the 
number of organisations that now span numerous local authority districts, in 
effect becoming national organisations and losing their local identity. Whilst 
the mean for districts in which housing associations operate is four, the seven 
largest housing associations have units in more than 100 districts, with three 
organisations operating in over half the local authority districts in England (the
204Housing Corporation, 2001b). Table 6.1 shows the scope of operation of 
these organisations.
Table 6.1 Housing associations operating in over 100 local authority districts
Housing association No. of districts % of all districts in England
Housing 21 219 62
North British 210 59
Anchor T  rust 190 54
English Churches 172 49
Hanover 148 42
Sanctuary 135 38
Guinness Trust 105 30
Source: the Housing Corporation (2001b) Table 1
A reflection of this elitist inclination was the tendency towards continual 
expansion by a number of the larger London housing associations. Managers 
expressed some doubts as to whether distinctive organisational qualities 
could be retained.
We have grown very rapidly. Therefore we are now approaching the time 
when we should be consolidating. I think it would be very difficult to 
continue at this rate of rapid growth without losing a lot of what we had 
built up in the process (Interview no. 16, senior manager, 8/10/97).
Other commentators cautioned against the dangers of an incessant struggle 
towards growth. For example the then Chair of the Housing Corporation 
warned:
In recent times we have become concerned about the growing evidence 
of so called “mega-mergers”, in a sector which came out of local 
initiatives. The evidence is that there seems to be a chief executive 
driven motivation that “big is beautiful”, but I think that “mixed is 
beautiful”’ (Baroness Dean of Thornton-le-Fylde, Chair of Housing 
Corporation, speaking to National Housing Federation Voluntary Board 
Members Conference, February 1998, quoted in Mullins, 1999).
205Managers within the housing association sector frequently mentioned the 
continuing dominance of a small number of housing associations in London. 
Some interpreted this supremacy as a force for conservatism, to protect 
organisational status. According to this view, associations were perceived as 
interested in the consolidation of their position and expansion wherever 
possible. One Chief Executive saw the influence of an elite group as exerting 
a negative impact in their capacity to ‘act as a force to resist change’ 
(Interview no. 3, 12/8/96). This comment was significant in that organisations, 
that at times were perceived as innovative and radical, were in this respect 
seen as inward-looking and conservative. An officer of a stock transfer 
organisation illustrated this tendency for certain associations to portray 
themselves as part of a select group of dynamic and prosperous 
organisations:
We are made to think that we are the elite...For example we had a staff 
briefing which analysed a survey of external perceptions of the 
organisation. One of the conclusions was that we are very arrogant. 
They [senior management] saw this as a strength (Interview no.25, 
housing officer, 4/5/99).
Despite much rhetoric around tenant participation, residents’ were 
marginalised by the emergence of an elite sector of organisations. As an 
officer of another organisation, one of the largest London associations 
commented ‘I think it is an irritation to tenants always going on about how big 
we are. Big just means less local I suspect’ (Interview no.9, 5/3/97). This 
perception inevitably fed a feeling of superiority. This same officer mentioned 
survey evidence from partners about the association, the conclusion was: ‘we 
are big, we have got loads of money and we are a bit arrogant’ (ibid.)
The influence of a small number of organisations had led to a privileged class 
of organisations, which were particularly effective in ensuring an appropriate 
level of public and private money. These organisations were able to exert 
increasing control over the agenda of the housing association sector. In 
particular, some warned of a democratic deficit wherein ‘key decisions are 
effectively being made by a small, influential caucus of committee members 
with the expertise and knowledge to interpret crucial performance information’
206(Pearl, 1997, p.58). One committee member characterised her experience of 
a medium-sized housing association as being ‘like a Masonic lodge’ because 
of the way in which meetings were dominated by a small number of select 
individuals with the capacity to influence decisions (Interview no.22,
27/11/98).
A strong view amongst housing staff was that many key policy decisions were 
becoming the preserve of an elite policy community. According to such views, 
the culture of the central government quango (the Housing Corporation) was 
reflected in the culture of housing associations in an example of what Di 
Maggio and Powell (1991) term ‘mimetic isomorphism'. As a member of the 
management committee of a medium-sized association asserted: They mirror 
each other, that is the problem. “The man in the grey suit”, “grammar school 
boys”...  I get on with the individuals who have a basic level of integrity, but 
there is a feeling that it is like an old boy’s club’ (Interview no.22, 27/11/98). 
This view that policy was concentrated in the hands of an elite policy network 
of experts represented a common complaint from management committee 
members who felt marginalised by professional interests. As a representative 
of the Federation of Black Housing Organisations (FBHO) expressed it: 
‘housing association committees have been an old boy’s network, it has been 
very incestuous and people recruit on that basis rather than looking at the 
skills which are needed’ (Interview no. 24, 18/2/99). For this individual the 
sector needed to change in fundamental ways: ‘it is still a very paternalistic, 
narrow culture within a closed sector, and it has been this way for a very long 
time’ (ibid.).
This isomorphic tendency could be witnessed even amongst organisations 
that exhibited the strongest local profile (black and minority ethnic housing 
associations). Characterised as ‘strong enough to maintain their separate 
identity’, nevertheless research has identified a tendency for these distinctive 
organisations to ‘become more and more mainstream’ (Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation, 1998, p2). This elitist trend reflected what Michels (1967) called 
an ‘iron law of oligarchy’ whereby organisations are eventually run by elites
207who identify with similar elites in other organisations. Thus, the loss of 
organisational identity had become an increasing feature of the late 1990s 
environment as the pressures of uniformity and standardisation created an 
elite sector, dominated by certain large housing associations in the London 
area.
The larger housing associations, in effect, enjoyed many of the benefits of 
their local authority predecessors whereas the smaller and specialist 
associations were placed at considerable disadvantage within the current 
environment: ‘In particular the requirement for a strong asset base positively 
places small associations and cooperatives at a disadvantage’ (Cope, 1999, 
p. 350).
Not only were the smaller organisations vulnerable, but there were also 
concerns that the performance of associations would suffer as a consequence 
of their rapid growth. A report from the London Borough of Camden concluded 
that: ‘Housing associations are expanding too fast leading to a deterioration in 
the effective management of their properties. Some appear to be experiencing 
a rapid deterioration’ (LB Camden, 2002, p.27).
Another indication of elitism is the tendency for larger organisations to form 
complex group structures. The tendency for organisations to form new group 
structures indicates the way in which growth has its own momentum, with an 
oligopolistic tendency becoming apparent within the sector. For one of the 
significant new organisations the stated purpose of mergers is to be ‘better 
able to concentrate on...core activities, bringing an enhanced, more focused, 
more equitable service to our tenants’ (Genesis Housing Group Ltd., Annual 
Report, 2000/2001). Contemporary housing associations were forming new 
composite entities, which could effectively combine skills and resources in 
new forms of hierarchical institutional structures. Furthermore, these 
hierarchical structures result in a tendency towards organisational uniformity 
amongst the elite housing associations (Lambert and Malpass, 1998, p. 105).
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small number of select developing associations. The Chief Executive of one of 
the largest organisations admitted this at a time when only fourteen 
organisations were viewed as dominant:
In many ways London is more conservative than the regions...London is 
dominated by the big fourteen organisations. They are able to exert 
influence and minimise changes. They act as a force to resist change 
(Interview no.3, 12/8/96).
The emergence of the ‘G15\ a group of the largest London housing 
associations illustrates the gradual dominance of a select, ‘premier league’ of 
organisations. Table 6.2 lists the members of this group and illustrates how 
they have formed parent, subsidiary and associate structures. These 
structures were initially formed to incorporate commercial and care services; 
to incorporate elements not traditionally associated with housing association 
core business. Gradually however, these structures have also incorporated 
other existing housing associations as part of a larger group structure.
209Table 6.2: The G15 Housing Associations
Housing Association 
(Parent Group in 
brackets)
Social 
Housing 
stock, 2003
Number of
su bsid ia ries/associates
London and Quadrant 
Housing Trust
23,915 3
Hyde HA (Hyde Group) 14,458 4
Metropolitan Housing 
Trust Ltd.
13,801 2
Circle 33 Housing Trust 
Ltd.
11,949 3
Broomleigh HA Ltd. 
(Downland Affinity Group)
11,789 3
Peabody Trust 11,763 2
Southern Housing Group 11,763 2
Notting Hill Housing Trust 
(Notting Hill Housing 
Group)
11,270 4
Paddington Churches 
Housing Association 
(Genesis Housing Group)
10,263 2
Family HA 9,855 3
East Thames Housing 
Association (East Thames 
Housing Group)
8,296 4
Stadium HA (Network 
Housing Group Ltd.)
7,197 5
Ealing Family HA 
(Catalyst Housing Group)
6,791 5
New Islington and 
Hackney Housing 
Association
5,875 3
SLFHA Ltd.
(Horizon Housing Group 
Ltd.)
5,860 5
Source: The Housing Corporation, Public Register of Social Landlords
The G15 associations attempt to function as a pressure group in exerting 
influence over government policy. They have campaigned about the 
inefficiency of Housing Benefit administration and lobbied government (albeit 
unsuccessfully) to remove this responsibility from local councils (NHF, 2001a). 
They did succeed however in encouraging government to rethink how this 
benefit was administered through the provision of expert ‘help teams’ to local 
authorities (ODPM, 2000). They have also campaigned to retain market
210closure in their attempts to dissuade the government from providing subsidies 
to private developers (Housing Today, 27/6/03). However, the fact that both 
initiatives were introduced in 2003 illustrates the relative impotence of these 
organisations as a pressure group in changing government thinking.
A further indication of an elitist tendency was witnessed in the 
recommendation from the Housing Corporation that the number of housing 
associations receiving grants from local authorities should be reduced to a 
core of preferred partners (Housing Corporation, 2003c). This  pilot partnering’ 
approach was praised as a ‘positive step’ by a Treasury commissioned review 
of housing supply (Barker, 2003) illustrating a preference for local authorities 
to negotiate with smaller numbers of organisations with a reliable track record 
in development and management (normally large, established associations). 
This model of partnering and  joint commissioning’ showed how hierarchy had 
become embedded within a decreasing number of influential organisations.
6.4.2 The loss of discretion
Part of the original ethos (and attraction) of many housing associations was 
the idea that they would allow considerable flexibility in working practices. An 
important indication of organisational change was provided by a personnel 
manager of one of the largest rehabilitation organisations:
In 1986 I would have said [the organisation] was very much charitable, 
happy-go-lucky, have a go at everything. It has become much more 
ordered, organised, more procedural, bureaucratic, and hierarchical. 
There is a difference between the image we do project and what we 
would like to project. The image we would like to project is probably an 
efficient, professional, quality service organisation. But what I pick up 
sometimes is that we appear bureaucratic. One half doesn’t know what 
the other half is doing (Interview no.  19, 8/1/98).
One way in which this hierarchical culture manifested itself was in a more 
systematised approach to housing management. The loss of discretion 
resulted from a need for associations to express their commitment to the 
concept of accountability, leading to greater emphasis on standardisation and
211uniformity and the removal of subjective judgments in decision-making 
processes. The development of a performance culture within the voluntary 
housing sector in the 1990s reflected a wider ‘audit explosion’ (Power, 1997) 
in public sector management and resulted in an emphasis on uniformity and 
standardisation of processes.  Individual members of staff were increasingly 
discouraged from exercising their individual judgment in interpreting housing 
policies and procedures.
The loss of discretion was manifested in an increasing reliance on standard 
operating procedures. As the Chief Executive of one of the smaller London 
housing associations commented: ‘routines are beginning to become the 
norm, which is right and proper in a professional organisation. . . routines are 
already much better done, those sorts of measures of improved efficiency are 
there, they are tangible and you can see them, which is very satisfying’ 
(Interview no. 4,  14/8/96). A further example was found in the response of a 
Housing Director:  many things are now written down properly for the first 
time, such as a nuisance policy and training for staff (Interview no.  13, 
11/4/97).
Housing managers expressed the view that government regulation throughout 
the 1990s was imposing certain styles of operation, which conflicted with their 
traditional roles. As a senior manager of one of the large London 
organisations commented:
At the same time that associations are being asked to diversify and 
behave like different beasts. . . regulation is actually forcing them back into 
a particular mould in terms of the way in which social landlords are 
actually going to behave (Interview no. 6,  11/2/97).
The above quote illustrated how despite expressed rhetoric, the pressures of 
government policy would lead to homogeneity in organisational strategies, 
forcing them into a  particular mould’. The pressures of regulation were 
imposing strains on the sector to become more uniform, and to adopt some of 
the structures and processes traditionally associated with the statutory sector.
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in the 1990s had a significant impact in changing cultural perceptions of the 
housing association sector. As one middle manager of a stock transfer 
organisation stated: *when I started at the organisation it was like a family. 
Now we are merging and becoming more like a local authority’ (Interview no. 
29, 8/12/00). Such views represented a widespread concern amongst senior 
managers that they were becoming merely agents of government policy. In 
addition, a proliferation of good practice guidance, performance standards 
and monitoring throughout the 1990s had a fundamental impact in changing 
the perception of the housing management function, from an informal and 
flexible role to a much more standardised systematic approach to the job.
An indication of this more formalised approach to housing management was 
shown in the decision of one of the large London associations to monitor the 
activities of staff:
Three or four years ago we logged into ‘timesheeting’ exercises working 
out where staff time was going. We pay housing officers to be out in the 
field, give them car loans and then discover that they spend all their time 
in the office...! think a lot of London housing associations have been 
through that exercise (Interview no. 6,  11/2/97).
This quote illustrated a tendency in some of the larger organisations to move 
from a model based upon trust that housing officers were using their time 
effectively to a model where continuous supervision of activities was 
becoming more important. Studies of performance management regimes 
identified a propensity amongst staff to adopt defensive strategies, which are 
often counterproductive and undermine organisational effectiveness (Jacobs 
and Manzi,  1999).
The frustrations expressed by some officers at their inability to exercise 
discretion were illustrated in the following comment from a member of an 
organisation formed through stock transfer.  Managers above suppress us; 
they do not allow us to be managers. For example we are not allowed to hold 
budgets’ (Interview no. 25, 4/5/99). The same individual expressed a sense of
213frustration at the lack of autonomy involved in their roles:  Staff are not 
managers but feel they should have been’ (ibid.).
For training officers, the strategies adopted and skills expected of staff were 
directed towards minimising discretion and limiting opportunities to exercise 
subjective judgments. Thus:
The emphasis is about setting clear standards, telling people what you 
expect them to do, giving feedback, coaching and developing them if 
they are not performing (Interview no.  19, 8/1/98).
The post-1988 roles also changed the relationship between landlords and 
residents. For example a housing officer complained at the lack of autonomy 
involved in his role:
At one time we did a lot for our residents, for example additional things 
that were not counted as repairs (such as changing locks free of charge) 
Now we have a policy of “deferred repairs” where minor jobs are saved 
for one large contract in order to save money (Interview no. 29, 8/12/00).
The issue of discretion plays a vital role in determining the equity of service 
provision within housing organisations. One of the historic problems of 
housing policy has been the existence of institutional discrimination 
(Henderson and Karn,  1984; Phillips,  1986; Jeffers and Hoggett,  1996). A 
significant problem identified is the existence of discretion or ‘street-level 
bureaucracy’ (Lipsky,  1980) where front-line staff compromise management 
objectives through the pressures of day-to-day working. The difficulty of 
discretionary judgment is that whilst it allows individual flexibility, it may lead 
to inconsistency and is vulnerable to bias. Therefore, ‘the challenge is to 
replace individual discretion with rules, and to develop decision-making 
procedures which are as comprehensive, rational and prescriptive as 
possible’ (Smith and Mallinson,  1997, p.343). Strategies adopted by housing 
organisations have been designed to minimise individual discretion through a 
process described as ‘institutional hygiene’ (Jeffers and Hoggett,  1996). This 
emphasis upon rational, systematic and equitable policies acts as a further 
pressure to produce uniform and standardised responses, which are capable
214of challenge, and which prevent subjective judgment and discrimination. 
Housing associations have found themselves caught in an ineluctable process 
wherein decision-making is required to be rigorous and transparent. The 
requirement to provide systematic and standardised procedures necessitates 
more hierarchical structures that are capable of being monitored and 
challenged by stakeholders.
In particular the letting of new properties, referred to as allocations 
procedures, was one of the key areas wherein discretionary decision-making 
had been formally reduced to minimal levels. In particular housing 
associations are bound by the ‘nomination’ agreements whereby local 
authority partners determine applicants to be rehoused by associations. Table 
6.3 contrasts the London picture with national trends. It shows how over 60 
per cent of tenancies are from statutory agencies with just over 30 per cent 
chosen by associations’ own allocations staff; compared to over 50 per cent of 
applications decided by staff at the national level.
Table 6.3 Referrals in the London region in 2002 (%)
London England
Local authority nomination 59.3 39 7
Statutory agency (e g  social 1.6 0.9
services)
Voluntary agency (e g  CAB, 2 3 0.8
MIND)
Direct application 8.1 36.7
Internal transfer 224 16.6
Move from another housing 1.5 0.8
association
Other 4 7 4 4
Source  NHF, CORE Data
However, the above figures underestimate the levels of nominations required 
on housing association new developments, where 100 per cent nominations
215are commonplace as a requirement for local authority consent (see above). 
For such properties a housing service manager commented, the issue of 
letting property is one ‘over which we have no control at all’ (Interview no. 31, 
15/8/02).  For a Director of a medium-sized association the environment after 
1988 inevitably involved a loss of autonomy: 'there is a sense of being a 
master or mistress of your patch that is undoubtedly being eroded’ (Interview 
no. 8, 26/2/97). However, the absence of formal discretion in many cases 
merely led to decision-making processes driven underground with subjective 
judgments continuing to be exercised. Allocation decisions were inevitably 
concerned with managing scarcity and in such a context, discretion would 
always play an important part of the decision-making process. Thus, there is 
talk of  unwritten rules that were not in the standing orders’ (Interview no. 22, 
27/11/98). Whilst hierarchy led to a diminution of discretion to ensure 
standardisation and uniformity in decision-making there remained pockets of 
hidden discretion that were unrecognised and for the most part 
unacknowledged.
The imposition of rigid performance criteria was believed to have strongly 
influenced housing association strategies with the advent of the modernisation 
agenda within local government and  Best Value’ performance plans instituted 
at the end of the 1990s.
The changing practice of housing management has witnessed a reduction of 
individual discretion and autonomy in decision-making. As housing 
associations have been encouraged to adopt more uniform and standardised 
organisational practices, tasks have become more strictly specified. These 
reforms have had a fundamental impact on a sector which had for a long 
period relied upon a much more informal style of management compared to 
its local authority predecessors. Subjective judgments became much more 
difficult to exercise and the sector increasingly began to resemble local 
authority bureaucracies.
2166.4.3 The end of ‘generic’ housing management
A final consequence of the development of more hierarchical structures, with 
a greater emphasis on systems and procedures is that the nature of the 
housing management task is being transformed within the voluntary housing 
sector. Traditionally, housing management was dependent on a range of 
generic management skills, including rent collection, managing empty 
property, allocating properties, dealing with neighbour nuisance, advice to 
tenants and repair enquiries (Smith,  1989; Cairncross et.al ,  1997). In 
particular housing association staff were seen as highly skilled in these 
generic responsibilities, based on their local knowledge of the neighbourhood 
and their role within locally based community organisations (NFHA,  1983a). 
The generic approach is based upon the ‘Octavia Hill’ model of providing 
intensive and comprehensive support including support for vulnerable tenants. 
As Cope (1999) comments:
The 'Octavia Hill’ method has evolved into the generic approach to 
housing management. In this case each officer has a ‘patch’ of 
properties and is the first point of contact for tenants on all matters. The 
officers work in teams covering a particular area and the team provides 
the full range of management and maintenance services. . . Small 
associations are forced to be generic in that they do not have sufficient 
staff to undertake each different function (p.208).
Housing management staff have fulfilled a range of different functions building 
close relationships with a small number of residents, normally located in 
scattered street properties. The strengths of housing associations lay 
principally in the fact that their small ‘patches’ allowed them to develop a more 
caring relationship that did supposedly remote local authority bureaucracies. 
As Dunleavy (1981) has shown, equating local authority departments with 
poor management provided a central foundation for the loss of legitimacy of 
public sector housing. The 1980s reforms allowed the dismantling of local 
government monopolies with little public disquiet. The 1988 Housing Act not 
only changed the role of housing associations in public policy but also 
changed the way in which the management task was carried out. The move 
away from rehabilitation work since 1988 and the emphasis on developing
217new property has meant that housing officers now have to manage large 
newly-built estates, often incorporating a number of different landlords. The 
complexity of the process required a more specialised approach to 
management. This change from a generic role was summarised by a 
management committee member of one of the large London associations:
In the 1970s there was a move (certainly among the Shelter based 
associations) to make the housing officer’s work more interesting by 
having more generic spreads [of work], in direct opposition to the local 
authority approach to make work more systematised.  In the 1980s that 
went into reverse. . . People’s jobs were actually going to be less 
interesting. A more “focussed” approach as it was termed (Interview 
no.20, committee member,  11/11/98).
In addition, the stock transfer process meant that associations were inheriting 
local authority estates with their long histories of social problems, including 
design, repair and social exclusion. Housing managers were managing larger 
patch sizes’ and ‘the workloads have become much greater. Originally I was 
managing a patch size of 200 units. This gradually increased to 400 
properties.’ (Interview no.29, 8/12/00). This lack of general responsibilities 
was expressed in the following terms by a front-line manager:
Prior to redeployment my job was generic. I had a much smaller patch 
and did everything. Now there are rent arrears officers who do that and 
nothing else (Interview no.48, neighbourhood officer,  14/12/03).
For such members of staff this reliance upon specialism made the service 
delivery less effective than previously. For example:
There are specific specialist roles; it makes it very easy to deny 
responsibility. We are not involved in rents at all. I don’t know anything 
about my tenants’ rent accounts. By the same token the rent officer can’t 
do housing officer stuff. They don’t know and they are not concerned 
(Interview no.48, neighbourhood officer,  14/12/03).
Part of the consequence of this increasingly specialist role was that levels of 
job satisfaction had decreased. This was perceived to have become 
particularly acute in the proposals to change funding regimes under the policy 
of ‘Supporting People’. This policy was designed to integrate funding streams
218for vulnerable tenants under a single budget (DETR, 2001). Whilst meeting 
government requirements to have more transparent subsidy systems, at the 
same time it was perceived to have reduced the more interesting aspects of 
the housing management function. As a neighbourhood officer commented:
I used to have a community development role. Now all the nice touchy- 
feely parts have been hived off because the funding comes from 
somewhere else, such as the Supporting People budget. My role has 
become very much an authoritarian one; I have lost all the nice bits 
(Interview no.48, neighbourhood officer, 14/12/03).
Similarly whilst bemoaning the extent to which the more interesting aspects of 
their function had disappeared under restructuring arrangements, a number of 
staff acknowledged that they would not be able simply to turn the clock back 
to previous ways of working. The changes were therefore viewed as 
irreversible:
I feel that all the good bits of the job have gone. However, if I was to 
change back to a generic role I would need serious retraining just to 
keep up with the changes (Interview no.48, neighbourhood officer, 
14/12/03).
The struggle to retain a sense of the defining goals and purposes of housing 
associations in the face of new demands illustrates a key dilemma for 
contemporary voluntary organisations. The new demands have imposed 
important constraints, which limit the traditional core strengths of diversity and 
flexibility traditionally found within the housing association sector.
Housing associations have therefore introduced more specialist staff, 
including community development officers and those skilled in debt 
counselling to generate income from residents. As a manager of one of the 
largest associations commented: ‘our housing officers used to deal with 
maintenance, now they only deal with rent accounting’ (Interview no. 9, 
5/3/97). Associations were starting to replicate traditional professional 
demarcations found in local government organisations. An example of this 
decline in generic housing management was found in the comments of a 
Director of one of the medium-sized London associations. As he explained:
219The idea that you deliver the same service to everybody is changing 
because it is expensive...80 per cent of our tenants need absolutely 
nothing. . . But we are getting increasingly more and more dependent 
people coming in and we have got to make sure that we have targeted 
[these individuals] and got the skills to help these more dependent 
people (Interview no.8, 26/2/97).
The consequence of this view was that some organisations were actively 
discouraging tenants from contacting management staff. Housing managers 
were encouraged to spend their time on intensive management problems and 
avoiding time-consuming personal contact with residents. Thus:
That is different from just having an open door, saying “I am a housing 
manager, bring your problems to me”. So we are actually saying to the 
tenants who are competent “don’t bring your problems to me, go down to 
the housing benefit office, I’m not here for you” (Interview no.27, housing 
officer, 5/10/99).
The above example indicates certain ways in which the traditional informal 
models of housing management involving regular personal contact with 
residents are being reconsidered in the housing association sector. The 
Director of a large association made a similar point in saying: ‘the housing 
officer tends to bet bogged down in a lot of trivial stuff... It is a question of 
degree and we think we need to change the culture so that the housing officer 
can do other things ...at the moment the housing officer’s role is too broad’ 
(Interview no.  16, 8/10/97). Organisations are therefore paying much greater 
attention to the ‘core competencies’ of staff members.
These ideas reflected a shift towards a more ‘professional’ culture for housing 
managers. The difference from the pre 1988 environment was illustrated by 
the following response from a training officer of one of the largest London 
associations:
In 1985/6 training was all over the place, it was disparate, booking you 
on a course when you saw something interesting. Plugging gaps in staff 
skills in a very unsystematic way. It was all very reactive and haphazard 
There was no proper coordinated budget or anything. Now we have an
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and an expectation within the organisation that we offer a range of 
general skills training once or twice a year . ..There has been a big shift 
in terms of the expectation of the organisation (Interview no. 9, 8/1/98).
The policy officer of one of the largest associations in the country expressed 
the change from generic to specialised roles in the following terms, ‘what we 
are looking to is to provide a more segmented service. Certain people need 
certain things and we are going to try and provide those services to them’ 
(Interview no. 9, 5/3/97). This change towards a more specialist role for 
housing officers was also mentioned by front-line workers. As an officer in 
another large housing association expressed it: ‘management are now 
introducing a ‘case work’ approach to housing management. The approach is 
akin to a social work model. It involves intensive work with a limited case load’ 
(Interview no.29, 8/12/00).
Housing managers therefore faced a situation where their responsibilities 
were in theory becoming more varied but in practice they are facing pressures 
to undertake more specialised and rigidly demarcated working practices. An 
example of the way in which the culture of housing association housing 
management had changed has been this clear attention to more focused 
areas of work, particularly arrears control. Thus ‘staff are now called “income 
maximisers”. They have to produce arrears reports every two weeks’ (Focus 
group no.1, 27/5/99).
What appears to be emerging from these more specialist roles for housing 
managers is a new form of professionalism. Within the context of local 
authority housing management Furbey et. al. (2001) refer to a ‘new network 
urban professionalism’ (p.37) to illustrate the combination of skills required of 
contemporary housing managers as they struggle with the demands of cross- 
boundary and interdisciplinary working. Within the housing association sector, 
there has been less discussion of issues of professionalism. However, the 
end of a generic management function and the more specific skills required of 
managers within the voluntary housing sector suggests that specific and 
narrowly defined skills or competencies for front-line housing managers are
221serving to create a new professional status for housing association staff 
based upon income maximisation and specialist skills rather than a generic 
housing management role.
6.5 Conclusion
In the late 1980s the enthusiasm for local government ‘modernisation’ (DETR, 
1998) and debate about changing local governance was assumed to imply a 
rejection of hierarchical structures in favour of decentralised, accessible, 
flexible and responsive service provision ‘beyond bureaucratic paternalism’ 
(Hambleton and Hoggett, 1987). The Housing Act 1988 was in large part 
based upon a disaggregation of housing provision, with the emergence of 
housing associations in the forefront of a more pluralistic style of service 
delivery. These policy objectives were underpinned by a proliferation of good 
practice guidance (Audit Commission,  1986; Caimcross et. al.,  1989, 
Chartered Institute of Housing,  1993) and academic research into the theme 
of tenant participation and decentralisation (Burns et. al.,  1994; Pollitt et. al., 
1998).
In contrast to the stated objectives of housing policy since the 1980s this 
chapter has shown that due to the necessity to ensure value for money, 
accountability and probity, hierarchical management plays an increasingly 
important role within the housing association sector. The sector is increasingly 
subject to task specialisation; systems and procedures based upon uniform 
principles; regulation and centralised control. A strong collective ethos and 
stricter regulatory control are becoming increasingly important components of 
housing policy and the traditional low grid nature of housing practice, whereby 
housing association staff were not constrained by political interference from 
local government members has been replaced by strong interference from a 
central government bureaucracy. Hierarchy can be seen as a continuing, 
central and ever-expanding component of contemporary housing 
organisations. Bureaucracies offered predictability and security through the 
operation of routine tasks and housing associations as they grew larger and 
became incorporated more fully within a modern welfare state increasingly
222valued such traits. Figure 6.3 represents the movement towards hierarchy 
identified within the sector.
Figure 6.3: The shift to hierarchy in the 1990s
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The consequences of elitism, loss of discretion and specialisation were likely 
to have considerable impact on the future development of the organisational 
identity of housing associations as their traditional image of small-scale, local, 
accessible organisations. The creation of a super-league of the G15 housing 
associations reinforced tendencies towards elitism with a small number of 
associations dominating the housing policy agenda. Secondly, housing 
officers faced diminishing opportunities to exercise formal discretion in their 
working practices. Finally, hierarchical pressures were leading to new ways of 
approaching traditional functions of housing management, moving away from 
informal contact with residents to encompass processes that are measurable 
and accountable. This last change is likely to have important consequences 
for the relationships between residents and staff of housing associations as
223the housing officer becomes seen to be a less approachable and more remote 
presence.
As organisations grow and adopt standardised top-down processes and 
structures they have reinforced the dominance of a small number of large 
organisations. Housing associations have taken on some of the forms of local 
authority bureaucracies but also have their own distinctive features and 
assume new kinds of hierarchical forms.
Trends towards a concentration of power and influence amongst a number of 
small associations have created a solidifying and reinforcing effect. This 
‘premier league’ therefore became an increasingly exclusive club, as smaller 
organisations found it progressively more difficult to enter the game. Thus, a 
tendency towards path dependency can be observed with a reinforcing effect, 
the larger organisations become progressively bigger and more standardised; 
bigger ones get bigger albeit reluctantly and the smaller ones become smaller 
(or become merged into other large organisations).
In order to continue to grow, large associations need to negotiate with local 
authorities from a position of strength. At the same time they risked 
jeopardising their local links as they become identified with unaccountable, 
appointed agencies. However, the main difficulty for housing associations is 
that they have adopted hierarchical features by default. Whilst local authorities 
were designed as large bureaucratic organisations, with strict departmental 
divisions, housing associations have adopted these features accidentally and 
incrementally. They have gradually moved away from their locally-based and 
community-oriented (egalitarian) origins. Most of these organisations were not 
designed to be hierarchical and they have therefore imposed bureaucratic 
mechanisms on unstable foundations. Their adaptation to hierarchical styles 
of working is likely to be problematic compared to the local authority sector 
which was designed according to Weberian principles of bureaucracy. One of 
the consequences of this more hierarchical approach is the adoption of a 
fatalist approach to management which is the focus of the following chapter.
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THINGS CAN ONLY GET WORSE? HOUSING MANAGEMENT IN THE
FRONT LINE
We need to act in a new way because fatalism, and not just poverty, is 
the problem we face, the dead weight of low expectations, the crushing 
belief that things cannot get better (Tony Blair, speech at Aylesbury 
estate, Southwark, 2 June 1997).
7.1  Introduction
The concept of fatalism demonstrates one of the distinctive contributions 
offered by Cultural Theory, yet is largely neglected in discussions of 
organisational behaviour. As a high grid and low group environment, to what 
extent does fatalism depict existing social relationships within housing 
management? At one level, to portray the housing service as permeated by 
fatalism may be seen as a considerable distortion. The rhetoric of housing 
management sees residents as consulted widely and with a far greater 
degree of involvement in management discussions than ever before. 
Government policy in the late 1990s has been heralded as ‘a major step 
forward in setting national standards for involvement by tenants in the 
decisions affecting their homes and localities’ (Carter,  1999) and offering ‘a 
radical shift in power within housing services’ (ibid., p.7). Initiatives introduced 
in the 1990s, attempting to achieve a measure of ‘empowerment’ for both 
tenants and staff, represent an important attempt to counteract apathy and 
powerlessness and purport to maximise choice, influence and status.
However, at another level, the practice of housing management continues to 
engender a high degree of fatalism both amongst residents and front-line 
staff. Hood (2000) suggests that third sector organisations provide potentially 
rich soil (Hood, 2000, p. 151) for the development of fatalist attitudes as they
225comprise a strong element of uncertainty, complexity and confusion. This 
chapter considers both the pressures towards and consequences of fatalism 
within the voluntary housing sector amongst front-line housing managers and 
residents. In considering evidence for the prevalence of fatalism within 
housing associations, the chapter examines the extent to which the 
cumulative impact of progressive government constraints combined with the 
geographical concentration of disadvantaged groups and the inherent nature 
of the management task have exacerbated an attitude of passive resignation 
to management change.
7.2  The pressures towards fatalism
The ‘central principle on which a fatalist society operates is a rejection of co­
operation in any form, as something likely to have unpredictable and possibly 
unpleasant results’ (Hood, 2000, p. 148). Fatalism is perceived as a rational 
response to ‘an inherently insane and unpredictable world’ (ibid.).
Fatalists tend to be self-oriented and lacking in altruism. Moreover they 
have an extremely pessimistic view of nature, expecting that attempts to 
improve their lot will result in failure. Reinforcing these beliefs is a deep 
risk aversion and a strong tendency to discount future rewards...In 
general they will avoid risks and pursue behaviours that free them from 
having to depend on others for their own success (Chai,  1997, p.54).
This chapter will demonstrate that fatalism can be seen as an important 
although largely unacknowledged element of much housing management 
practice. Moreover, it is particularly prevalent within the housing association 
sector (and particularly new developments since 1989) due to a combination 
of exogenous and endogenous pressures. The effects of fatalism are seen 
amongst staff, they distort relationships between staff and residents and in the 
resident experience of housing management.  However, despite an 
understandable tendency to assume that fatalism must be an entirely negative 
aspect of organisational behaviour, the final section considers the extent to 
which fatalism can also be viewed as a positive feature of organisational 
behaviour.
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The external pressures facing the housing association sector can be seen as 
exerted by government agencies (central and local) and by social and 
economic factors. By the late 1980s, the close control exerted by the Housing 
Corporation over associations was seen as offering ‘central government a 
more direct way of achieving its objectives than working through local 
authorities’ (Caimcross et. a/.,  1997, p.23). Thus, government Ministers began 
to see that instead of having to coerce recalcitrant and oppositional local 
authorities into meeting government objectives, a more effective way of 
ensuring output targets were met was through the control of a 
nondepartmental body in the shape of the Housing Corporation. Housing 
associations were forced to respond to guidance, prescription and 
requirements laid down by central government agencies in order to qualify for 
the substantial public subsidies that became available. In addition, pressure 
was exerted through the Audit Commission (1989) to improve the 
performance of housing associations in accepting homeless households.
One of the key historical strengths of the housing association sector has been 
its strong sense of autonomy and independence; many housing association 
managers therefore naturally complained of increasing levels of government 
interference. As a senior manager of a large housing association commented, 
housing policy after 1988 had moved in the direction of greater centralisation:
I think the biggest single criticism that you could make of housing policy 
is that it is driven from the centre and strongly determined priorities from 
the DETR. I think there has been a marginal shift, but there is still a very 
strong central determination (Interview no. 12, 8/4/97).
This view echoed those of other writers who argued that in relation to housing 
associations ‘the rules of the game are all determined by the centre’ (Lambert 
and Malpass, 1998, p. 106). Managers expressed frustration at the dual 
imperatives of strict regulatory control and measures to ensure efficiency. 
These constraints applied to association activity led to fundamental changes 
in their autonomy. ‘Historically, housing associations had plenty of freedom
227and few resources. Now, through social housing grant and housing benefit, 
they have plenty of resources but little independence’ (Malpass, 1999c, p.31). 
Housing associations were therefore perceived to have jeopardised their 
legitimacy as they become associated with central government rather than 
autonomous actors. Managers expressed a strong sense of hostility towards 
external regulation imposed upon them. Talking of the period immediately 
following the introduction of the 1988 Act a committee member of a large 
association commented: ‘at one stage it was terrible, we were being strangled 
by the bureaucracy of the Government and the Housing Corporation’ 
(Interview no.23, 25/1/99).
At the same time, centralised policy-making was accepted as inevitable within 
an environment where housing associations assumed greater responsibility 
for the delivery of housing services. In the late 1990s, one manager 
expressed the view that ‘regulation is going to impinge more tightly’ (Interview 
no.6,  11/2/97). Another manager warned that increasing centralisation would 
threaten organisational identity: ‘Regulation has become far more 
prescriptive. . .The danger is that we lose some of the diversity we have within 
the housing association world’ (Interview no. 11, 21/3/97). The extent of 
control exercised by the Housing Corporation led some to comment that 
organisations ‘can scarcely make a move of any real significance without first 
gaining the approval of the relevant regional office’ (Malpass, 2000a, p.272). 
The Housing Corporation was therefore increasingly seen as a ‘controller 
rather than a nurturer’ of the housing association movement. Thus ‘although 
an element of policing was necessary, if control was too tight, many 
associations would fold up or at least function inefficiently’ (Balchin, 2002, 
p.236).
Institutional constraints upon housing associations were imposed in a top- 
down manner not only through central government but also by the decisions 
of local authorities. As seen earlier, the ability of housing associations to 
directly influence the local policy agenda was largely determined by their size, 
structure and resources. However, even for those organisations with the 
capacity to influence local decision-making, there was increasing pressure to
228adhere to local authority demands in exchange for land deals and 
development opportunities. One of the major constraints on the independence 
of housing associations was the use of increasingly prescriptive ‘nomination 
agreements’ by which local authorities designate the proportion of properties 
that housing associations should offer to applicants on their housing waiting 
lists. Particular areas were often seen as affected by these arrangements. 
Thus:
Southall has been used as a dumping-ground for the Somali community.
The agreement was for 100 per cent local authority nominations
reducing to 75 per cent on the 4th let (Interview no.34, housing
association manager, 6/1/03).
These kinds of agreements both restricted the autonomy of housing 
association staff and created an impression that such developments were 
restricted to low status groups. Such trends represented classic breeding 
grounds for a fatalist cultural ethos as they encapsulated highly regulated 
(high grid) environments with little scope for a collective identity to flourish. 
These agreements were widely used by local authorities for new 
developments in high-demand areas such as London. Thus, it was a common 
practice to have 100 per cent nomination rights for a minimum of ten years on 
new developments if built on council land or with local authority social housing 
grant (Withers and Randolph,  1994, p.58). Housing association managers 
saw themselves as having minimal input into resident selection and allocation 
on many of their high-profile schemes for the foreseeable future.
Further restrictions were evident in the fact that in areas such as London, 
residents felt they were denied access to their landlord’s own accommodation. 
The proportion of vacancies that can be offered to a housing association’s 
own tenants (‘transfers’) was generally below 30 per cent and in many cases 
less than 20 per cent of their residents (NHF, CORE data).
Economic pressures acted as an additional constraint on the development 
programmes delivered by the sector. The need to ensure efficiency savings 
resulted in a shift away from high risk rehabilitation programmes (where costs 
were very difficult to estimate) towards new build, large-scale consortium
229estates (where risk was shared and where development costs were fixed). 
This meant that the traditional function of associations to identify street 
properties for purchase and rehabilitation was abandoned in favour of building 
large estates and developing in consortium arrangements with other social 
landlords. The extent to which associations had to accept constraints dictated 
by local authorities was expressed by a housing association development 
officer: ‘We would not get the land because we could not afford the price 
unless the rules of the game were rigged’ (Interview no. 33, 2/12/02). Housing 
associations were increasingly forced to accept land deals which were largely 
contingent on the wishes of local authority partners and the acceptance of a 
high percentage of local authority nominated applicants.
An additional economic pressure was that housing associations found 
increasing difficulty in identifying new sites for development in the London 
area. The impracticability of generating new affordable housing within high 
demand inner city environments has led to a number of studies from 
professional bodies and housing associations raising concerns about their 
future viability (LHF,  1998; 1999). As the National Housing Federation 
suggested:
The combination of rapidly rising land, property and construction prices 
across the capital, continuing grant rate reductions for new build and the 
introduction of rent caps now means that the development of new 
housing in many parts of the capital is almost impossible to deliver (NHF, 
2000, p.3)
Housing associations had very little room for manoeuvre within high-demand 
areas (almost all of London could be so classified). Thus, in the late 1990s, 
not only were housing associations increasingly reliant on central and local 
government agencies but they were also dependent on a variety of statutory 
and voluntary bodies to achieve their objectives. The dependence on external 
agencies created considerable challenges for the voluntary sector, which had 
been used to exercising considerable latitude in their decision-making.
230A further significant change of government policy followed the 1997 General 
Election. Acknowledging the problems of benefit dependency within new 
housing association property, government stipulated that restrictions should 
be made upon housing association rent levels (so-called ‘rent caps’). Over a 
number of years rent increases were limited to the retail price index (RPI) plus 
a small percentage. The 2000 Green Paper (DETR, 2000) proposed that rent 
increases levied by housing associations be limited to RPI plus zero. These 
restrictions further reduced scope for autonomy and led to predictions about 
future financial viability. These limitations have had a significant impact in 
terms of ability to develop new social housing in high demand areas such as 
inner London.
An important constraint on the autonomy of the sector was introduced when 
the government decreed in 1999 that housing associations should be subject 
to the same rigorous inspection regime as applied to the local authority sector. 
This regime, termed ‘Best Value’, initiated a regulatory process based on 
statutory performance indicators and comprehensive performance 
assessments. Housing associations were subject to regular inspections from 
the Audit Commission (who had replaced the Housing Corporation) and had 
to demonstrate ‘continuous improvement’ in service delivery. Housing 
associations were then classified on the basis of a ‘traffic light’ system (red 
indicating significant failure, amber for the possibility of improvement and 
green for satisfactory). Seen as ‘an inspection system intended to ensure 
compliance’ (Bramley et. a/., 2004, p.144) the Best Value regime was also 
described as ‘an approach which is centrally driven, prescriptive and 
mechanistic’ (Maile and Hoggett, 2001, p.518). As part of a wider trend 
towards increased central government regulation of public bodies (Hood et. 
a/.,  1998) the housing association sector had to fall in line with a hierarchical 
process which measured processes and outputs to an extent that was 
unprecedented.
2317.2.2 Endogenous (low group) pressures: housing association residents
The constraints of government coexisted with a conspicuous change in the 
social status of housing association residents. The nomination agreements 
concluded as a result of negotiations between local authorities and housing 
associations meant that new properties would be exclusively offered to 
‘priority need’ groups. These groups were defined in statutory terms as those 
with dependent children or suffering health problems. New housing 
association developments inevitably entailed a high concentration of 
disadvantaged groups as the vast majority of properties were restricted to 
households meeting statutory homelessness criteria or otherwise being 
defined as in a ‘high need’ category.
A major issue for social housing since the late 1980s was the way that the 
income profile of those in the housing association sector became 
‘progressively skewed towards the bottom two income deciles’ (Forrest, 2000, 
p.212). Changes in the socio-economic profile of residents meant the housing 
association sector rapidly became associated with a lack of choice and a 
sector of last resort. Table 7.1  illustrates how on a national basis the steep 
decline in full-time employment in housing associations is reflected by a 
growth in economically inactive groups over a 20 year period.
Table 7.1: Employment status of housing association head of household, Great 
Britain, 1981-2001 (%)
1981 2000/01
Full-time employment 42 24
Part-time employment 4 9
Unemployed 6 6
Retired 34 34
Other economically 
inactive
14 27
Total 100 100
Source: Bramley et. al. (2004) Table 2.8
232Turning to London, table 7.2 illustrates the steep rises in lettings to homeless 
households. Whilst the figures apply to all tenancies, the vast proportion of 
these lettings was to housing association landlords. The figures are 
particularly striking bearing in mind that in 1980/1 only 27 per cent of lettings 
in London were to homeless households (see table 3.8 earlier).
Table 7.2: Lettings to homeless households in London, 1988 to 2002 
(percentage of all lettings to new tenants).
Region 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
London 53 46 76 64 60 51 61 67
South 26 25 53 49 49 36 41 54
East
England 27 28 46 40 34 25 25 31
Source: Wilcox (2003), Table 97b
Whilst striking, these figures underestimate the processes taking place on 
new housing association estates with the sector being forced to accommodate 
a client group increasingly comprising low income households; minority ethnic 
groups; households with children and ‘vulnerable’ groups.
One of the most influential reports commissioned about the impact of housing 
association development policies was that produced by Page (1993) whose 
‘Cassandra’ warnings (Cole, 2000, p. 166) have been borne out by the figures 
for benefit dependency, low income and economic inactivity on new housing 
estates in London, compared to traditional council or other housing 
association property. It is estimated that over 70 per cent of all new lettings by 
housing associations in London were to households with no wage earner 
(National Housing Federation, CORE statistics, January 2000). Due to the 
strict eligibility criteria for offering tenancies, new housing association estates 
have become firmly associated with a resident profile dominated by low- 
income earners, unemployed and economically inactive groups. London
233housing associations have seen a very rapid process whereby new tenancies 
are allocated to the most deprived groups. By 2003 it was estimated by the 
National Housing Federation (NHF) that 91 per cent of new lettings in London 
to housing association family units were from local authority nominations 
{Inside Housing, 12/12/03).
Moreover, the new tenants of housing associations are disproportionately 
selected from groups classified as ‘vulnerable’, meaning elderly households, 
pregnant women, those with dependent children and individuals suffering 
health difficulties, this last category increasingly signifying mental health 
problems. The combination of the1990 NHS and Community Care Act and 
longer-term policies of ‘normalisation’ and ‘deinstitutionalisation’ (Means and 
Smith,  1994) resulted in the closure of large psychiatric hospitals with 
individuals encouraged to accept tenancies within mainstream housing 
provision (meaning housing association accommodation). These policies 
placed greater pressure upon housing associations with a perceived lack of 
support from local authority social service departments (Lewis and 
Glennerster,  1996). The effect of allocation policies, which are designed to 
give priority to statutorily homeless households, means by definition that 
landlords are compelled to provide accommodation to significant numbers of 
individuals with mental health problems. New housing association estates 
therefore comprise a volatile mix of residents with learning difficulties, mental 
health problems, drug dependencies, disabilities and high numbers of single 
parents. Front-line staff were increasingly anxious about the impact of a 
changing client group: ‘We are not social workers or psychiatrists, a lot of us 
do not want to go down that road’ (Interview no.29, housing officer, large 
housing association, 8/12/00).
Housing associations have therefore seen significant increases in the 
numbers of residents suffering psychiatric problems and requiring more 
intensive management support. A study conducted by the London Housing 
Federation (1995) estimated that 60 per cent of new tenants could be placed
234in the category of vulnerable and that these numbers were likely to increase. 
As a senior manager commented
I  think  the  issue  about  vulnerability  is  of  fundamental  importance, 
particularly in  London  or any  Metropolitan  area.  The number of people 
we now take who have a history of mental health problems or who have 
had a mental health problem,  particularly amongst single people is very 
large; most single nominees will come through vulnerability routes. That 
then brings the responsibilities of trying to manage that when you are not 
actually the manager of somebody,  you  are the care manager as such 
(Interview no.6, Director of Operations, 11/2/97).
In similar fashion a front-line housing officer expressed the way in which 
housing associations were expected to cope with new sets of problems 
without adequate resources:
The biggest change is in regard to the client group. This is mainly due to 
Care in the Community policies. Tenants are much more vulnerable, 
many have quite serious mental health problems. They cannot cope with 
a tenancy and there is no back-up support (Interview no.29, 8/12/00).
Allocation policies were seen as responsible for many of the problems of 
managing social housing as seen in the following comments from a 
community development officer:
The issue of allocation policies and council nominations is at the root of a 
lot of the problems... The policy has been one-offer only to get 
applicants out of bed and breakfast. The only transfer offers on to the 
estate have been management priorities; these are people who are 
already vulnerable. Others who are given properties are people who 
have been homeless, refugees and rough sleepers. 95 per cent of these 
people are extremely vulnerable (Interview no.35, 8/1/03).
This community development worker for one of the main London developing 
associations also commented on the profile of new residents:
As legislation has become more stringent, more vulnerable people have 
been put on to the estate. What has their experience been? They have 
come from abroad; they may be battered wives; they have had no
235experience of sustaining a tenancy; they are isolated; people who have 
suffered racial harassment (Interview no.35, 8/1/03).
Associated with these trends to house a much narrower band of socio­
economic groups has been a perceived crisis of affordability (Whitehead,
1997, p. 18) in the social rented sector. This problem of affordability 
entrenches poverty traps inherent within the Housing Benefit system (Kemp, 
1998; Cole, 2000, p. 168) and is linked to arguments about the development of 
a  dependency culture’ (Dean and Taylor-Gooby,  1992) within housing 
association accommodation.
The issue of affordability resulted from policy decisions in the 1980s to 
increase rents to market levels as finance shifted from capital to personal 
subsidy. Figure 7.1  illustrates the stark decline in general subsidies (from 
£9bn to less than £2bn in less than twenty years) as means tested benefits 
provided most financial assistance (from £2bn to almost £10bn, mainly 
provided through the Housing Benefit system).
Figure 7.1: Changing forms of assistance with housing costs, Great Britain, 
1980-1998, £m at 1996 prices
□ Means tested 
subsidies
■ General subsidies
1980/81  1990/91  1997/98
Source  Conway, 2000, p.37
The requirement upon social landlords to manage risk and to rely on private 
finance led to associations taking decisions to impose significant rent 
increases over short periods of time. Housing associations had to use cross­
subsidy to finance new developments and management costs were being 
disproportionately deflected onto tenants (Chaplin et. al.,  1995) a policy of
236allowing housing benefit to ‘take the strain’ (Malpass, 2000a, p.26) of reduced 
subsidy was developed in the 1990s (Whitehead, 1997, p.18).
As landlords had to raise funds from their own reserves, the increases in rent 
levels were imposed at the same time as the sector was accommodating 
much higher numbers of residents dependent on income support and means- 
tested benefits. The result was to create a ‘crisis of affordability’ (Bramley, 
1994) within social housing. As early as 1991 the National Housing 
Federation found that at a national level rents were set consistently above 
equivalent properties in the private sector and had risen at three times the 
rate of household incomes (Randolph, 1992).
The problem of affordability was more evident within the housing association 
sector than amongst local authorities, as considerable pressure was exerted 
from private financial institutions to maximise income in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s. The escalation in rent levels led to growing concern at the 
existence of  poverty’ and ‘unemployment traps’ (Hills, 1993) whereby 
residents were discouraged from working due to the high marginal tax rates of 
taking up employment as benefit is withdrawn. A growth in benefit 
dependency was associated with this process of ‘pauperisation’ (Brown and 
Passmore,  1996, p.9). The level of dependency and disincentives to work was 
a growing concern for central government, but since 1989, the persistence of 
these poverty traps became more conspicuous. Table 7.3 illustrates the steep 
increases in rents compared to average incomes during the 1980s and 1990s.
Table 7.3: Average rents and incomes in the housing association sector in 
Great Britain, 1980-1998
1980 1990 1998
Average rent (£) 12.52 25.00 54.51
Average income (£) 66.00 94.00 142.00
Average rent as % of average income 19.00 26.60 38.40
Source: Wilcox, 2000
237By the end of the millennium, the client group of housing association tenants 
had progressively narrowed to incorporate a higher proportion of 
disadvantaged groups. The extent of social exclusion found in new housing 
association accommodation was generally greater than that found in local 
authority estates without the same amount of time to develop community 
capacity to cope with the range of problems facing the sector. As a community 
development officer suggested:
On a local authority estate you have normally had 25-30 years to 
develop a sense of community. You cannot develop a community over 8 
years (Interview no.35, 8/1/03).
To give an example, a neighbourhood profile of a development in outer 
London indicates the scale of the issues facing the sector. The development 
was typical of many of the new developments completed in the early 1990s (it 
was completed in 1992) by a consortium of housing associations. Table 7.4 
illustrates the salient features of this estate and is symptomatic of many new 
housing association developments in London with unusually high levels of 
young people compared to old (43 per cent aged under 15, compared to 3 per 
cent aged over 60). The estate had high levels of unemployment (33 per cent 
compared to a borough average of 7 per cent) benefit dependency and 
sickness. Half the households had net weekly incomes below £200 a week. In 
addition, one household in every five on the estate had applied for refugee 
status at some point, of whom half had indefinite leave to remain in Britain.
The neighbourhood was described by a caretaker as ‘highly unbalanced. The 
only balance was in terms of need’ (Interview no.42, 17/2/03). Such 
developments are increasingly common in high demand areas such as 
London, where housing associations in the late 1980s and early 1990s were 
compelled to offer properties almost exclusively to the highest need groups. 
Additionally, the background of many of the new residents was often 
perceived as highly problematic. As a resident caretaker explained: ‘if they are
238housing association tenants it is highly likely they have been kicked out of 
properties elsewhere’ (Interview no.43,  17/2/03).
Table 7.4: Selected socio-economic profile of a London (housing association) 
consortium estate, 2003, compared to ward and borough data (percentages)
Household features
By age
Aged 0-15
% of
Estate
(N =185) 
43
% of
Ward
23
% of 
Borough
20
Aged over 60 3 13 19
By family type
Family and lone parent households (HH) 69 42 52
By economic status
Economically inactive 55 42 52
Unemployed as % of economically inactive 33 8 7
Caring for family member at home 25 6 8
Long-term sick/disabled 14 3 2
By income
Annual income below £10,000 36 24 18
Receiving income support 39 33 19
Receiving council tax & housing benefit 64 39 18
By educational attainment
Pupils attaining 5 GCSEs, A-C 38 44 47
Pupils with free school meals entitlement 48 33 26
Sources: Resident survey, 2002, local authority ward data and 2001 census.
Problems were compounded by the fact that individuals with above average 
incomes would normally choose to leave the social rented sector to become 
owner-occupiers, with the remaining tenants perceived as dependent on 
welfare services. By the year 2001, a study by the Housing Corporation 
(2001a) found that four fifths of young housing association tenants planned to
239exit the sector within the next ten years, reflecting the transient nature of the 
tenure.
Owner occupiers commented on the frustrations of living in close proximity to 
housing association accommodation on a predominantly social rented estate.
I just feel it is so simple. It is down to the management of who comes in 
to the area. I sometimes feel that this is a place where they want to keep 
the worst elements so at least the police know where to come when 
there is a problem. At least they are all in one area. That’s how we felt; 
that that this place was a dumping ground for some real bad elements in 
society (Interview no.38, 14/1/03).
All of the above features contributed to a low level of collective identity, 
compounded by the view that few London housing association tenants had 
willingly moved into their accommodation. Research conducted by Cambridge 
University found that London tenants had little choice in where to move 
compared to residents in other parts of the country and their mobility ‘reflected 
what households were offered rather than what they would choose’ 
(Dataspring research report, quoted in Inside Housing, 9/7/03).
New tenants therefore comprised a much lower income profile; included 
greater numbers of vulnerable residents, greater proportions of children to 
adults and had far less choice about where to live. As a result, housing 
association tenants were seen as confined within social housing, unable to 
take up employment and only affordable to those receiving full housing benefit 
payments.
The tenure was no longer seen as diverse and available to individuals with a 
variety of needs and capacities, but rather one limited to households 
experiencing acute stress. These problems were intensified by a perception 
the social changes affecting the housing association sector had taken place 
over a much shorter period of time compared to their local authority 
counterparts.
2407.2.3 Internal pressures: the nature of the management task
Housing management is governed by an organisational context characterised 
by ambiguity, uncertainty and imprecise functions. The level of indeterminacy 
within housing management, whereby the parameters of the job are difficult to 
define makes it more difficult to distinguish a clear role than in other more 
established professions such as social work (Franklin and Clapham,  1998). 
Front-line housing managers have often had a ‘precarious legitimacy’ (Furbey 
et. al. 2001, p.36) with their role being seen as a common-sense occupation 
with a low social status. Their work has been limited to generally low level and 
mundane generalist activities, such as rent collection, repairs and neighbour 
nuisance (ibid, p.37). Limited technical ability is associated with the task; there 
is uncertainty about the boundaries of housing management and historically 
little collective identity amongst housing managers (ibid., p.38). Seeing the 
history of the housing profession and the ‘professional housing manager1  as 
involving dispute, conflict and uncertainty (Mullins et. al., 2001, p.614) 
indicates how the perception of the practice of housing management has 
historically been seen as problematic.
As Stewart (1998) has argued the use of the word ‘management’ has further 
distanced the occupational identity from a professional status (p.39) by the 
implication that it has a narrow, administrative role. In addition, what Furbey 
et. al. (2001) term the ‘fragile domain’ (p.37) of housing professionalism can 
be illustrated by the fact that in the late 1990s only around 15 per cent of the 
estimated 100,000 core housing staff had become members of the 
professional body (the Chartered Institute of Housing) (Pearl, 1997, p.219).
Moreover, almost all discussion of housing management has been conducted 
within a local authority environment; there has been little or no discussion of 
housing association professionalism. Whilst (as shown in chapter four) senior 
managers have seen their pay scales rise and their status enhanced by 
playing a more central role in housing policy, this status has not been 
transferred to front-line housing managers. In the past housing associations 
could be seen as a more attractive career option than local authority work as
241the management process was not subject to the same level of interference 
from local government members. However, as the nature of the management 
task became more problematic, housing association housing management 
could be perceived as an even lower-level occupation than local authority 
staff, lacking professional skills and consisting of crisis management of an 
increasingly problematic client group.
In addition, the focus on efficiency in the 1980s (based on the need to attract 
private investment) meant that contemporary housing management staff 
perceived that they were expected to work harder without additional 
remuneration and were increasingly subject to monitoring and surveillance 
within a performance culture based upon meeting organisational targets.
Thus, at the same time that housing officers were dealing with a more 
challenging client group their duties were increasing disproportionately:
The workloads have become much greater. Originally I was managing a 
‘patch’ size of 200 units. This has gradually increased to over 400 
properties. At the same time we have not lost any responsibilities...The 
job is now noticeably more stressful...We are now swamped with work 
(Interview no.29, 8/12/00).
The pressures of the task were placing staff under considerably more difficult 
working conditions. Front-line housing managers therefore complained that 
the job has doubled’ (Interview no.25, housing officer, 4/5/99).
The pressures of housing management meant that the task became less 
attractive as a career option. A survey conducted for a leading housing journal 
found that almost forty per cent of housing professionals would not enter the 
social housing sector if they had the choice again and that twenty one percent 
were actively considering leaving the profession (Inside Housing, 8/6/01). The 
process of residualisation referred to above, had strongly affected the 
motivation and commitment of front-line staff. As a housing manager of one of 
the largest London associations commented the task of the housing manager 
was becoming increasingly unpopular:
242Let’s face it, who would be a housing officer with all that grief when they 
can get another job for the same money and not get a load of earache? 
It’s not exactly the most attractive job in the world is it? (Interview no.35, 
housing manager,  15/8/02)
Another senior manager of one of the medium-sized associations stated that it 
was becoming increasingly difficult to attract prospective candidates as 
applicants were dissuaded by the levels of pay and stress associated with the 
job. ‘We cannot recruit good quality housing management staff. (Interview 
no.37, 10/1/03).
The perception of housing management as constituting a limited and 
mundane set of tasks can be linked to an inability to exert a significant 
influence upon the direction of social housing policy. Kam (1997) for instance, 
has complained of a failure to ‘champion the cause of the disadvantaged’
(p. 178) or more conservatively to defend services against cuts in provision. As 
Cole and Furbey state: ‘faced with declining resources and growing 
operational problems in the 1980s, the challenge to government policy 
mounted by housing practitioners was often muted and focused on the detail 
of change rather than its underlying philosophy’ (p. 138). In particular, front­
line housing management staff were seen as detached from the strategic 
decision making process and increasingly seen as playing a ‘firefighting’ role 
in the late 1980s and 1990s; preoccupied with their day-to-day working 
practices and unable to influence longer-term decision-making processes. 
Other writers have mentioned the degree to which housing departments 
‘accept their difficulties without public protest, and often apparently without 
realising the difficulties themselves. In effect they seem to operate at the level 
of practical rather than discursive consciousness’ (Sarre et a!.,  1989, p. 194).
A common response to the bewildering rate of change was to emphasise the 
extent to which the job had become entirely reactive, comprising a crisis 
management function. Front-line staff expressed the view that their jobs had 
become increasingly problematic, but at the same time less interesting, with 
decreasing levels of discretion and a tendency to degenerate into a limited set
243of responsibilities. One senior manager warned of the dangers of indulging in 
purely reactive service provision: ‘If you are managing nothing but a crisis, 
that seems to me to be the definition of impossibility’ (Interview no. 12, 8/4/97). 
The extent to which day-to-day demands of the job militate against forward 
planning and innovative management was summarised by one manager as 
follows:
Housing managers are not strategists...you do not need strategy when 
someone is breaking down the door to get accommodation. You don’t 
need strategy other than self-protection... We have been almost wholly 
reactive (Interview no.6,  11/2/97).
The sense of managing a crisis was found to be deep-rooted amongst many 
housing staff. Thus, ‘even with the best will in the world 80 per cent of a 
housing officer’s time is spent on casework rather than developing initiatives 
on the estate’ (Interview no.31,  15/8/02).  Front-line workers commonly felt 
alienated by the plethora of new initiatives at the same time as being 
expected to cope with increased regulation from the Housing Corporation.
The frustrations of the job were summarised by a housing officer as follows:
We have no support from the line manager, as the roles are so diverse. 
You are told to get on with the job whether it is right or wrong and then 
face the consequences...The most frustrating part of the job is not having 
enough time to finish things. . .there is not enough time within a thirty five 
hour week... some of us are doing fifty hours...we do not give tenants as 
much time as they deserve (Interview no.27, 5/10/99)
Thus, housing staff felt that they were struggling to cope with the day-to-day 
pressures. The demands of the job were such that it was very difficult to 
engage in long-term strategy or to make forward planning whilst the features 
that made the job attractive (the personal contact) in the first place had been 
lost.
An additional question was whether housing managers wanted to play a role 
traditionally associated with social work. Housing association accommodation 
had become equated with a client group with little sense of a cohesive identity 
apart from the fact that they were a group with numerous social problems. 
Often residents were perceived to be inappropriately housed and lacked
244effective support mechanisms. Housing managers faced larger ‘patch sizes’ in 
attempts to increase efficiency they found themselves unable to manage more 
complex and specialist support needs (Hack and Humphreys, 1998, p.9). 
Thus, ‘the tenants need massive support which is not being provided’ 
(Interview no.36, community development officer, 8/1/03).
Front-line housing staff also felt that they were progressively becoming 
subject to much higher levels of personal abuse. As one housing officer 
expressed it: ‘dealing with residents on the phone is very stressful when 
people are incredibly obnoxious. The abuse has definitely got worse’ 
(Interview no.29, 8/12/00). Similarly, ‘I don’t expect people to be grateful but I 
don’t expect them to be quite so horrid. You would not believe the abuse that 
we get from some of our residents’ (Interview no.48, neighbourhood manager, 
14/12/03).
Housing association allocations policies were widely assumed to have 
contributed to generating a more difficult environment to manage. As a local 
authority officer commented, speaking of a housing association estate built in 
the early 1990s:
There were real concerns about allocations policies. [For example] the 
fact that we were housing so many drug-users, single parents and ex­
offenders. It has to be a recipe for disaster...It is all very well to house 
those in the greatest need but the short term benefit has turned into the 
long term hell (Interview no.42,  17/2/03).
The housing management task was compounded by a complexity of 
partnership arrangements and interorganisational networks (Reid, 1995;
1997;  1999). The management of multi-agency projects whilst in theory 
offering opportunities for cross-boundary working, in practice often resulted in 
a lack of guidance and uncertainty: the consequence was a high level of 
‘confusion about what the job involves’ (Interview no.29, housing officer, 
8/12/00). The management of housing association consortium arrangements 
provides the clearest example of the difficulties associated with inter-agency
245working. The kinds of problems encountered were summarised by a housing 
manager in the following terms:
The confusion surrounding the management of the consortium on the 
estate is compounded by what is going on in the sector at the moment, 
there is a huge staff turnover. There is no continuity, there is not a single 
person who has been there in the consortium from the start to now. We 
have lost that wealth of knowledge. We will continue to do so until there 
is a change in the economic climate (Interview no.31, housing manager, 
15/8/02).
Problems that were common to local authority housing estates were therefore 
magnified by the lack of continuity and the fragmentation resulting from having 
a range of different landlords taking responsibility for a neighbourhood.
The fatalism of staff was exacerbated in a vicious circle whereby front-line 
officers felt that their only option was to leave the housing management 
profession. A high level of staff turnover was commonplace as individuals 
were reluctant to work in such a stressful environment for any length of time. 
As a housing officer in one of large associations suggested: ‘We have 
experienced a huge turnover of staff (currently the housing officer is a 
temporary member of staff). This has disrupted all our community tenant 
initiatives -  there is a concern about the stop-start of activity over the last 6 
years' (Interview no.32,  15/8/02).  The level of turnover particularly affected 
consortium schemes where a variety of landlords had responsibility for 
managing a neighbourhood. The problems are magnified by having 6 or 
however many members there are' (Interview no.31, housing manager,
15/8/02). The level of confusion was illustrated by the fact that none of the 
interviewees was aware of the exact number of landlords responsible for the 
estate. The high turnover of staff meant that the opportunity to accumulate 
knowledge and skills was lost over time.
You don’t seem to be able to get back to basics. The information about 
who owns the land, who manages the contract does not seem to be 
retrievable. It must be somewhere, but it is not in [our organisation]. That 
situation is replicated across the housing providers (Interview no.31, 
housing manager,  15/8/02).
246Moreover, the management task in the late 1990s was also associated with 
an increasingly mundane and routine set of processes. Housing officers 
traditionally valued working in housing associations as their work comprised a 
more diverse range of duties than within a highly structured local authority 
environment. However, as one housing officer stated ‘my work now entirely 
comprises neighbour nuisance cases. It becomes very frustrating. There is no 
variety in the workload' (Interview no.29, 8/12/00). Furthermore, one of the 
most intractable aspects of housing management; the management of anti­
social behaviour, became more challenging as housing associations were 
encouraged to manage properties on multiple landlord estates. Neighbour 
disputes by definition rely on subjective accounts and are therefore 
notoriously difficult to resolve, but the problems are intensified by the 
reluctance of different landlords to follow common procedures. Thus:
Anti-social behaviour is a particular problem when you have multi- 
landlord disputes. A tenant of another landlord was taking action against 
one of our tenants. Who does the tenant go to when we have no 
jurisdiction? These kinds of reports tend not to get taken seriously. They 
do not get resolved well. There is a tendency to believe what your own 
tenant is saying against a tenant of another landlord. There is little 
communication between front-line officers (Interview no.35, RSL 
manager, 6/1/03).
A recurring theme in discussions with front-line staff was the frustration 
expressed both at a lack of management support and absence of training for 
staff attempting to cope with new ways of working. As one front-line manager 
commented:
We are not adequately trained for these new initiatives. .. We are not 
trained to deal with the changing client group. The lack of support makes 
us feel terribly helpless. We are in a similar situation to inner-city 
teachers (Interview no.29, 8/12/00).
This sense of helplessness was reinforced by the isolation inherent in carrying 
out day-to-day duties. A neighbourhood manager expressed the level of 
stress associated with experiencing some of the conditions of visiting tenants 
in their own homes, ‘If I have to go there I go in last thing at night, I go straight
247home and have a shower afterwards’ (Interview no.48, 14/12/03). There was 
also little outlet for the frustrations of the job. Thus ‘I have a patch of 600 
houses. I could be out all day and if I have three visits from hell and I am 
alone in my car, I have nowhere to offload it’ (Interview no.48, neighbourhood 
officer,  14/12/03).
Housing managers had a tendency to view their role in instrumental terms, 
having lost the idealism that attracted them to the job in the first place. As a 
management committee member of a medium-sized organisation expressed 
staff attitudes. 'Now it’s more of a business...  No longer are they in this job 
simply because they believe in housing. It’s a job, nine to five’ (Interview no.3, 
25/1/99). A lack of professionalism which went hand in hand with a lack of 
status, suggested that working within a housing association environment had 
lost much of its original appeal as an informal sector, which attracted highly 
motivated individuals.
Although housing associations were being used by central government as a 
key policy vehicle, front-line staff did not see themselves as playing a strategic 
role. The management task became increasingly problematic at the same 
time as the workload was perceived to be more routine and constrained. 
Working in an environment where discretion is discouraged at the same time 
as contact with others was minimised, provides classic conditions for fatalism 
to flourish.
7.3  The impact of fatalism
The consequences of these fatalistic pressures are threefold. As housing 
management has become strongly associated with the management of 
decline, staff exhibit a strong sense of futility in their practices. Secondly, as 
certain neighbourhoods experienced a negative correlation between their 
tenure and the potential for social breakdown, the relationship between staff
248and tenants deteriorated.  Finally, the spiralling effect of fatalism is witnessed 
in the resident experience.
7.3.1  Staff futility
As shown above, the ability of housing associations to manage their affairs in 
a flexible manner was severely constrained by the demands of an 
environment based largely upon interdependency. The ability for associations 
to make their own decisions about who to house, about the level of rents to 
charge and where to develop become increasingly constrained as their room 
for manoeuvre was progressively limited. A major complaint amongst 
managers was therefore their inability to exercise autonomy in decision 
making as housing managers were forced to accept the consequences of 
decisions made by external agencies. For example:
The biggest problem is allocations. The rehousing officer will interview 
the tenant and I will get the tenant from hell. They recently landed me 
with a 16 year old girl. The other tenants in the block are going mad. She 
sleeps all day and parties at night; it is a huge issue (Interview no.48, 
neighbourhood officer,  14/12/03).
Such complaints were seen very differently depending on one’s organisational 
position. Senior managers tended to adopt a much more positive view about 
relationships with partner local authorities. Thus, the 100 per cent nomination 
arrangements were negotiated at a senior level by development staff and 
directors to take advantage of available opportunities. In contrast, front-line 
staff perceived themselves to be excluded from these negotiations. The 
pressures of allocations systems generated a sense that their role had lost its 
purpose:
The problem is that we have to interview new applicants but if we don’t 
like them that is not grounds for refusing accommodation. You normally 
get a sense of a person straight away. However, whoever the council 
give you as a nomination you have to take anyway, so what is the point 
of interviewing them? (Interview no.48, neighbourhood officer, 14/12/03).
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opportunities implications of housing allocations, they reflected commonly 
held complaints by housing managers. A senior manager of one of the large 
philanthropic organisations contrasted the period before and after 1988: 
‘before we used to interview the applicant. Now there is no point as we never 
turn them down’ (Interview no.27, 5/10/99). This statement that associations 
were merely becoming the agents of local bureaucracies was a common 
refrain in discussions with front-line staff.
The nature of the task referred to above reinforced a sense of futility, partly 
manifested in low motivation. Thus, one housing officer stated:
I would say that morale in the organisation is appalling. A lot of people 
are away on long-term sickness absence...! think the increased workload 
has caused immense stress, in particular confusion about our role and 
the remit of the job. I think we are losing touch with what we are really 
good at, which is managing tenancies (Interview no.29, 8/12/00).
The demoralisation of front-line staff was also reflected in high levels of 
absenteeism:
There are three members of staff on permanent sick leave due to stress 
at work. We are not getting any of the nice rewarding jobs. I would 
estimate that the organisation is comprised of 28 per cent temporary 
staff, which is hugely expensive (Interview no.48, neighbourhood officer, 
14/12/03).
The atmosphere of working in a rural office offered a stark contrast with that of 
a London office, ‘when I was based in London I could sense the tension, it 
was very grim, especially as I did not even have my own desk’ (Interview no. 
48, neighbourhood officer,  14/12/03). In particular there was not felt to be any 
opportunity to benefit from the work. For example, ‘We can all deal with stress 
if there is some relief. But there are not any rewards’ (Interview no.48, 
neighbourhood officer,  14/12/03).
Front-line staff felt that as housing associations lost their ability to act 
autonomously, the rationale for their work had been lost. Thus: ‘I feel we are
250moving away from our core objective, that is being a housing agency’ 
(Interview no.29, 8/12/00). Housing association staff complained that their 
work was made impossible as they faced decisions made by third parties, 
outside their control. In situations where housing associations were managing 
estates as part of a consortium of landlords, these pressures were 
exacerbated. For example: ‘you are managing an area, which is largely out of 
your control. Others don’t have the same standards. It is very difficult to get 
that enthusiastic that what you are doing is actually making a difference’ 
(Interview no.32, community development officer,  15/8/02). This quote 
expressed the contrast with the period before the 1988 Act; when housing 
association staff felt that they were able to contribute to local areas, based on 
their local profile, their close relationship with residents and their small-scale 
activity.
The pressures generated by the contemporary environment led many staff to 
deflect their frustrations with their work onto other groups. Hence they would 
sometimes choose to categorise residents as dishonest, untrustworthy and 
liable to fraudulent behaviour. A front-line housing worker expressed the 
sense that housing managers were engaged in a meaningless game to 
encourage residents to pay rent on time:
People know their rights. In the past tenants would pay up if you 
threatened a Notice [of seeking possession]. Now they pay no attention, 
as they know they will not be evicted. They merely threaten to go to the 
press (Interview no.28, 5/10/99).
This example of arrears policies, which have been embraced by all social 
landlords as a priority, showed how core policies had become seen as a 
largely ineffectual exercise. Staff felt that their experience was characterised 
by impotence and an inability to determine organisational outcomes. This 
impotence was manifested not only through the exercise of tenant rights, but 
also through the impossibility of controlling the actions of other agencies. In 
particular, local authorities were singled out for criticism. Thus:
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we are blighted by the local authority performance. It takes ages to 
process standard claims and papers are frequently lost. We now send 
Notices [of Seeking Possession] even when we know people are eligible 
for housing benefit. We also seek court action while claims are being 
processed...It is futile however as Courts will not give [possession] 
orders where there are outstanding housing benefit claims (Interview 
no.9, 8/12/00).
Frustration with the legal process was a common compliant. Staff expressed 
irritation that although they were forced to give priority to rent collection, their 
efforts were inevitably unproductive as the judicial system was inherently 
biased against them. For example, a front-line worker complained:
The judge always finds in the tenants’ favour, always. You have a family 
from hell who have been to court numerous times before and the 
decision is just to review [the case] in six weeks. Why? The only 
evictions you get are when the property is abandoned; when people 
know they cannot stay. Those smart enough to know the system will stay 
where they are. They will go through the procedures knowing that they 
will not have to leave their property as they have been through it so 
many times before. Meanwhile you have to arrange bailiffs, locksmiths 
on the off-chance that the court will find in your favour (Interview no.48, 
neighbourhood officer,  14/12/03).
Housing staff saw their work as increasingly comprising a ritual set of games 
with predetermined outcomes. Possession notices were issued, not to secure 
the eviction of residents, but merely in order to motivate government agencies 
to take action. The activity of instigating possession proceedings was 
condemned as a pointless and time-consuming exercise, with all parties 
aware that they were engaged in a purely symbolic process. There was a 
considerable degree of scepticism about the suitability of measures to monitor 
and evaluate performance. For example one member of staff suggested:
Targets are unrealistic, for example rent arrears. If targets are not met, 
salaries and morale suffer. We have targets of 101  per cent rent 
collection, yet we carry historic debts of five to six years. The targets are 
completely unattainable; you have to manipulate the figures. It is the only 
way to justify the work being done (Focus group no.2 , 2/6/99).
Rather than increasing the commitment and motivation of staff, the constant 
monitoring and supervision of working practices generated incentives to
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of a small voluntary organisation admitted that this engendered an attitude of 
dishonesty: ‘you almost have to cheat to keep your job’ (Focus group no. 2, 
2/6/99).
A sense of futility was also clearly evident in attitudes towards tackling anti­
social behaviour. Due to the changes in the client group considered earlier, 
the problem of neighbour nuisance assumed a high priority for central 
government since the late 1980s. In particular housing workers were 
preoccupied with the difficulty of taking effective action against the 
perpetrators of anti-social behaviour; in many cases residents suffering 
mental health difficulties. As one front-line housing worker expressed it: ’What 
can you do if you are dealing with somebody who is clearly unwell?’ (Interview 
no.29, 8/12/00). Housing staff saw themselves as largely powerless to 
confront the most serious instances of neighbour nuisance as their only 
effective weapon was eviction, which would not be granted in a court where 
there was evidence that the resident suffered mental health difficulties. 
Housing officers felt frustrated that their efforts were not appreciated by their 
residents:
You can’t win, housing officers are often out of the office, tenants 
complain that they always get their voice mail, then that they never see 
them on the estates. You are in a no-win situation (Interview no.31, 
Housing Services Manager,  15/8/02).
This sense that change was impossible, led to a strong sense of 
demoralisation amongst staff, particularly at front-line level. The cumulative 
impact of managing a client group, dominated by poverty and unemployment; 
of excessive regulation and front-line workers’ perception that their jobs were 
undervalued and underpaid bred a strong sense of resentment. This 
resentment was expressed in the view that a large part of the practice of 
contemporary housing management was essentially a worthless activity. Thus 
The most frustrating part is that you cannot change their expectations. In 
reality I know that I cannot make a difference’ (Interview no.48, 
neighbourhood officer, 14/12/03).
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scepticism about many initiatives, in particular schemes to increase resident 
involvement. For example one advice officer commented: ‘I think 
empowerment is flowery talk basically. I have always had doubts about it.
Give me an example of someone who has become “empowered”. I just find it 
rhetoric, hot air... Blairite spiel’ (Focus group no.3, 18/4/02). Staff commented 
on a sense of desperation amongst landlords to involve residents, with 
incentives given to tenants described as ‘almost like bribery’ (Focus group 
no.4, 24/4/02). There was also considerable cynicism about how these 
schemes were perceived by external agencies. For example, one front-line 
housing manager stated:
As housing officers we are given no training in enhancing tenant 
participation. All we were asked to do was to drop leaflets through doors. 
It is quite scary as I think [involvement] is one of the worst aspects of our 
performance, yet we were recently inspected and praised by the Housing 
Corporation for our tenant participation (Focus group no.4, 24/4/02).
Housing association Board members could also be susceptible to a sense of 
futility in their (post 1988) roles and functions. The difficulty facing 
management committee members has been expressed by Malpass (2000a) 
as follows:
The combination of performance monitoring by the Corporation and the 
employment of professional staff means that in the larger associations 
board members have very little real work to do. It is fanciful to think that 
they are in control of strategy in any real sense...board members 
probably delude themselves if they think they make much difference or 
represent anyone but themselves (p.260).
A sense of demoralisation was evident in some of the responses from 
management committee members. For example one member of a large 
London association expressed a belief that her presence at committee 
meetings was entirely tokenistic. She stated: ‘actually decisions were made in 
the pre-meetings before the committee. I thought, “why am I wasting my time 
here?"’ (Interview no.22, 27/11/98). This type of comment represented a
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paying only lip service to their expressed objectives.
7.3.2  Relationships between staff and tenants
Housing management has long been criticised for its excessive paternalism 
as practiced by local authority landlords: The traditional paternalistic style of 
housing management practiced by social landlords positioned tenants as 
passive supplicants, waiting for welfare help’ (Bramley, et. a/., 2004, p.143).
As discussed in chapter three, the historical legacy of housing associations, 
particularly the Shelter organisations, had been associated with a high level of 
personal support and informal contact. They were organisations that prided 
themselves on their ability to cultivate effective relationships with their tenants 
largely on the basis of a casual but nevertheless effective management style. 
Partly because they had not historically managed large estates but also due 
to a more informal approach to management, housing associations were 
largely insulated from the severe criticisms levelled at local government 
housing departments. In contrast, the post 1988 environment represented a 
serious challenge to these organisational images. The pressures of resource 
constraints, of private finance and changes to the resident profile resulted in 
priority being devoted to critical problems, with much of the taken-for-granted, 
routine responsibilities neglected. Situations therefore often had to reach a 
crisis point before intervention could be justified. Thus ‘frequently the police 
have to be involved before support can be provided’ (Interview no.29,
8/12/00). There were several indications that the relationship between staff 
and tenants had steadily deteriorated since the 1980s.
A strong indication of a worsening relationship was evident in the attitudes of 
residents to their landlords. For example, the tenant of an organisation formed 
through a merger agreement gave the following description of how the 
organisation had changed. It had become ‘very distant in all meanings of the 
word ... The [previous] housing association taken over was local’ (response to 
questionnaire,  18/3/01). This resident expressed a common complaint that
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housing associations as staff were now based in inaccessible offices. These 
offices were considerably further away from residents than local authority 
departments, entrenching the perception of an unapproachable and 
centralised service.
Front-line housing association staff characterised the relationship with 
residents as a ‘one way street -  we want to get information, but we don’t 
really want to listen to their problems’ (Focus group no. 3, 24/4/02). Staff 
appeared conscious that the changing environment had placed them in a 
process of containment, with a much lower level of tolerance of tenant 
behaviour and a relationship characterised by mutual distrust. The extent to 
which associations were underwriting financial risk through rent increases had 
a demonstrable impact and the clear consequence was that associations 
were forced to adopt a much less sympathetic attitude towards those tenants 
in rent arrears. For example staff criticised the adoption of vigorous rent 
arrears policies.  I feel we are penalising the poorest tenants by harassing 
them to chase the housing benefit section’ (Interview no.29, 8/12/00). Many 
front-line staff felt that the relationship had deteriorated not as a result of their 
own actions but due to the administrative incompetence of others. Thus:
DSS [Department of Social Security] and HB [Housing Benefit] are 
atrocious...staff will not discuss cases unless tenants are under threat of 
eviction. We are therefore considering issuing notices [of seeking 
possession] to all of our tenants in arrears (Focus group no.2, 2/6/99).
From a resident perspective relations with staff were described as ‘good with 
the immediate housing officer but bad with the rest’ (response to 
questionnaire,  18/3/01). Thus, the front-line housing worker remained an 
important point of contact, particularly in the light of organisational mergers 
and a greater hierarchical culture within many contemporary organisations. 
Nevertheless, descriptions of landlords often took highly detrimental forms, for 
example tenants described their organisation in the following ways: ‘money
256and merger mad’ and ‘not really a social landlord any more’ (response to 
questionnaire,  18/3/01).
One tenant spoke of their experience in changing from a local housing Trust 
to a new national organisation. In response to a question about what their 
landlord was most successful at doing, the tenant answered ‘bullying’. This 
tenant continued:
My first landlords were a housing Trust...they were committed to resident 
welfare and security with low rents...Unfortunately due to financial 
problems [the new organisation]... came in as agents. Since then we 
have experienced high rents, aggressive, bullying behaviour and a 
distant management style (Response to questionnaire, 18/3/01).
A housing officer expressed the tensions generated by models of 
management adopted in the 1990s: ‘one problem is how the social work 
approach fits in with managing the tenancy. An authoritarian approach is 
needed at times, for example with nuisance cases’ (Interview no.29, 8/12/00). 
Others commented on inherent contradictions in the management task. For 
example, one manager commented.
Housing officers have a very split role. We talk about rent and have to 
take tenants to court and then say: “by the way what do you think about 
this?”. ..On the one hand we are enforcing tenancy conditions and being 
very strict and on the other hand very friendly and wanting them to go to 
focus groups (Focus group no.4, 24/4/02).
Authoritarian attitudes were seen to result in coercive management 
interventions. Policies designed to control anti-social behaviour and to limit 
neighbour nuisance reflected an authoritarian impulse within contemporary 
housing management practice. From a staff perspective, managing neighbour 
nuisance presents the most frustrating and intractable component of the 
housing management task (Karn et.al., 1993). From a resident perspective, 
whilst measures to limit nuisance may have been broadly welcomed in order 
to confront anti-social behaviour, they were at the same time indicative of a
257much more punitive approach to management, introducing a firm element of 
social control.
Housing management therefore increasingly came to resemble an 
authoritarian function, whereby authority and discipline permeated day-to-day 
management practice (Franklin and Clapham, 1998). A more restrictive 
approach towards residents was expressed by a neighbourhood manager.
They see me as a representative of the landlord and not there to help 
but just to be aggressive. There is a perception that we are authoritarian 
and just there to control them (Interview no.48,  14/12/03).
Landlord strategies premised upon the assumption of preventing social 
breakdown required more punitive and intensive styles of management. 
Policies implemented in the 1990s reflected an increase in authoritarian 
interventions from managers. Thus one front-line housing officer spoke of a 
‘move to withhold services (such as transfers and improvements) in cases of 
rent arrears’ and ‘an emphasis on punitive measures rather than positive 
incentives’ (Interview no.26,  12/5/99).
The ‘pathologising’ of disadvantaged groups (see Marsh and Mullins, 1998) 
has intensified a tendency to blame individuals for a high incidence of 
problems faced by housing associations. Such groups have served as easy 
targets to allocate blame, functioning as a socially excluded ‘underclass’, 
liable to anti-social and criminal behaviour. Representations of social housing 
residents in media portrayals and central government pronouncements have 
intensified the allocation of blame amongst particular categories of individuals 
(such as single parents). In the late 1990s media preoccupation with 
'neighbours from hell’; created an impression that housing estates were 
environments containing unique combinations of social deprivation and anti­
social behaviour. Policies to tackle anti-social behaviour demonstrated the 
way in which civil misdemeanours were becoming incorporated into criminal 
law. For example, the determination of central government strategies to tackle 
the issue of anti-social behaviour can also be illustrated by the concept of 
‘anti-social behaviour orders’ (ASBOs) introduced in the 1998 Crime and
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prosecutions if breached. Despite the fact that just over 500 of these orders 
were issued between 1999 and 2001 and evidence of widespread variation in 
their application (Campbell, 2002) the initiative was extended in the Police 
Reform Act 2002 to registered social landlords. In spite of a lack of evidence 
about their efficacy, ASBOs have been used as an important weapon to 
demonstrate a commitment to tackling the problems facing housing 
association landlords with an array of increasingly prescriptive and 
authoritarian responses.
Housing association staff perceived that there was an increasing focus on the 
individual behaviour of their residents and the obligations attached to the 
reward of a tenancy. As one officer stated: ‘the stress is now on being good 
neighbours’ (Focus group no.1, 27/5/99). The implication of this statement 
was that residents needed to be socialised into developing appropriate 
normative standards of behaviour. Hence a more punitive culture had become 
established involving proposals to remove statutory rights (such as a right to a 
secure tenancy and easier grounds for possession of property). Social 
landlords were able to offer probationary or introductory tenancies to new 
residents and to ‘demote’ tenancies (thereby removing security) in Part 2 of 
the Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003. These initiatives indicated the way in 
which landlords were far less tolerant to problems of neighbour nuisance and 
rent arrears; they were thereby able to remove long-held tenancy rights from 
their residents.
Paradoxically, the importance attached to resident involvement could also be 
viewed as heralding a more authoritarian response from social landlords and 
reinforcing difficulties for those unable to meet rental payments. Some 
committee members commented that financial institutions were particularly 
keen to encourage resident participation for precisely this reason (Interview 
no.20, 11/11/98). For example, one housing association committee member 
stated that residents were generally less sympathetic than officers:
259Some of the tenants have some very perverse ideas about arrears and 
arrears control. They take a very hard line, not realising that the 
organisation actually houses people who come out of mental health 
institutions (Interview no.20, 11/11/98).
Tenant groups additionally felt that their landlords were suspicious of their role 
as representatives of residents. As an example one tenant commented:
Having been a Forum member for three to four years and having 
constant knowledge about tenant participation and courses I now feel 
our housing association do not like me knowing what I do now. I think 
they feel threatened as they are not used to us knowing anything 
(response to questionnaire,  18/3/01).
This statement indicated the discomfort experienced in the changing 
relationship between landlord and tenants despite expressed rhetorical 
commitment to partnership and mutual solutions. This tenant described their 
experience as ‘horrendous with threats to certain tenants and fear of 
harassment’ (response to questionnaire, 18/3/01). The style of management 
practiced by housing associations was also thought to have changed 
significantly from the early 1980s as measured by a firmer approach to rent 
arrears. Thus: ‘In the housing association sector it has been estimated that 
eviction rates rose by 14 per cent from 1998 to 2000’ (Pawson and Ford, 
2002).
Negative attitudes towards residents were also pervasive, implying that there 
was little difference from previous styles of housing practice:
There is still a strong sense of paternalism. For example: “you’re very 
lucky to have got that subsidised accommodation, what are you 
whingeing about?” or “Why should I provide a service if they are in rent 
arrears?” (Interview no.6, Director, 11/2/97).
An example of the changing ethos of the sector was given from a tenant of 
Peabody Trust in relation to rent collection policies:
The main change has been from a charity where the tenant was the 
main concern to making sure that the books balance. If we are two 
weeks in arrears with the rent we get a letter immediately. That did not
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no.30, 14/12/00).
Staff expressed concern that they had lost a sense of personal contact that 
had been the most important and rewarding aspect of their work:
The relationship with tenants has changed. When I first worked at the 
organisation, I had much more time. I would visit a tenant if they phoned. 
That is unheard of now, unless it involves a neighbour dispute. (Interview 
no.29, housing officer, 8/12/00).
The lack of face to face communication with tenants generated a belief that 
front-line housing association staff had become isolated in their bunkers. 
Working in offices removed from residents meant that the raison d’etre of 
traditional housing management had been lost.  An important consequence of 
the changes introduced in the Housing Act 1988 was that there was far less 
tolerance of rent arrears and neighbour nuisance. Housing associations had 
therefore moved to a more intensive management style which carried a strong 
resonance of authoritarianism.
7.3.3  The resident experience
Housing associations were perceived to occupy a low place in the list of 
priorities for both central and local government. As groups housed were from 
the lowest socio-economic deciles and included significant numbers not 
eligible to vote (as they were asylum seekers, people suffering mental health 
difficulties and children) they were inevitably not likely to form an effective 
political constituency.
The lack of pressure groups campaigning for the rights of housing association 
residents is a noticeable feature of the contemporary political landscape. For 
example the pressure group Defend Council Housing, discouraged 
membership from housing association residents as their rationale was to 
dissuade council tenants from voting to become housing association tenants 
(Interview no.42,  17/2/03).
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early 1990s benefited from relatively high design standards and in that sense 
many of the lessons from failed municipal mass housing schemes had been 
learned. However, it appeared that new forms of social problems were 
becoming evident within housing association accommodation. As a manager 
of one of these schemes commented:
On paper it fits all the criteria for a perfect social planning, but in reality 
none of it works; there are problems of drugs, prostitution, quite violent 
crime and anti-social behaviour (Interview no.32, 15/8/02).
A further consequence of the allocation policies referred to above was that 
residents were often likely to be inappropriately housed and lack effective 
support mechanisms. As housing staff managed larger ‘patch sizes’ in 
attempts to increase efficiency they found themselves unable to manage more 
complex and specialist support needs (Hack and Humphreys,  1998, p.9).
The perception of twenty-first century social housing as a marginal and 
residual tenure was marked by a high level of stigma attached to the granting 
of a tenancy. As a housing officer of one of the largest London developing 
associations stated:
There is a lot of pressure from leaseholders and still a lot of stigma 
directed against mainstream tenancies. I am sure that many complaints 
result from the fact that they are directed against housing association 
tenants (Interview no.29, 8/12/00).
Housing association tenants were seen as being at the bottom of a hierarchy 
of tenure types. Thus ‘I am sure that there is a pecking order of housing: 
owner occupiers, leaseholders, council tenants, housing association tenants 
and homeless households. Housing association tenants are slightly above 
rough sleepers’ (Interview no.36, community development officer, 8/1/03).The 
changing social composition of housing association tenants created intensive 
demands on housing staff but in particular the perception that social housing
262had become a residual tenure for marginalised groups had a detrimental 
impact upon service delivery.
Furthermore, the low social status of housing association residents meant that 
there was no viable political constituency associated with the social rented 
sector. As a senior manager of a large housing association acknowledged, 
the result of policy changes was that.
You had in principle an acceptance of shifting from a producer to a 
consumer-driven culture, while at the same time the consumer is 
becoming an increasingly disempowered person in terms of economic 
and social status. (Interview no. 12, 8/4/97)
Thus 'providers and tenants in the sector remain politically vulnerable, with 
future financial support for both still being unpredictable in the longer term’ 
(Harrison, 2002, p. 126). The suggestion that the sector is becoming rapidly 
associated with social exclusion and with fragmented and marginalised 
communities meant that the management task was not a high priority for 
policy-makers despite much government rhetoric to the contrary. As a front­
line housing officer commented ‘it is always the tenants who get forgotten 
about’ (Interview no.28, 5/10/99).
Similarly, a management committee member expressed the view that 
residents were largely passive recipients of housing services and had 
therefore been able to have little say in management decisions: ‘I think 
housing association tenants have always had a very rough deal because they 
have had very little influence and power over the landlord’ (Interview no.22, 
27/11/98). One of the central problems facing housing association managers 
was that neighbourhoods lacked political support and therefore nobody was 
prepared to agitate for improvements. An example can be provided from the 
case of a consortium development. A local authority senior officer 
commented:
Until recently it was almost invisible as an estate and as a community. It 
was not on anybody’s radar. None of us was really aware of the depth of
263the problems until we started Neighbourhood Renewal. I also think it was 
low on the housing associations’ priorities. The concept of being a 
housing association site made it invisible. It was originally a health 
authority site and did not concern us except for needing planning 
permission. It became an enclave and something of a law unto itself. 
There were so many housing associations with a stake in it and all of 
them politically seem to have baled out. (Interview no.42, project 
manager, 17/2/03).
New housing association estates were therefore not likely to feature heavily in 
organisational priorities. Residents were therefore left with a sense that 
nothing could be done to solve the myriad of problems encountered on their 
estates. For example one senior manager commented: ‘I think that the 
perception is that the police don’t deal with [the problems] so what chance has 
the housing association got?’ (Interview no.35, senior manager, 6/1/03).
This marginalisation was compounded by the perception that such 
communities lacked effective leadership; the political representation was 
therefore inferior to that offered to council tenants. Thus, from a local authority 
perspective housing association estates were not seen as a priority. ‘It was 
not seen as a local authority problem. Consequently there is a lack of 
adequate advocacy or championing of the area’ (Interview no.42, local 
authority senior officer,  17/2/03).
The lack of interest in the housing association sector was intensified by low 
levels of resident solidarity and activism. This point was indicated by a lack of 
protest from housing association tenants: ‘Interestingly we don’t receive so 
many complaints from these residents. It has become part of their 
environment’ (Interview no.35, community development officer, 8/1/03). 
Residents become resigned to the numerous social problems encountered, 
and their attitude was contrasted with the behaviour of other private sector 
residents:
It is common sense to respond to the people who shout loudest.
However, [this estate] is silent. It is interesting that the most vocal
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(Interview no.35, community development officer, 8/1/03).
Such views clearly indicate that the marginalisation felt by a significant 
number of residents would be translated into a culture of passive acceptance 
of policy changes imposed by social landlords. Furthermore, where such 
residents were living on estates managed by a diversity of landlords it was 
very difficult to gain any sense of a coherent resident movement or consensus 
about collective issues around which to mobilise. The quiescence remarked 
upon in earlier studies of council tenants (Dunleavy, 1986) has therefore been 
accentuated by the particular circumstances of housing association residents 
in the 1990s.
The lack of a political constituency for housing association properties was 
starkly illustrated in the tendency for new developments to be managed as 
consortium arrangements. As an example a local authority officer commented:
It is peculiar that an estate as small as this should have so many 
landlords. The residents themselves have no sense of social justice. If 
they cannot act as a collective body and that is extremely 
disempowering and alienating. As there are so many different landlords 
and different systems they cannot coalesce around any issue 
(Interview no.42, local authority project manager, 17/2/03).
A management committee member warned that demoralisation would be 
widespread, particularly in situations where there was not a strong physical 
landlord presence (as in consortium estates): ‘if you don’t get someone then 
there is no hope. You can’t do it with absentee landlordism’ (Interview no. 44, 
19/2/03). These concerns were echoed in the responses of front-line staff 
where fears of social breakdown were commonplace and often related to anti­
social behaviour amongst children. As a resident caretaker of a consortium 
estate expressed it:
I have never known an estate as bad as this for children. I don’t know 
anybody who doesn’t want to move off here... .I would love to move out
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(Interview no.43,  17/2/03).
A further aspect of the resident experience was the high level of cynicism and 
distrust evident from the responses of both front-line staff and residents. 
Resident attitudes in some neighbourhoods pointed to a high level of 
scepticism about the benefits of area improvement. On one specific housing 
association estate, in answer to a question about whether any changes would 
encourage them to participate, 84 per cent replied that nothing would. 60 per 
cent would not recommend living in the area to a friend and 45 per cent felt 
unsafe or very unsafe on their estate. Additionally 54 per cent stated that they 
were not on friendly terms with their neighbours (LRFG, 2002 survey of 
tenants).
A fatalistic worldview was related to the increasing incidence of behaviour 
damaging to the community, in particular levels of open drug-dealing and 
prostitution on certain housing association estates:
I see prostitutes on a daily basis...  It was a big shock to me when I came 
here. No-one told me it was like this. I feel like I am stuck here now. My 
kids hate it here; they absolutely hate it (Interview no.43, resident 
caretaker,  17/2/03).
The extent of social dislocation in certain neighbourhoods further generated a 
sense of poor service delivery in what could be seen as a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. For example, the presence of open soliciting and drug-dealing was 
expressed by one local authority officer as ‘an indication of a community 
under siege’ (Interview no.42,  17/2/03). A local authority project manager 
expressed the sense that in some housing association estates a fatalistic bias 
had gained a strong hold on entire communities:
I liken it to an individual. Certain people display what you could call a 
‘victim’ body language. Certain people are more liable to be burgled and 
mugged than others. This is a community based on a type of victimhood. 
It gives off certain sets of vibes (Interview no.42, 17/2/03).
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symbiotic relationship between low aspirations and expectations of social 
housing providers. This point was clearly expressed by a local authority 
officer:
There is ... a police and community dynamic conspiring to make a 
community vulnerable. There is a lack of performance and a belief in 
simply maintaining the status quo. It is very subtle and is synergy at its 
very worst. It creates a really ugly reality. These are subtle negative 
features and really difficult to detect. I do not think there is a conscious 
decision to provide a poor service; it is more about low levels of 
expectations and aspirations from both residents and service providers.
It is something that you almost need to deconstruct (Interview no.42, 
18/2/03).
The resident experience of housing management was summarised by a 
senior manager of a large housing association: ‘the residualised housing 
service of the future is only going to consist of either very intensive 
management or very intensive policing’ (Interview no. 12, 8/4/97). The resident 
experience was encapsulated in a distinction between old and new style 
housing association management techniques. The description of the 
experience of living in housing association accommodation as ‘absolute hell’ 
was a revealing comment made by a clearly frustrated resident (response to 
questionnaire, 18/3/01). In similar vein another resident commented ‘I don’t 
know what the answer is but I just know it is hell on earth at the moment’ 
(Interview no.38,  14/1/03).
Fatalism could therefore serve to reinforce negative attitudes in a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. Commentators on housing policy have referred to processes of 
‘mutually reinforcing social, building and organisational problems’ (Power and 
Tunstall, 1995); a ‘cycle of labelling and exclusion’ (Taylor, 1998) or 
‘downward spirals and dynamics’ (Lee and Murie, 1999). However, most of 
these descriptions have been applied exclusively to local authority ‘problem’ 
estates. Despite Jensen’s research into Danish housing organisations, 
illustrating that ‘fatalism can thrive as a response to any of the active 
solidarities [of cultural theory]’ (1999, p. 185, emphasis in original) there has 
been little discussion of fatalism within the housing association sector. Fatalist
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notoriety, reflected in local perceptions of neighbourhood and reinforced by 
the social processes and management practices of housing associations. 
Residents and staff thereby become trapped in a spiral of ever-increasing 
fatalism. This approach had a number of causes in central government, senior 
managers and front-line staff. However, the effect was the same in that it 
created a sense of fear, frustration and stigma to the management of housing 
association accommodation. Having said this, fatalism could be seen as 
having some positive consequences.
7.4  The positive features of fatalism?
Management theory tends to view fatalism as an entirely negative 
development, which needs to be removed in order for effective organisation to 
flourish. The quote from Tony Blair at the top of the chapter provides a good 
example of this view with the notion that ‘the dead weight of low expectations’ 
was the priority to tackle. However, there is an argument that fatalism can act 
as an important pressure valve, allowing staff to express frustration and 
dissatisfaction. It is therefore important to acknowledge and allow staff the 
opportunity to express these frustrations and cynicism.  Its function as a 
‘Greek chorus’ (Hood, 2000, p. 150) within public management, warning of 
potential dangers can be used to positive effect
To be fatalistic is to believe that events are unfolding in such a way that 
no other outcome is possible; it is to be without hope that any change 
could be brought about by human agency. This does not mean that the 
outcomes are always necessarily bad. It is possible to be a fatalist and 
an optimist (Gamble, 2000, p. 12).
This optimistic outlook was reflected in comments from staff. Although a 
sense of community dislocation had clearly gained a foothold within certain 
neighbourhoods, which disproportionately featured housing association 
properties, a project manager commented: ‘I always say that you should not 
underestimate the ability of people to survive in the most appalling 
circumstances’ (Interview no.42, project manager, 17/2/03).
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sector as necessarily a negative experience. An alternative view was that 
crisis management could prove a source of comfort for some staff. Thus, one 
Chief Executive of a small housing association suggested that some staff 
actually welcome the challenges posed by these styles of management:
It is easy to fall into the trap of thinking that... life is wonderful just 
because there is chaos. There’s nothing nicer than crisis management. 
You don’t have to deal with the boring stuff because you are too busy 
rushing around in a crisis (Interview no.4, 14/8/96)
Staff could therefore adopt coping strategies in order to accept their current 
situation. Their coping mechanisms include an ability to ignore problems and 
an acceptance of the confusion and conflict inherent in their role. Despite a 
certain level of scepticism, ‘after a while you become very cynical in housing’ 
(Interview no.48, neighbourhood manager, 14/12/03), some front-line staff 
were able to view their experience as positive:
Initially I felt extremely vulnerable going to where people lived. Now I’ll 
stand up to anything. It is an excellent grounding for dealing with conflict. 
(Interview no.48, neighbourhood manager, 14/12/03)
In such ways, fatalism may be an appropriate strategy for managing within a 
chaotic environment with staff welcoming the diversity of experience that the 
role could offer:
I like a challenge. I need a lively kind of job. I actually enjoy going back 
to work after I have been away on leave. The job is very varied and no 
day is the same. I like meeting people and making contact, although 
sometimes it can be very fraught. I could not sit at a desk all day long. I 
do enjoy the job and cannot imagine doing anything else (Interview 
no.48, neighbourhood officer,  14/12/03).
The level of personal contact, although often expressed as a stressful 
experience was also seen as a source of fulfilment. Staff used these attitudes 
as a coping strategy in some very stressful situations; fatalism thus allowed 
them an opportunity to express their frustrations with their work and enabled 
them to find an outlet for their exasperation at the continued pressure of their
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within housing associations that would not be available to a local authority 
member of staff.
Our office...is very mellow. My manager is very laid back and does not 
interfere....! would not want to go back to the local authority as it is so 
constricted. My view is that if it does not work let’s change it; I don’t feel 
you have that choice in a local authority... We have a huge manual of 
policies and procedures. These may work in the central office but our 
approach is the best fit. You have to toe the party line, but we have 
considerable flexibility in what we do. Other people [in the central office] 
can’t believe how different it is here (Interview no.48, neighbourhood 
officer,  14/12/03).
Such comments illustrated that whilst housing associations were being forced 
to limit their discretion, there remained a perception that the sector retained 
an autonomy that was distinct from local authority practices. Staff were 
therefore still able to interpret policies and procedures in their own way and 
for their own local circumstances. The impression of constraint therefore 
paradoxically allowed staff in local offices to take a more relaxed attitude 
towards their work.
7.5  Conclusion
Housing associations before 1988 had been accustomed to a high degree of 
latitude in terms of management, development, rents and allocations. As they 
became incorporated into mainstream housing service delivery, they found 
themselves increasingly involved in a rigorous centrally imposed system of 
target-setting and inspection. Thus, by 2003 the sector had to accustom itself 
to an environment where decisions about who to house, the style of 
management, what kind of property to develop in which localities and rent 
levels to charge had all been largely taken out of their hands. Increasingly 
bound by performance criteria, dependent on local and central government 
agencies as well as other voluntary sector partners, their level of autonomy 
was significantly circumscribed. This new role marked a qualitatively 
distinctive period in their history. The perception that associations were no 
longer in control of their own destinies and had become subject to the
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to question the possibility of associations being able to shape their future. 
Housing associations were increasingly characterised by ever-greater 
dependency upon local authorities and central government. Although the 
relationship was meant to be one based upon partnership, more often than 
not it could be characterised as a principal-agent relationship with government 
agencies firmly in the driving seat.
Isolated from the condemnation attached to large bureaucratic organisations, 
housing associations had managed to avoid the coruscating criticisms 
attached to local authority housing management. However, since 1988 the 
pressures facing housing associations have been magnified. Although design 
features of housing association developments were far superior to those 
encountered in the era of mass, high-rise, system-built estates, the 
geographical concentration of multiple deprivation has imposed equally 
severe management challenges. There is little social diversity amongst new 
housing association residents as access to social rented housing is limited to 
those in the greatest need and the sense that organisations were losing 
autonomy, combined with the perception that they had become detached from 
their core objectives exacerbated trends towards fatalism. One of the main 
reasons for the persistence of a fatalist cultural ethos was a perception that 
housing managers faced a task that was becoming increasingly unsustainable 
as social housing was progressively identified as a receptacle for individuals 
experiencing critical problems at the same time as they lacked alternative 
choices. Residents of social housing developments could be seen as a latent 
interest group, reflecting the impact of social atomisation; there was 
considerable social homogeneity amongst residents but no collective identity.
Government policy and organisational pressures combined with some of the 
inherent features of the housing management task created a spiralling effect.
A path dependency was created in the 1980s and 1990s linked to tighter 
regulation, a changing client group and increasingly problematic management 
challenges. These pressures exacerbated tendencies towards futility,
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expectations took a hold.
Fatalism has functioned as a self-fulfilling prophecy, which has exerted a 
cumulative impact. Evidence from new housing association schemes points to 
indications that these fatalistic trends are increasingly likely to flourish. Figure 
7.2 illustrates how a fatalist cultural bias can manifest itself even within 
successful housing associations.
Figure 7.2: Organisational pressures towards fatalism
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A fatalist cultural bias is both the most neglected and arguably the most 
significant outcome of the 1988 Housing Act. The management of a residual, 
marginal tenure, including increasing numbers of vulnerable residents 
imposed severe management problems that have been largely ignored in 
much of the normative commentary on management change. Housing 
managers have adopted increasingly coercive strategies in order to cope with
272the demands of managing a client group with a low socio-economic profile 
and increasing levels of anti-social behaviour. At the same time, organisations 
are strongly encouraged to generate a sense of resident empowerment, 
partnership and capacity building. The tensions included within these 
divergent strategies have allowed fatalism to gain a much stronger footing 
than hitherto, noticeably in the attitudes of those working in front-line 
occupations as well as those who ostensibly benefit from the new initiatives.
For front-line housing association staff, strategies were both defensive and 
hierarchical, implying a lower level of tolerance of tenant behaviour and a 
relationship characterised by mutual distrust. Their task now consisted of 
managing decline at the same time as they were expected to accept a much 
broader range of duties and responsibilities. Staff were expected to work 
harder without additional remuneration and were increasingly subject to 
monitoring and surveillance. This process of residualisation had strongly 
affected the motivation and commitment of front-line staff, indicating that a 
traditional reliance on goodwill had been lost.
At the same time, fatalism can also be seen as offering a positive 
rationalisation ma|ing sense of the bewildering complexity of the current 
environment. Its ability to stimulate critical debate and to generate a sceptical 
attitude towards management change can help to challenge over-optimistic 
assumptions and to diminish unrealistic expectations. Its function as a ‘Greek 
chorus’ (Hood, 2000, p. 150) within public management, warning of potential 
dangers could be used to positive effect. In this sense fatalism may not be a 
wholly undesirable consequence of management change. It can be viewed as 
rational response to a bewildering range of management initiatives. The 
importance of fatalism is not merely to address a general set of complaints, 
but rather to indicate a strong sense that housing associations were entering 
a new era for which they were generally unprepared. The recognition of a 
fatalist cultural bias represents an important insight into the way in which 
organisational change had unforeseen consequences.
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CONCLUSION
8.1  Introduction
Described as ‘the biggest example of a shift of public service provision to the 
voluntary sector’ (Paxton and Pearce, 2005, p.ix) the reforms to the housing 
association sector initiated in the Housing Act 1988 have led to an acceptance 
that housing associations have become significant players in public policy and 
a tendency to see the sector as a template for welfare state modernisation. 
The ability to lever significant levels of private finance, their local roots, their 
responsiveness to change, their managerial innovation, their capacity to offer 
consumer choice and ability to serve government objectives have all served to 
present housing associations in a favourable light as an exemplar of 
organisational reform. Housing associations have come to be seen as one of 
the outstanding successes of the 1980s; research conducted by the Joseph 
Rowntree Foundation concluded that ‘few tenants or staff would wish to 
reverse’ the move from local authority to the housing association sector 
(Paxton and Pearce, 2005, p.ix).
This thesis has called into question these highly optimistic views of the sector, 
showing that existing knowledge about housing associations was at best 
rudimentary. The idealistic perspective of the sector was based on 
assumptions and generalisations unsupported by either empirical evidence, 
theoretical support or any systematic study of the behaviour of the variety of 
historical types that exist. The nature of organisations within the sector, its 
DNA’, has therefore remained unclear.
Existing literature on housing management and housing associations has 
failed to provide adequate analytical tools to explain the various changes 
affecting housing associations or to capture the front-line experience of those 
working within them. The failure of a fundamentally non-conceptual discussion
274to draw upon wider social science disciplines has served to limit 
understanding of the sector.
Whilst there has been increased attention to the sector since the 1990s, 
chapter two indicated that studies can be classified under four major themes, 
each of which has considerable limitations. Firstly, historical studies have 
largely ignored the possibility of applying classifications or organisational 
typologies and therefore have been unable to deal with complexity of 
organisational change. There has been no systematic attempt to categorise 
the variety of organisational forms and the tendency to rely on a thesis of 
discontinuous change has prevented an opportunity to identify patterns of 
behaviour.
Secondly, managerialist explanations have rested on an assumption that 
housing policy has led to a shift to low grid organisations which have primarily 
taken individualist directions. Studies conducted according to new public 
management (NPM) principles assume a linear process of progressive 
change. The difficulty is that whilst explanations reflect the objectives of the 
Housing Act 1988, they fail to explain the practical impact, including significant 
unintended consequences of housing policy. Managerialist explanations 
therefore represent both outdated and idealised models of the housing 
association sector.
Network models represent a third attempt to come to terms with the greater 
complexity of post-NPM fragmentation in the sector, but the emphasis on 
relationships between organisations fails to provide any kind of classification 
or organisational typologies. Moreover, it represents an unduly optimistic view 
of the sector; assuming that housing policy can be explained in terms of 
decreasing central control, whereas as the study shows, in many cases the 
opposite is the case.
Institutionalist path dependency models provide a final model of historical 
change, illustrating the extent of continuity (or sedimentation) that exists within 
specific organisational forms. However, the neglect of a cultural dimension
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Hence, they were unable to provide the qualitative material that can explain 
organisational culture from the inside. Moreover, the above accounts fail to 
provide models that can provide classifications of organisational difference.
In contrast to these limited accounts of the sector, the present thesis provides 
a more detailed account of organisational change by utilising cultural theory. 
The benefit of this approach is that it manages to explain the different and 
contradictory trajectories of change affecting the sector through a study of a 
variety of organisation types, providing typologies of organisational forms.
This thesis provides both historical and cultural foundations for an 
understanding of organisational change by looking at London housing 
associations as a whole and in providing categorisations of organisational 
behaviour. In doing so, it aims to put them on the map of housing policy in a 
more systematic way, rather than simply asserting the complexity, diversity 
and ‘discontinuity’ of the sector. The study has shown that despite widespread 
positive depictions of the reform programme, organisational change has 
affected housing associations differentially and with a number of unintended 
consequences.
In particular the categorisation of housing associations through the lens of 
cultural theory has enabled the organisational DNA of the sector to be 
identified through four main classifications, allowing the sedimentation of 
organisational values to be excavated across a period spanning more than 
twenty years.
8.2  The injection of individualism
The historical discussion in chapter three illustrated that the sector’s 
philanthropic roots was founded upon individualistic assumptions. The 
influence of committed and benevolent individuals had a strong effect upon 
shaping the values and core cultures of many important organisations, such 
as Peabody, Guinness and William Sutton Trust.
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ignoring criticism of their paternalism) allowed central government in the 
1980s to introduce a regime that drew upon these individualistic origins and 
allowed a ‘re-privatisation’ of the sector to emerge from the 1988 Act. A 
programme that combined principles of “fragmentation, incentivisation and 
competition’ reflected a classic new public management (NPM) approach; the 
primary objectives of the Act were to develop a more pluralistic approach to 
housing provision, to introduce a performance management system to 
improve service delivery and to enable housing associations to compete for 
development opportunities . Local authorities were to be marginalised by the 
adoption of a strategic, enabling role and housing associations were to be 
allowed to develop without regulatory constraints. This policy meant that rents 
were deregulated, the development process was to be simplified and 
associations were to be allowed access to private sector financial markets 
outside of the restrictions of the public sector borrowing requirement. This re­
privatisation marked a reversion to the individualistic and quasi-commercial 
origins of the Charitable Trusts.
A reform process initially intended to move organisations in both lower grid 
and lower group directions embodied archetypal features of an individualist 
approach to public management; introducing an unprecedented level of 
competition and significant levels of private finance whilst at the same time 
severely reducing levels of public subsidy. It also introduced performance 
incentives in order to motivate managers to act in more innovative and 
entrepreneurial ways, paying much greater attention to value for money and 
effectiveness of service provision. As municipal bureaucracies were reduced 
to a strategic, enabling role a much wider group of voluntary sector providers 
adopted responsibility for housing provision.
The success in attracting private finance, in managing risk and in 
demonstrating entrepreneurial and innovative characteristics was seen as 
justification of the decision of the Thatcher administrations to use housing 
associations as the major provider of new social housing, in opposition to a 
widely discredited local authority sector (despite a lack of empirical evidence
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management).
The immediate post 1988 environment could be presented as one of rampant 
individualism, where housing associations were eager to take advantage of 
development opportunities and where an ideologically sympathetic 
government allowed them the freedom to develop wherever they chose. The 
sector was encouraged to increase rents to market levels and housing 
associations were seen as firmly private sector institutions. They were viewed 
as an ideal alternative to local authorities who carried the blame for much of 
the problems of housing management.
However, the implementation of the legislation carried a number of 
unintended consequences, a ‘heroic’ managerialist clique emerged, which 
was able to gain considerable personal benefit from the high salaries on offer; 
the sector experienced unprecedented levels of conflict and cooperation was 
increasingly rare as associations lost motivation to see themselves as part of 
a collective ‘movement’. The response to change illustrated the way in which 
this individualistic culture adopted a life of its own. It unleashed powerful 
propensities towards the use of private finance, towards managing risk and a 
culture of entrepreneurialism; these individualist values would become 
permanent features of the housing association landscape.
Housing associations were victims of their own success in the immediate 
aftermath of the 1988 Act. Individualism reached its limits, resulting in a cash 
crisis for the Housing Corporation in the early 1990s, emanating from an 
eagerness amongst senior managers to take advantage of a subsidy regime 
that rewarded risk-taking. At the same time a number of high profile cases of 
fraud and investment failure added to concern about the unfettered 
competition of the post 1988 environment. The subsequent development 
boom was widely regarded as damaging to the long-term sustainability of the 
sector.
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central government intervention was needed as individualism reached its limit. 
Central government was forced to restrain both spending and borrowing by 
housing associations; the Housing Corporation initially failed to anticipate the 
extent of subsidy required to fund new developments, the levels of risk were 
underestimated by associations and  the introduction of private finance 
required substantial rent increases which reinforced problems of affordability 
and benefit dependency for residents. In some extreme cases housing 
associations experienced organisational collapse and in others issues of 
probity surfaced. This response to the reform programme was therefore 
indicative of classic individualist market failure and the experiment of 
delivering public sector objectives through unfettered private sector agencies 
was considerably restrained by the mid 1990s.
Despite these setbacks, a culture of individualism continued to be embraced 
by senior managers. It offered welcome opportunities to demonstrate 
entrepreneurial skills; managers were keen to present themselves as heroic 
figures, and they were given responsibility for shaping organisational vision, 
they were offered high salaries and given considerable opportunities for 
innovation. At the same time, the lesson for central government was that 
unrestrained individualism was not feasible as an organisational strategy. 
Institutions could not be considered as the main vehicles of government policy 
unless they were bound by substantial regulatory constraints.
8.3  The legacy of egalitarianism
Egalitarianism represents the second major cultural value associated with the 
housing association sector. In particular it can be seen to permeate three 
major waves of housing association development in the 1960s, 1970s and 
later in the 1990s.
First, the emergence of the ‘Shelter’ associations such as Notting Hill, Circle 
33 and Shepherds Bush reflected a dissatisfaction not only with conditions in 
the private rented sector (associated with ‘Rachmanism’ in the 1960s) but
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existing voluntary agencies and with the ‘coercive’ slum clearance and 
comprehensive redevelopment programmes carried out by local authorities. 
The ‘new wave’ of voluntary organisations has commonly been seen as the 
heart of the housing association sector, providing a starting-point in the career 
of many key individuals, committed to more community-based approaches to 
meeting housing need.
Despite the success of these rehabilitation programmes, increasing frustration 
was expressed at the exclusion of minority ethnic communities from the 
benefits of mainly white-dominated, ‘mainstream’ housing associations. This 
anger led to the emergence of a second wave of egalitarian organisations in 
the 1970s and early 1980s, which became categorised as part of a ‘black and 
minority ethnic sector* (BME). These included organisations such as Ujima, 
Presentation and ASRA. In addition other specialist organisations emerged 
(such as Habinteg or Look Ahead) catering for individuals with physical and 
mental health difficulties (particularly important given the problems associated 
with ‘community care’ policies in the 1980). The success of these 
organisations was assisted by financial support from the Housing Corporation.
However, as discussed above egalitarianism came under severe pressure 
from the competitive culture following the 1988 Act. The market pressures of 
the following years resulted in a number of associations with strong egalitarian 
foundations embracing a ‘brave new world’ of risk, competition and private 
finance which saw widespread concerns about a subsequent loss of local 
identity. This conflict between the supporters of egalitarian principles and the 
more individualistic ‘change-makers’ represented the heart of many intra- 
organisational disputes in the 1990s.
An egalitarian ethos comprised the founding vision for many housing 
associations in London, in particular amongst those associations who have 
subsequently dominated funding through the Housing Corporation Approved 
Development Programme. These egalitarian values have developed over time 
through a process of sedimentation, whereby attitudes and norms have
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black and minority ethnic (BME) sector as well as at committee level within 
other mainstream associations. Organisational history continued to guide 
policy and practice and the sector was strongly influenced by these historical 
traditions and organisational biographies.
The data showed that the influence of a black and minority ethnic housing 
movement continued to provide the strongest egalitarian conscience for the 
sector. Housing association management committees were the major 
conduits for this egalitarian bias, compelling organisations to remain within 
geographical locations whilst senior managers attempted to push these 
boundaries. The consequence was an increased level of intra-organisational 
conflict.
Nevertheless, the problems of individualism identified above, allowed a re- 
emergence of an egalitarian ethos in the late 1990s, manifested in a desire to 
return to historical guiding visions and principles. This incentive to move 
towards egalitarianism emerged with the election of a Blair administration 
committed to tackling social exclusion and providing a ‘joined-up approach to 
joined-up problems’. This agenda presented considerable opportunities to 
reinvigorate a sector, with an emphasis upon resident activism and tenant 
empowerment. An agenda of regeneration and neighbourhood renewal 
reflected community-based approaches which placed housing associations at 
the centre of public policy. As shown in chapter six, many contemporary 
organisations, based in London attempted to take forward this agenda and 
extend their role as agents of social change.
At the same time, the other side of egalitarianism was a high level of 
sectarianism within and between organisations, a sense that associations 
were creating false expectations, for example in relation to resident 
empowerment and at an extreme, a propensity towards self-destruction. 
Egalitarian organisations were seen as unsustainable in an environment of 
growth and in extreme cases, resorted to tearing themselves apart, ultimately
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by other large associations.
Egalitarianism can therefore be viewed as the culture that was most 
susceptible to organisational failure. Housing Corporation performance 
assessments commonly referred to problems of factionalism and sectarian 
cultures. A number of black and minority ethnic organisations found that 
subsidy was withheld and that the Housing Corporation was moved to 
intervene in the running of their operations due to failures that emphasised the 
difficulty of sustaining an egalitarian culture. The only conclusion that could be 
drawn was that egalitarian forms of organisation were not feasible within an 
environment that relied upon growth and adherence to government policy 
goals. Egalitarianism in many respects represents the lost culture of the 
housing association sector. It is the culture that is most strongly valued by 
many staff and Board members, yet it is also the ethos that has suffered the 
most attrition since the Act due to its difficulty in coping with change and with 
attendant organisational conflicts.
8.4  Hierarchy on unstable foundations
In research terms, hierarchy has been a neglected feature of a sector that 
prided itself upon hostility to bureaucracy and external control. However, the 
discussion in chapter two illustrated how a trend towards hierarchicalism had 
been evident since the 1974 Housing Act, which introduced central 
government control (through the Housing Corporation) over the sector. This 
body began with a funding role and became increasingly concerned with the 
monitoring of organisational performance; presenting a challenge to 
organisations which historically viewed themselves as largely autonomous 
and independent.
Paradoxically, these hierarchical features were magnified by the 1988 
Housing Act, which while modelled on individualistic principles in effect led to 
a much more prescriptive environment for the sector. Chapter six illustrated
282that hierachalism was manifested in a number of ways. First, through financial 
control as the Corporation attempted to rein back the demands on the public 
purse and to rectify social concerns about affordability as associations chose 
to balance financial shortfalls through rent increases.
Secondly, hierarchy was evident through a tendency to growth and 
organisational mergers, which became apparent in the landscape of housing 
associations. These factors were strong drivers towards increasing 
organisational size, gaining higher status and influence in policy decisions. In 
addition, the new forms of housing associations, emanating from stock 
transfers, introduced new organisational forms, with previously council-owned 
estates taken into housing association (or registered social landlord) 
ownership. These organisations were larger than previous community-based 
associations, needing new estate management skills and requiring more 
hierarchical systems and procedures than in the past
Third, Housing Corporation regulation and monitoring became increasingly 
stringent culminating in 2000 when housing associations were placed under 
the same ‘Best Value’ performance management system as local authorities. 
This initiative placed them squarely within a central regulatory system and the 
later role of the Audit Commission in monitoring performance further served to 
institutionalise housing associations as public sector bodies.
The outcome of these changes was a growing elitism within the sector, 
indicated by the increasing importance of the ‘G15’ associations in the London 
area, dominating development funding and the allocation of resources. At the 
same time the implications for housing managers were that organisations 
faced a loss of discretion in their day-to-day activities and task, specialisation 
rather than the traditional generic approach to housing management.
The institutional design of housing associations was modelled on avoiding the 
limitations of public sector bureaucracies and (as seen) it was for this reason 
that they were selected as the primary vehicle for government policy.
However, over a relatively short period of time housing associations were
283subjected to exponential growth, as well as being offered generous levels of 
(public and private) funding. Thus, organisations designed as small-scale, 
locally based institutions have found themselves within a period of less than 
twenty years, thrust into a world of big business and high risk operations, 
covering a large number of localities.
Hierarchy was therefore one of the main unintended consequences of the 
1988 Act. It emanated partly from the excesses of individualism mentioned 
above, with central government keen to restrain the actions of senior 
managers and to gain more control over housing policy outcomes. 
Government policy under both Conservative and Labour administrations had 
been concerned to gain increased leverage over the performance, 
development process, rent levels and the audit and inspection of the sector. 
The way in which the sector has responded to the opportunities and threats 
offered has been entirely rational. It has focused on the benefits of economies 
of scale with considerable organisational restructuring and merger 
arrangements. The result has been a concentration of influence amongst a 
small number of elite organisations. A further unintended consequence of the 
Housing Act 1988 has been a drive towards codification, standardisation and 
uniformity. These tendencies were exacerbated by Housing Corporation 
moves towards ‘partnering’ arrangements which implied that certain 
organisations had a favoured status in terms of development funding and 
relationships with local authorities. Inevitably the preferred organisations were 
the large associations with substantial development and management 
experience. These hierarchical features exerted a spiralling effect whereby 
the larger organisations became more complex, more specialised and bound 
by increasingly rigid procedures.
Moreover, hierarchalism not only operated at an organisational level; it had a 
significant impact on management practice with fundamental changes to 
housing management, where traditional generic functions have been replaced 
by more specialist roles for front-line staff. These hierarchical pressures
284further served to reinforce each other, resulting in a concentration of power 
and influence amongst a small number of associations and less discretion and 
autonomy for staff working in these organisations.
The growth of hierarchy has created particular difficulties for housing 
associations. The traditional vehicles of housing policy, local authorities, were 
designed to function as welfare bureaucracies; departmentalism, 
standardisation and uniformity were widely accepted as standard procedure.
In contrast, housing associations traditionally functioned on a much more 
informal basis; this informality was their central strength and attraction for both 
staff and residents. As they replaced local authorities as new welfare 
bureaucracies, yet lacked inbuilt accountability mechanisms of the elected 
process, their role became much more problematic. Whilst their legitimacy 
has been called into question, commentary to date has neglected to mention 
this increased bureaucracy as an inherent difficulty. In conclusion their 
hierarchical structures rest on unstable foundations.
8.5  A fatalist sector?
Housing management has long suffered from a low status; historically it was 
seen as ‘women’s work’, it has been widely regarded as a common-sense 
occupation requiring limited expertise and increasingly it has functioned as a 
service for the poor. It has therefore struggled to be taken seriously either as 
a professional occupation or as a suitable subject for detailed academic study. 
Despite efforts on the part of professional bodies to change its prominence, 
housing associations have not managed to fundamentally raise the status of 
housing management work. There is therefore an inherent propensity towards 
fatalism within housing management practice.
Chapter seven illustrated how, in spite of the widespread optimistic view of the 
success of housing associations, the 1988 Act has helped to foster a fatalist 
culture with deep roots amongst front-line staff and residents, creating a set of 
relationships largely ignored to date.
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staff emanates from a number of sources. First, changes to the client group 
throughout the 1980s have been linked to a process of Tesidualisation’, 
whereby access to social housing became limited to groups experiencing 
widespread deprivation. As housing associations became the sole providers 
of new social housing after 1988 they inherited allocation policies that 
restricted offers of accommodation to ‘priority’ need groups as defined by the 
1977 Housing (Homeless Persons) Act. Social housing therefore came to 
occupy a residual position as an ‘ambulance service for the poor’ (Harloe, 
1978).
Second, central government regulation (discussed above) combined with 
nomination agreements with local government agencies meant that housing 
associations experienced decreasing levels of autonomy in terms of who they 
were able to accommodate. This loss of discretion meant that their 
management control was significantly circumscribed, in spite of the rhetoric of 
a more entrepreneurial and innovative sector, offered under the post-88 
‘regime’.
A third contributory factor was that the management task became increasingly 
associated with controlling anti-social behaviour. High child densities on new 
housing estates, complex multi-landlord consortium arrangements and a lack 
of accountability meant that the sector faced new challenges, for which they 
had little experience (for example in estate management as opposed to 
managing street properties).
The cumulative impact of these drivers of change was a high expression of 
futility in the ability of front-line staff to control their working environment as 
they perceived they had no discretion in who to accept whilst new applicants 
presented an unprecedented challenge. Second, there was evidence of a 
worsening relationship between staff and residents as the task became a 
function of social control rather than social welfare. Finally, the resident 
experience worsened as housing associations struggled with the demands of 
managing multi-landlord estates and the consequences of managing
286ambitious development programmes. These features offered a stark contrast 
to the highly optimistic views of the sector offered by a majority of practitioner 
commentators.
The significance of fatalism within housing associations was that (as with 
hierarchy) it exerted a reinforcing effect. Thus as housing staff perceived their 
work to be low status and repetitive this increased the dissatisfaction with their 
jobs and led to higher levels of staff turnover. It also exerted a detrimental 
impact upon service provision. Furthermore, as relationships between staff 
and residents deteriorated, mutual suspicion was reinforced and performance 
worsened; central government was therefore compelled to provide stricter 
regulation which further affected staff morale.
The identification of a strong fatalist culture within housing associations 
reflects what other writers (in a broader context) have argued about New 
Labour welfare policy. Thus, Stoker’s (2004) discussion of New Labour’s 
modernisation programme illustrates a reform programme that is deliberately 
founded upon fatalist principles, ‘to create a dynamic for change by creating 
instability but also space for innovation’ (p.69). Policy is therefore incoherent 
‘with reason and for a purpose’ (ibid.) Hence, whilst there are rewards 
available to those who win competitive bids, the ground rules are unclear and 
deliberately vague, creating the illusion that all will benefit and encouraging 
others to bid for funding. Such views use Hood’s (2000) notion of ‘contrived 
randomness’ to depict government policy, based on the principle of a lottery. 
Thus, policy is based on the deliberate cultivation of low-trust relationships 
with a low likelihood of cooperation and deliberate uncertainty (Stoker, 2002,
P 421).
Housing associations operate in a complex, changing and competing set of 
networks where there is considerable uncertainty and confusion and 
examples of housing association consortium schemes provide evidence of 
increasing social tension and management confusion. An environment 
characterised by deliberate unpredictability with cross-cutting tensions of 
audit, inspection and review allows fatalism to flourish. These difficulties are
287especially relevant to housing associations which are significantly affected by 
their ambiguous situation within both public and private sectors.
The attention devoted by central Government to strategies since 1997 to 
combat ‘social exclusion’ (SEU, 1998) implies that fatalism is acknowledged 
as a core social problem. The experience of residents within social housing, at 
a period when there is considerable debate about the residualisation of the 
social rented sector, provides grounds for breeding low group identities 
through social atomisation and high grid environments where their social 
interaction is highly regulated; a classic fatalist cultural bias.
Nevertheless, whilst, fatalism may be represented as mainly negative and 
obstructive, it may also exert a positive impact as a force, allowing the release 
of latent frustrations. Fatalism could allow staff to express their dissatisfaction 
and tackle the challenges of the contemporary housing management task. 
Thus, the function of a fatalist ethos as a ‘Greek chorus’, warning against 
unrealistic expectation and countering over-optimistic prognoses can be a 
rational and positive response to a hostile environment. Fatalism is a 
neglected but important feature of housing management and it can point to 
two alternative futures for practice. On the one hand it may act as a Greek 
chorus, offering a judicious response to a bewildering level of management 
change and helping to counter some overstated claims made about the 
benefits of management reform. On the other hand it may be a more negative 
force, engendering increased levels of hostility and suspicion; if unnoticed 
fatalism will get progressively worse, in a spiral of organisational decline.
8.6  The broader context
This study has illustrated that the application of cultural theory to the housing 
association sector offers a level of understanding that other theories have 
failed to contribute, in particular the recognition of a fatalist dimension to 
social life. It therefore validates Hood’s (2000) suggestion that third sector 
organisations provide potentially rich soil (p. 151) for the development of 
fatalist attitudes as they comprise a strong element of uncertainty, complexity
288and confusion. Within a broader context, this thesis joins other writers (such 
as Hood and Stoker) who have begun to draw upon cultural theory to illustrate 
aspects of contemporary local governance. Figure 8.1  illustrates the 
tendencies since 1988 to move towards ‘higher grid’ organisational forms.
Figure 8.1: The move to a high-grid sector
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The early cultural theorists predicted a ‘microchange’ towards fatalism (see 
Thompson et. a/., 1990). They envisaged in the early 1990s that ‘the push 
towards privatisation, we predict will have not only the intended effect of 
strengthening individualism but also the unintended consequence of 
increasing fatalism’ (p.79). Whilst such predictions have been fulfilled in part, 
they have neglected the extent to which public management reforms have 
also resulted in increased levels of hierarchy; that is the opposite intention of 
the housing reform programme.
The widely accepted notion that housing associations have experienced 
outstanding success neglects the practical experience of working within the
289sector. The data provided in the present study illustrated that whilst the 
response to change has been highly differentiated, there are clear indications 
the housing associations have adopted high-grid organisational forms, which 
pose novel challenges for the sector. These challenges need to be 
acknowledged if housing associations are to assume an effective leading role 
in welfare state modernisation, as they replace locally elected municipal 
bodies. Whatever the future of the sector holds, the present study shows in 
general terms that ‘euphoric’ views of housing associations are largely 
mistaken. Thus, network theorists emphasise the positive collective 
partnership arrangements, stressing how egalitarianism is returning, whilst 
underplaying the hierarchical remnants in policy. Managerialist writers use 
NPM prescriptions but overestimate the extent of individualism and underplay 
both hierarchy and fatalism.  Housing associations as agents of public policy 
have four main options as illustrated in figure 8.2.
Figure 8.2: The different options for the social rented sector:
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290organisational failure. However, cultural theorists argue that no one specific 
cultural bias is likely to endure in the long term; a finding which is also borne 
out by the research findings. The study indicated that individualism reached 
its apotheosis in the mid 1990s and had to be restrained by government 
intervention. Egalitarianism was largely unsustainable in an expanding sector 
which was progressively drawn into acting as a replacement for public sector 
institutions. The spiralling effects of hierarchy and fatalism raise particular 
challenges, yet they also indicate that these higher-grid cultural biases are 
approaching their own limits. The main implication for policy is that the 
spiralling effects of hierarchy and fatalism are reaching a point of 
disequilibrium and require rebalancing; in particular housing associations will 
need further injections of egalitarianism if they are to avoid organisational 
failure.
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317Appendix I
METHODOLOGY
The empirical material upon which this thesis is based is drawn from a 
number of sources. First, a series of interviews was conducted over a period 
of seven years. Second, resident surveys were drawn upon. Third, 
organisational documents were reviewed, including Annual Reports, publicity 
material and organisational histories. Fourth, an extensive search of literature 
relevant to the subject was carried out, including government documents, 
policy guidance and data from representative bodies. Fifth, statistical sources 
were used, including government publications and sources from the National 
and Housing Federation (also incorporating the London Housing Federation). 
The London Housing Unit and the Association of London Government also 
collect material across the London area.
Interviews
Personal interviews constituted the main part of the research, providing 
background to decision-making and exploring the attitudes and perceptions of 
a variety of actors (at different organisational levels). A total of 48 formal 
interviews were conducted. The objective of the interviews was to gain an 
understanding of subjective experiences and the meanings attached to those 
experiences (Devine, 1995). The aim was to gain an understanding of the 
motives and interpretations of organisational actors and to attempt to embrace 
heterogeneity of experiences and accounts by seeking a diversity of views. 
The intention of the interview was to gain personalised accounts of attitudes 
to organisational change. Individuals were encouraged to offer their own 
interpretations of organisational transformation and to criticise where 
appropriate the management style of housing associations. Positive 
interpretations were also encouraged where appropriate. Due to the 
controversial nature of some of the questions and responses anonymity was 
granted to respondents in order to allow frankness.
318Interview material was sought largely to establish the pressures, constraints, 
tensions and influences upon key organisational actors in the housing 
association sector between 1996 and 2003. I was particularly concerned to 
gain a broad selection of views about housing management change. 
Consequently, I endeavoured to select a cross-section of different interested 
parties. I was particularly keen not simply to gain a corporate view of 
organisational practice.
Interviewees were selected at senior level initially (Chief Executives and 
Directors) to gain a corporate level view of change. Subsequently, middle 
managers and front-line housing management staff (normally referred to as 
‘housing officers’) were interviewed to gain a wider perspective on the change 
process. Management committee members were also approached and 
interviewed. Other stakeholders included the Chief Executive of the National 
Housing Federation, the Chief Executive of the Federation of Black and 
Minority Housing Organisations and representatives of the Housing pressure 
group, Shelter. Local authority staff were also interviewed to gain perspectives 
from the statutory sector, which retains a responsibility for allocating funds 
and monitoring the performance of partner housing associations. In addition, 
resident groups were contacted to provide some perspective on service 
delivery. Other interviewees included neighbourhood officers, a resident 
caretaker, tenants, owner-occupiers and leaseholders. A ‘snowball sampling’ 
technique was used, whereby interviewees recommended other potential 
interviewees.
Interviews were conducted on a semi-structured basis. Similar questions were 
put to each interviewee, but opportunities to probe the responses differed in 
each interview. Letters were sent to the main organisations operating in the 
London area and representatives of all the main organisations agreed to be 
interviewed. The interviews normally lasted about forty minutes each. These 
interviews were recorded and transcribed. The main feature of questioning 
entailed:
319•  An explanation of how their organisation (and the sector as a whole) 
had responded to the post 1988 changes
•  Discussion of the strengths, weakness, opportunities and threats to 
their organisations (or the sector)
•  Explanation of how service delivery had evolved during the period 
between 1988 and 2003
•  An explanation of how relationships between housing associations and 
other agencies had changed following the 1988 Act
•  Discussion of wider policy issues resulting from the changing function 
of the voluntary housing sector
London was selected as the most significant area for housing association 
activity (the majority of organisations are located here) being where 
historically the highest level of housing association activity had been 
conducted. It has the greatest concentration of housing association 
accommodation in the country and provides an arena where some of the most 
significant organisational debates are acted out.
The 1988 Housing Act was selected as the key incentive of legislative 
change, although the study necessarily looks at change from a wider 
perspective in order to provide context and background to the contemporary 
development of the sector. The intention of the interviews was to locate 
actors’ interpretations of housing change within a wider institutional setting; to 
gain an understanding of their role within the voluntary housing sector. In this 
regard it was decided to interview not only staff working for housing 
associations but also to question local authority staff and other interested 
parties to gain a broader perspective upon how housing associations connect 
with a wider policy environment.
Focus group discussions
In addition to the interviews, a series of four focus group discussions was 
conducted with representatives from local authority staff, housing association
320front-line managers and advice workers. These focus group discussions were 
intended to evaluate the changes from the perspective of front-line staff; 
enabling other information to be collected through collective debates. The 
formats of these latter meetings were more fluid than the semi-structured 
interviews. The focus groups were intended to identify group issues within a 
collective environment and to encourage a more open discussion of changes 
within the sector. The intention of these discussions was to gain a more 
dynamic view of the way that individuals perceived the sector, allowing 
contributors to respond to different interpretations of management change and 
to follow different lines of thought from a one-to-one interview technique.
Surveys
The research also drew upon two main surveys. One was conducted at a 
residents’ conference (at a Tenant Participation Advisory Service) conference 
held in Coventry in March 2001. 56 responses were collected from this 
exercise. Although based on national tenant profile, a number of responses 
about London-based associations were identified from the comments.
Tenants were asked to respond to a list of questions, but also to provide 
further information about their landlords.
A second survey was used, which drew on material collected from a study of 
residents on a housing association estate in the London Borough of Ealing. 
This was conducted by a market research company, in a neighbourhood 
profiling exercise carried out in 2002. A third of the residents (185 in total) 
completed the survey. The estate was part of a large consortium scheme 
constructed in the early 1990s as one of the first large-scale housing 
association developments. The findings were revealing in that they illustrated 
many of the serious challenges facing housing association schemes which 
were coming to light ten years after the developments were first constructed.
In particular they pointed to the difficulties of coordination of the activities of a 
variety of different landlords and where the local authority input was minimal.
321Annual Reports and Organisational Histories
A study of reports and organisational publications was undertaken to 
ascertain changes in the way that associations presented themselves to their 
stakeholders and a wider public. This involved a search of libraries and 
contacting various organisations to collect their publications. In some cases 
they had produced organisational histories, which gave a valuable insight into 
the way they presented their changes. The Harry Simpson memorial library 
(based at the University of Westminster) was a valuable source of housing 
information. I was also concerned to examine monitoring reports on specific 
organisations, now available from the Housing Corporation and the Audit 
Commission. In some cases, minutes were available from local authority 
committee meetings where housing association issues were debated.
Statistical Sources
Since 1989, statistics on the housing association sector have become widely 
available through the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, the National 
Housing Federation (through their CORE monitoring system), the Housing 
Corporation and annual Housing Finance Reviews edited by Steve Wilcox. 
These sources were used to provide a wider picture of how the sector has 
changed since 1988. However, material before 1988 is far more difficult to 
evaluate as there was no central database of information about the sector. 
The information that is available was collected on a more ad hoc basis and 
relied on individual organisations.
Literature Search
The academic literature included material from various specialisms 
(management theory, public administration and housing studies). Conference 
papers and journal articles were also used alongside government publications 
and guidance from relevant agencies (such as the Housing Corporation, the 
National Housing Federation and the London Mayor).
322Whilst the managerial reforms to the housing association sector and extensive 
regulation have ensured that extensive statistical information is collected, this 
information was generally not available in the pre-1988 period. Consequently 
a study of organisational change from a historical period proved a difficult 
task. Records are incomplete and the information that is available tends to be 
based on publicity material that is intended to show organisations in a 
favourable light.
In the early 1980s there were almost no publications that dealt with the 
housing association sector. Apart from publicity material from the National 
Federation of Housing Associations (as it was then called), there were no 
studies that looked critically at the sector or provided consistent and accurate 
statistical data. Consequently, it has proved difficult to provide contrasts with 
the pre 1988 and post 1988 period. Since the 1990s there has been a 
considerable increase in the collection of data and the beginnings of some 
academic studies. The Housing Corporation and the National Federation have 
also been more rigorous in their production of statistics as the sector has 
assumed greater prominence in policy terms. The previous regime illustrated 
the relaxed nature of the sector and the tendency to view it as a somewhat 
benign and amateurish collection of organisations.
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List of interviews:
Interview
number
Position Organisation Date
1. Area Director Kensington Housing Trust 11/1/96
2. Project Manager LB Croydon 23/1/96
3. Chief Executive Notting Hill Housing Trust 12/8/96
4. Chief Executive Octavia Hill Housing Trust 14/8/96
5. Director Circle 33 Housing Trust 24/9/96
6. Director Paddington Churches HA 11/2/97
7. Chief Executive 1066 Housing Association 25/2/97
8. Director Network Housing Association 26/2/97
9. Research Manager London and Quadrant HT 5/3/97
10. Chief Executive Swale Housing Association 13/3/97
11. Chief Executive Newlon Housing Trust 21/3/97
12. Chief Executive National Housing Federation 8/4/97
13. Area Director Notting Hill Housing Trust 11/4/97
14. Director Peabody Trust 10/9/97
15. Project Manager Hyde Housing Association 6/10/97
16. Director Moat Housing Society 8/10/97
17. Policy Officer Shelter 16/12/97
18. Policy Officer Shelter 16/12/9  7
19. Personnel Manager Notting Hill Housing Trust 8/1/98
20. Committee member, councillor Notting Hill Housing Trust,
LB Hammersmith and Fulham
11/11/98
21. Vice chair of housing LB Lambeth 20/11/98
22. Committee member New Islington 
and Hackney HA
27/11/98
23. Group Chair Notting Hill Housing Trust 25/1/99
24. Chief Executive Federation of Black Housing 
Organisations
18/2/99
25. Customer Services Manager Old Ford HA 4/5/99
26. Customer Services Manager Circle 33 HA 12/5/99
27. Housing Officer Southern Trust 5/10/99
28. Service Delivery Officer English Churches Housing 
Association
5/10/99
29. Housing Officer Notting Hill Housing Trust 8/12/00
30. Tenant Peabody Trust 14/12/00
31. Housing Services Manager Notting Hill Housing Trust 15/8/02
32. Community Development 
Officer
Notting Hill Housing Trust 15/8/02
33. Development Manager Acton Housing Association 2/12/02
32434. Assistant Regional Manager Ealing Family Housing 
Association
6/1/03
35. Estate Services Officer Ealing Family Housing 
Association
6/1/03
36. Community Development 
Officer
Acton Housing Association 8/1/03
37. Assistant Director of Housing Acton Housing Association 10/1/03
38. Resident Leaseholder Windmill Park Estate 14/1/03
39. Tenant Inquilab Housing Association 21/1/03
40. Resident Leaseholder Osterley Gardens Estate 21/1/03
41. Senior Neighbourhood Officer Notting Hill Housing Trust 28/1/03
42. Neighbourhood Renewal 
Project Manager
London Borough of Ealing 17/2/03
43. Resident Caretaker Windmill Park Estate 17/2/03
44. Committee Member Acton Housing Association 19/2/03
45. Housing Officer Look Ahead Housing 
Association
24/2/03
46. Project Manager London Borough of Barnet 4/3/03
47. Resident Choices for Grahame Park 14/10/03
48. Neighbourhood Manager Genesis Housing Group 14/12/03
Focus Groups
Number Position Organisation Date
1. Housing Officers and 
Customer Services Managers
LB Newham,
Crawley BC,
LB Redbrige,
LB Islington,
LB Hammersmith and Fulham, 
Bridge Housing Association, 
Central and Cecil Housing Trust, 
LB Camden,
South Norfolk DC,
Circle 33 HA.
27/5/99
2. Housing Managers Penrose Housing Association 2/6/99
3. Housing Officers, Homelessness 
Officer, Development Officer, 
Tenant Involvement Worker
English Churches Housing Group, 
Aragon HA, LB Hackney, LB Brent, 
Testway Housing Ltd., LB Lambeth
24/4/02
4. Housing Managers, Housing 
Advice Worker
Wyke Estate Tenant Management 
Organisation, Octavia Hill Housing 
and Care, Frontline Housing Advice 
Ltd.
18/4/02
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